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This thesis investigates Break Down by Michael Landy (2001), in which the artist’s 
7227 belongings were systematically catalogued, dismantled and granulated. Break 
Down, it is argued, opens up alternative modes of engaging with materiality and 
mediality; this thesis explores an array of related concerns arising from the work. 
Landy’s process of fragmentation elicits an inquiry into concepts of part and whole, 
single and multiple. The granulated material produced during Break Down 
provokes an account, via Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of affect, of the fragment 
as narrative matter. Further, Break Down is considered in terms of its operations 
between the textual and the material. With reference to Friedrich Kittler’s account 
of media as distributed and multilateral entities, this text explores the conventions 
pertaining to two textual forms deployed by Landy in relation to Break Down; the 
instruction manual and the inventory. Finally, Landy’s father’s sheepskin coat, the 
final object to be shredded during Break Down, is the fulcrum for an appraisal of 
the thing as an extension of personhood, and of human subjectivity as in some 
sense ‘thingly’. 
In this text, Break Down is constructed as an assemblage that operates at the 
intersection of a complex, mobile massing of currents and specificities; a framing 
that informs both the structure and the methodology of this thesis. Written, 
photographic and audio-visual source material is deployed here alongside close 
analysis of two important texts published by Landy in 2001 as accompaniments to 
Break Down itself: Michael Landy / Break Down, and Break Down Inventory. In 
addition, drawing upon Jane Rendell’s strategy of ‘site writing,’ passages of close 
observational writing are used intermittently throughout this text to relay what 
might in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms be called the becoming of the texts and subjects 
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Figure 1: Scene from Break Down showing conveyor belts, hopper and tonne bags filled with 
shredded matter, and Michael Landy's Saab, partially dismantled (Landy, 2008a, p.152). 
 
 







Michael Landy’s Break Down involved the systematic and comprehensive 
dismantling and granulation of the artist’s personal belongings. Break Down took 
place between the 10th and the 24th of February 20011 on a temporarily empty shop 
floor at 499 Oxford Street. This was the site of C&A,2 a recently defunct department 
store, some material vestiges of which – plate glass windows, escalators, mirrored 
walls and pillars and ‘pay here’ signage - remained in place during Break Down. In 
this space, Landy installed an imposing industrial conveyor belt: a hundred metres 
of cerulean blue frame3 with metal rollers that occupied most of the shop floor. 
The conveyor belt displayed Landy’s belongings, in various states of 
dismantlement, deposited in shallow yellow plastic trays. Additionally, it 
contained the action, clearly differentiating the space occupied by Landy and the 
eleven assistants – or, to give them their formal title, ‘operatives’ (Landy, 2001a; 
2008a, p.106) - who worked within the loop, from that of the viewing public. An 
object in one of the yellow trays would ride the circuit of the conveyor belt. This 
encircled four ‘work bays’ where different elements of the work of dismantling and 
shredding took place before ascending to the ‘sorting platform’, a raised section 
where items were separated into a row of shredders according to their material 
composition (Ibid., p.33).  
Most existing accounts of Break Down focus on Landy’s material practices in 
relation to his stuff; much less frequently discussed is the markedly textual nature 
of the work. Two publications by Landy form companions to Break Down. These 
                                                     
1 Although the work also involved two or three years of preparatory work. I take this from 1999, 
the date of Michael Landy at Home, a show at Landy’s studio in which he developed the first 
ideas of Break Down. The work of inventorying his belongings is said in some sources to have 
taken a full year (Landy 2001a; 2008a), and elsewhere, it is seen that this was only completed 
several months after the show took place (The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002). 
2 Nigel Cope (2000), in a newspaper article about the closure of C&A in the United Kingdom, 
explains that it ‘was founded as a trading company in 1841 […] by two Dutch brothers, Clemens 
and August Brenninkmeyer’, who used their first initials to name the company, and opened the 
first United Kingdom branch of C&A in 1922. 499 Oxford Street – previously Hereford House, 
which was first another department store, and then an exhibition space – was purchased and 
redeveloped by C&A in 1938 (Sheppard, 1980), where it seems to have continued until the 
closure of the company in this country in 2001. 
3 Colin Davies and Monika Parrinder (2003) specify that there were 160 metres of conveyor belt; 





are Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a), and Break Down Inventory (Landy, 
2001b). Break Down Inventory is soberly presented, soft-bound in a matte, grey, 
cover. It comprises an exhaustive list of every item shredded by Landy. The entries, 
which include kitchenware, clothing, reading matter, art, cat toys, and Landy’s car, 
appear in one run-on list. A frontispiece announces that 7227 items were destroyed 
during Break Down, weighing 5.25 tonnes; figures that vividly demonstrate the 
scale of Landy’s project.  
The second of these companion texts is Michael Landy / Break Down, ‘a folder of 
documents, a merge of words, collages, sketches and photographs’ (Hawkins, 2010, 
p.20). It is presented in the form of a plastic ring-binder, like an office folder of 
administrative protocols, organised into categories with yellow dividers. The tone 
of the contents hops between sections like the needle on a record player: the reader 
encounters a professionally printed and edited interview; a series of colour prints 
of collages in which the glue stick seems to be just out of shot; a hand written case 
study in which Landy experimentally dismantles a radio-cassette player (it takes 
ten days: see Landy, 2001a, p.108); a selection of media articles and samples of other 
material on the topic of consumerism; a series of Landy’s drawings of his 
belongings which, in the wobble of their lines seem wilfully to bring Landy – his 
body, his hand, his relationship to the things he draws – into focus. In a 
photographic record of the artist’s preparatory work, we see photographs of Landy 
examining a wire cage full of shredded plastic; tipping something out of a 
cardboard box into a bright blue hopper; standing impassively beneath a sign that 
reads, ‘Recycling & Waste Management EXHIBITION’ (Ibid., pp.76-106). 
This thesis proposes that Break Down opens up alternative modes of engaging with 
materiality and mediality. The geographer Michael Crang (2012) arrives at my point 
of departure in his passing remark that the art work reveals: 
a sense of dissipation and decay as temporality in the unravelling and unbecoming 
of things. In that unravelling the materiality becomes more evident as the form is 
lost’ (Ibid., p.766-7).  
Just so. Break Down, I propose, does not destroy so much as transform, changing 
the form of Landy’s belongings and revealing as it does the mediality of matter. 
This analysis is structured through a deployment of Deleuzo-Guattarian 
assemblage theory in which the assemblage is defined as a coming-together of 





in themselves be multiple, and will interconnect in multiple ways. In these terms, 
this thesis will show, Landy’s intervention exposes the play between singular and 
multiple, whole and partial, stable and mutable. In addition, I draw upon new 
media theory and in particular the work of the media theorist Friedrich Kittler, 
whose transformation of the term mediality has been defined as a ‘generalisation’ 
that can ‘apply […] to all domains of cultural exchange’ (Wellbery, 1990, p.xiii). This 
thesis is therefore concerned with both the mediality of matter, and the material 
form and technicity of media. Matter, I argue, here figured in the fragments 
produced by Landy, can be seen through Break Down, to hold the signs of its own 
composition and of events that have contributed to its formation over time. 
Meanwhile, the texts produced by Landy provide a prism through which to view 
the ways in which media technologies require a particular substrate on which to 
emerge in the first place, but also in themselves constitute an assemblage that 
shapes the media objects that are produced. 
This introductory chapter situates this thesis and establishes an account of the 
advances made here in relation to the existing literature. As such, it fuses the 
functions of an introduction (which provides a conceptual scaffold for the 
discussions to come) and a literature review (which situates these discussions in 
relation to the existing academic publications). I begin by reviewing and reflecting 
upon my own encounters with Break Down, and provide some initial discussion of 
methodological concerns that have shaped this text. I investigate how concepts of 
materiality and culture have been mobilised in existing commentary on Break 
Down, tending to permeate and foreclose existing academic literature on the work. 
Finally, I proffer an establishing discussion of the account of materiality provided 
by this thesis, which is framed by Deleuzo-Guattarian conceptions of multiplicity 
and becoming.   
1.1 Writing encounters with Break Down 
As will be discussed in Chapter 2: Methodology, there are profound implications 
for my treatment of context and scope in the choice to focus this inquiry on one 
art work alone. The work of this thesis is to investigate some moves through which 
the work is made and re-made; read and re-read. Break Down itself is the context 
for the discussions to come. This approach potentialises a rigorous examination of 
the way the piece works. One might, then, think of the schematic of the chapters 





number of turns, which are differently composed and yet interrelate and hook 
together, beginning and ending as they do with the art work, and with 
conceptualisations of mediality and materiality. The first, in Chapter 3: Fragment / 
Part / Whole, incorporates a direct confrontation with the material granulated by 
Landy in order to consider fragmentation as both a material process and an 
analytic concept. Chapter 4: Manual, and Chapter 5: Line / List / Inventory, examine 
the ways in which Break Down works between materiality and textuality, 
considering in particular the contents and material form of two texts by Landy: the 
instructions he provides for processing (2001a, pp.33-40) and the text in which he 
inventories the belongings shredded in Break Down (2001b). Finally, Chapter 6: 
John Landy’s Sheepskin Coat reflects upon the ways in which Landy’s belongings 
and Landy might, together, form a kind of nexus; an extended personhood. If this 
is so, I ask, what is implied about personhood, and about materiality, by Landy’s 
work of breaking down?  
Chapter 2: Methodology puts forth a sustained exploration of the underpinnings 
and implications of my deployment in this text of the strategy of site writing, 
adapted from the work of the scholar of art and architecture Jane Rendell (2005; 
2010). The discussion to come is studded with passages of site writing. These 
passages encompass direct observations of material artefacts and art works, but 
also photographs, video footage, and occasionally accounts of my own encounters 
with and processes of writing and observation. In this thesis, passages of site 
writing (which are labelled ‘observation’, and appear in blue italics) may have a 
direct, illustrative function; for example, they might animate – and be animated by 
- conceptual elements of discussion. Further to this, in working between modalities 
of theoretical discussion and observational work, they provide interruptions and 
intrusions that better allow this text to accommodate complexity and multiplicity. 
In enabling me to place myself explicitly within the text of this thesis, site writing 
occasions a mobilisation of subjectivities that provokes a richer account of the 
work. In these moments, this thesis is revealed as a conversation between author, 
art work, and the questions; concepts; images, that are provoked by Break Down.  
The use in this text of site writing passages, however, are not meant to prevent my 
also appearing in the text in other strategic points. Indeed, I want to include, here 
in the introduction, a meditation on my own long conversation with Break Down, 





motherhood. In my earliest encounters with Break Down, the surface of the work 
that caught my attention; in fact, that caused me outright glee, was that of the 
bellicose punk prank. Imagine an artist who has struggled for years to establish 
himself, then once he has sold some work to the Tate, once he has bought his Saab, 
and his suit from Saville Row, begins to imagine how he might ‘really fuck it up’ for 
himself (Landy, 2008a, p.104; see also Berning, 2012; Corner, 2010; Landy, 2008b). 
Where are Landy’s attachments? Pry them apart. Smash them with a hammer as 
hard as you can. Take love letters and birthday cards and family snaps and push 
them through the shredder. I do not want anything you can give me / now I am 
cold and without a coat / I don’t need all that stuff any more / I have ruined 
everything. Break Down, then, appeared at first as a satisfying act of nihilism. There 
is, too, a brute pragmatism at work in this piece. There is a prankishness in taking 
objects that had previously been in use, in place, in Landy’s home and subjecting 
them to a phoney procedure that leaves them beyond use or recognition. In much 
of his discourse on Break Down the artist draws on the space of the reclamation 
plant, where junk is sorted, processed, dismantled and shredded in order to salvage 
value before its final disposal. This adoption of modalities of system or process is 
set against a background of consumer culture and ‘inbuilt obsolescence’ which 
forces new purchases as belongings, on schedule, fall apart or become out of date 
(Miles, 1998). Landy’s deployment of these processes brings to Break Down a 
mordantly didactic note (this is how a radio is constructed; this is how 
systematically to reduce a Saab to shards and shreds).  
Protracted engagement with Break Down has, happily, obliged me to complicate 
these first responses. There is more to say here about loss and gain, destruction 
and creation in Break Down. As Landy himself observes, the work possesses a 
funereal quality (Corner, 2010; Cumming, 2002; Landy, 2002b; Wood, 2001); as 
such, it conveys a profound seriousness. Here, I think of the labour of clearing the 
belongings of the deceased, falling as often it does to bereaved family members, in 
which the disposal of trash, the discovery of treasures and the telling of stories 
entwine and enmesh the mourner. Landy’s lost belongings are memorialised 
meticulously and through a variety of means. These include his tender illustrations 
in Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a; see Figures 26 and 27) as well as 
meticulous entries in the Break Down Inventory (2001b). Landy does violence to his 
own stuff, he stages material, social and cultural loss and in doing so, gives priority 





destruction of some objects in Break Down, particularly, as in the case of Landy’s 
father’s coat, where they mark a heavy loss of some kind, feels almost impossible 
to bear. Filmed after the end of the work for a BBC documentary, Landy appears 
ghostly; untethered; as light and dry as a leaf (The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 
2002). 
Finally, there is play and joy in Break Down. I find these qualities in the hyperbole 
of the work; its procedural notes and inventory; the nostalgia of the objects 
displayed and the ‘Scalextric’ form of the conveyor belt (Landy, 2001a, p.107). A 
lively potentiality emerges through the work, which can sometimes feel like an 
extended experiment in and homage to the charisma of stuff. This charisma proves 
to have a surprising impunity, surviving as it does through the processes of 
dismantling, sorting and shredding through which Landy gives back his 
belongings’ raw materiality – their most fundamental affordances and propensities. 
It is this especially that first prompted my explorations of a theoretical account of 
matter and culture that might take into account the life of objects. 
Observation: Photographs of fragments produced during Break Down (Landy, 2008a, 
pp.186-93). Machines’ innards fascinate. Circuit-boards present an intensity of minute 
connections: wires wink and join together with a pleasingly purposeful intent. A sheaf of 
personal letters reappears as a rustling mass of paper, layered, frayed at the edges, dry 
enough to rip or burn: shredded, it lies in the hopper as a lively mass of loops and coils. 
Clothing lies meekly empty, miming the human form. An oil painting reveals itself as a 
hard, bright surface with chipboard beneath; in the tray, post-destruction, it is a pile of 
wooden chips interspersed with moments of colour. The paint chips away from the 
casings of household goods when they are dismantled and shredded, leaving the bite of 
a newly exposed metallic surface brightly gleaming.  
1.2 Scoping literatures 
A number of peer-reviewed academic publications comprise either an exclusive 
focus on Break Down or a discussion in which the work plays some substantial part. 
The publications surveyed here arise from a range of academic disciplines. Several 
(Beech, 2001; 2002; Charlesworth, 2002; Harvie, 2006; 2013; Davies and Parrinder, 
2003; Lydiate, 2001; Maet, 2013; Perry, 2013; Yaeger, 2003) emerge broadly from arts 





design. Further to this a significant body of recent discussion emerges specifically 
from the field of cultural geography (Armoore, 2009; Crang, 2012; Crewe, 2011; 
Hawkins, 2010; 2014). Finally, Day et al (2014) discuss the appearance in Break 
Down of themes of list and series as part of a paper that explores questions of 
methodology.  
Given the range of disciplinary influences at play, it is striking that when examined 
thematically, the literature on Break Down yields a marked tendency to imagine 
the work as a study on, or illustrative example of, consumption, the meaning of 
belongings in an individual’s life or conversely, the personal or cultural significance 
of the destruction of objects.4 Further, in existing accounts, the material objects 
that appear in Break Down tend to be treated as marked by Landy’s ownership of 
them, or expressive of something about Landy. In the following pages, these 
tendencies will be traced back into literatures on consumption and commodity, 
which I propose have productively shaped, but also curtailed, much existing 
scholarship on Break Down. Such literatures are taken to exist as part of (and not 
to be representative of, or necessarily exceptional within) an ecology of fields of 
enquiry in the social sciences and humanities that either centre upon materiality, 
or present serious implications for scholarly approaches to materiality. The current 
thesis does not attempt to produce a comprehensive mapping of such expansive 
projects as new materialism, speculative realism, or object oriented ontology. 
Nevertheless, I wish to acknowledge the influence of relevant texts on materiality 
from a broad array of fields.  
The ‘vital materialism’ of Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2010); Steven Connor’s 
‘magical things’ in Paraphernalia (2011); Sherry Turkle’s edited collection of essays 
in which lives and thought are interwoven with our stuff, Evocative Objects (2007); 
James Gibson’s work on material affordance (1979/1986); discussion of extended 
mind and material engagement by the philosopher Andy Clark (2009; 2011) and the 
archaeologist Lambros Malafouris (2013); the artist Gustav Metzger’s piquant 
account of process and materiality in auto-destructive art (1996): all are embedded 
in the discussions to come. I will not explore their contributions in any depth at 
                                                     
4 A second significant thematic strand that reoccurs in existing publications on Break Down, 
regarding the modality of the list as deployed by Landy, I refer to Chapter 5: Line / List / Inventory, 





this moment, except to observe a certain coherence in the questions that emerge 
through this admittedly heterogenous assemblage of texts: of how matter might be 
active; might be communicative; might possess the potential to be enlivened by 
human intervention and projection; might be possessed of a liveliness of its own. 
Nor, indeed, should it be imagined that the texts cited here are unique in asking 
these questions. 
In pursuit of these questions, the current text puts forth an account of materiality 
that is structured through an engagement with Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage 
theory – with a particular emphasis on their pivotal text A Thousand Plateaus 
(1987/2013). As will be discussed in Section 1.3, the prominence, in the works of 
Deleuze and Guattari discussed in this thesis, of matters of process or becoming 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/2013, p.410) is fundamental to the analysis that follows. 
This enables a complex conception of materiality as not only mutable, and 
expressive, but absolutely characterised by change, that exists in a universal 
oneness (Deleuze, 1970/1988, p.128) that is itself composed of difference. Deleuze 
and Guattari enable us to think of an intense thisness or specificity that does not 
emerge from the object in itself (since there is no object in itself) but is produced 
relationally.  
1.2.1 Consumption and commodity 
Break Down has tended to be considered in the light of concepts of commodity and 
consumption, sometimes to the exclusion of other domains of analysis. The current 
section summarises the constitution of these underlying concepts before, in 
Section 1.2.2, discussing the ways in which they arise in existing analyses of Break 
Down. A narrative of physical objects (and social practices that surround these) 
that pivots upon concepts of value provides a theoretical context for – and indeed, 
has tended to dominate - accounts of the work. In such accounts, our stuff is seen 
to communicate or embody aspects of social organisation and individual identity. 
Equally, identity, relationships, and cultures are seen to be constructed through 
engagements with material artefacts.5 To explore the implications of this narrative 
                                                     
5 Indeed, it is useful to consider the significance of this term constructed, since in the terms 
employed in assemblage theory, the concept of construction assists in thinking through, not 
representational or symbolic practices – or not necessarily - but specific processes through which 





I turn to an essay collection, edited by anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, The Social 
Life of Things (1986). This text is valuable in the current analysis for the reason that 
it clearly establishes a concept that, as I will show, shapes many existing readings 
of Break Down. This is the proposal that ‘commodities, like persons, have social 
lives’ (Appadurai, 1986, p.3).  
Significantly, ‘commodity’ (rather than ‘thing’) is the concept employed by 
Appadurai to distinguish between things ‘with a certain type of social potential’, 
which might gain, transmit and be constitutive of social meaning – and in 
particular, value – and, to cite his capacious alternative category, ‘other sorts of 
things’ (Ibid., p.6). In considering how an object might be understood or 
interpreted Appadurai draws upon an essay from the same collection – influential 
in its own right - in which Igor Kopytoff (1986) lays out an account of ‘object 
biography’ as a method for the analysis of material objects. Kopytoff suggests that 
an object be analysed in terms of its changing significance as it moves in and out 
of a commoditised state, gaining and shedding different forms of value as it is 
made, sold, given, lost, buried, rediscovered, used or displayed. Commoditisation 
is therefore not a stable state but ‘one phase in the life of some things’ (Appadurai, 
1986, p.17). It is clear that the ‘other’ things referred to by Appadurai – that is, things 
that are not possessed of the ‘social potential’ for commoditisation - are not of 
interest to him. However, one might reasonably ask what ‘sorts of things’ they 
would be and how they might escape the purview of the value systems he describes. 
In Appadurai, we are not in fact thinking of ‘sorts of things’ but rather, things that 
invite certain kinds of treatment.  
Observation: Shell armlet displayed at Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 
University of Cambridge6 (December 2016): I sit on the floor and peer through glass to 
observe this object, which itself sits in the bottom corner of its display case. The arm band 
is formed of a circlet of shell, off-white, about 6cm deep, which spirals slightly in on itself. 
A single shell has been sliced laterally to provide this object (that might almost seem to 
have been bent or moulded) with its form. The top edge of the shell has been well 
worked. Even where it was sliced, it has a gentle gleam and looks smooth and worn, as 
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do its curved sides. It appears that the shell has been carefully kept; in particular, the 
only marks visible on the shell itself are its own brown dapplings. On an inside edge, I 
discover the catalogue number 1922.1643a written in black in a meticulous hand. Down 
one edge are two or three carefully made holes which again have been sanded to make 
smooth edges. Eight lengths of twine, each roughly 30 centimetres long, are attached 
here, and onto these, tiny red and white beads, each only about two millimetres in 
diameter, are strung. At the top and bottom of each thread are much larger, black beads, 
about one centimetre in diameter; their irregularities and bell-like shape suggests that 
they are made of seed-pods or similar. The red beads look like glass, and have the precise 
semi-transparent shade of pomegranate seeds. The white are entirely opaque: some 
have a very slight grain in their surface suggesting that they may be composed of shell. 
The eight strings of beads are arranged, some in alternate red and white, or with the two 
colours arranged in groups of three, and one or two entirely in red. It is observable that 
there are considerably fewer white beads. They are slightly grubbier than the armband 
itself, perhaps suggesting a difficulty in cleaning and conserving this part of the artefact 
– but also, one might imagine, the life of the object during which these strings of beads 
might often have been wound and run through fingers. Each of the threads has a large 
bead, a length of small beads, and another large bead. Emerging from this is a long, 
fibrous, grassy leaf, entirely dry and somewhat crumpled and torn, attached with a 
delicate wrapping of twine right at the tip. The tangled gathering of leaves, the smooth 
gleam of the shell, the richness of these hundreds of tiny beads, give the piece its 
liveliness and its sense of occasion and plenitude.  
While he wishes to follow objects in terms of their specific ‘forms’, ‘uses’ and 
‘trajectories’, Appadurai never means to discuss the material composition or 
ontological constitution of things. Instead, he defines, he is interested in how 
things are put into play or ‘enliven[ed]’ through observable ‘human transactions 
and calculations’ (1986, p.5). An account of such ‘human transactions’ can be seen 
in his references to the set of practices through which the men of a group of islands 
near New Guinea exchange Kula objects (Ibid., pp.18-21). Though this is a group 
endeavour, an individual man’s social position is dependent upon his success. 
Further, Kula objects themselves gather a history; a collection of memories that is 
woven through with the status of its previous owners. The author goes as far as to 
explain that the objects are ‘decorated necklaces (which circulate [between islands] 





Nevertheless, one would be hard put to gain much beyond the vaguest 
understanding of the material qualities of these objects from this account, which 
focuses, instead, on the manner in which relations between groups from various 
islands are reified through formalised negotiations and exchanges. In the foregoing 
site writing of an object from the Kula system I work directly and specifically 
against the grain of the two foundational texts discussed here by performing an 
alternative approach to writing about a material artefact. This feels, if not precisely 
like revenge, at least like an act in which I do the armlet honour by retrieving and 
centralising an account of its form.7 
In a synopsis of the development of material culture studies, the geographer Louise 
Crewe comments that:  
In earlier accounts of consumption, commodities were followed to their points of 
origin […] as a means to understand and locate value. Later work addressed the 
biographies of things beyond the point of sale, looking at cycles of use and reuse 
[…]. More recently a number of accounts have revealed potently how the 
biographical histories and geographies of things, and their connections to people 
and places, really do matter (2011, pp.27-8). 
As Crewe suggests, there exists extensive discussion of objects as constituting, for 
example, some form of social value or a kind of personal value that relates to, 
supports or is constitutive of identity. If Kula was considered ‘the best-documented 
example of a non-Western, preindustrial, non-monetized, translocal exchange 
system’ (Appadurai, 1986, p.18), studies of Western material culture in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries frequently include discussion of 
individuals’ encounters with mass-produced or consumer objects – although again, 
such studies may not include much of a focus on the materiality of the physical 
objects under discussion. Crewe’s bivalent use of the term ‘matter’, then, aptly 
superimposes two important elements – ‘matter’ in the sense of physical substance 
and ‘matter’ in the sense of importance or significance. However, this coincidence 
of terminology is not unpacked or theorised. In particular, we never learn what it 
is (in Crewe’s terms) for a material object to ‘matter’ in the sense of being made of 
stuff. 
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museum artefact. My account attempts to rescue the physical form of the object as it is now, but 





Crewe alludes to a significant field of literature in which consumption is deployed 
not only as a set of practices, but as a set of values. Further to this, a range of 
accounts emerge that supplement discussion of consumption and use by 
concerning themselves specifically with waste and the disposal of objects (see for 
example Crang, 2012; Edensor, 2005; Hawkins and Mueke, 2003; Hawkins, 2006; 
Hetherington, 2004; Rathje and Murphy, 2001). To quote another play on words, 
this time from Crang (2012) the cast-off can be considered a kind of cast of the 
individual or society that wants rid. In this sense, refuse provides insights via the 
ways in which different kinds of objects are treated in their afterlife according to 
different kinds of value. It can be seen, then, that there are significant continuities 
between this and the field of consumption studies more generally. Moreover, the 
developments discussed are broadly consistent with the approach taken in 
Appadurai (1986): in a similar way, the consumption and disposal of material stuff 
is defined through the attribution of value, and is taken to have an indexical 
relationship with the consuming person or persons. Consumption, through this 
lens, becomes a component of culture or identity; a foundational element of 
practices of citizenship, education, the organisation of families, as well as an 
indispensable scaffolding element of the assemblage that one might call 
personhood. Meanwhile, disposal appears as a kind of negative image of the same 
set of constitutive processes.  
 





In discussing Break Down, Landy himself has often deployed such an account. His 
own descriptions of the work (especially in the early stages) include a notion of 
consumerism as a social force. This approach can be seen in the artist’s frequent 
citings of the sociological text Consumerism – as a Way of Life (Miles, 1998), one of 
a number of social theory texts along similar lines to appear in the Break Down 
Inventory and in Landy’s research.8 Miles presents the argument that consumerism 
is a defining feature of social life at the end of the twentieth century that is sold, 
falsely, as an ‘inherently liberating’ ethic: 
A myth has therefore been perpetuated which centres on the belief that everyone 
can be a winner in a consumer society; that by extracting prodigious quantities of 
wealth from nature everybody can be given what they need; and everyone can co-
operate against humanity's fundamental foe which appears to be nature itself [...] 
The benefits of consumerism in this sense appear to be filtering down. However, 
such a filter is only partial and merely serves to promote the idea that any form of 
consumption is inherently liberating when clearly it is not (Miles, 1998, p.150 
[underlining reproduced from the cut-and-paste from this text in Landy, 2001, 
p.88: see Figure 3]). 
In studies of consumption, a rich variegation is shown to persist in how people 
obtain, deploy and display their stuff. As such, we are offered a narrative in which 
human beings' ability for self-determination prevails and flourishes. This narrative 
takes place across a wide-ranging literature. In short, the argument is that 
consumer-capitalist acceleration notwithstanding, people continue to organise 
their lives in ways that are ingenious, provisional and (productively) chaotic, 
within and through material belongings and via practices of consumption. Human 
creativity persists. Individuals are bricoleurs who organise and reorganise a collage 
of material belongings in relation to constantly shifting tableaux of exigencies; 
influences; concerns. Again, such accounts of the material culture of post-
industrial consumerism continue the emphasis proposed by Appadurai. As such, 
what these accounts account for is not the materiality of the consumer object, but 
the commodified object that is animated by the values and meanings projected 
upon it. As the geographer Kevin Hetherington remarks in his influential 
discussion on the disposition of objects in domestic space, ‘the general move in 
much of this work on consumption has been towards recognising the skilled and 
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on Break Down entitled The Man Who Destroyed Everything (2002). Here, Miles discusses 
consumerism in terms of ‘the construction of need,’ via cultural products such as makeover 





creative person making a social life for themselves through consumer practices’ 
(2004, p.157). This narrative arises in Miles, as cited by Landy, when he argues that 
‘If consumers experience consumerism as a way of life then that life is necessarily 
authentic’ (1998, p.159; reproduced in Landy, 2001a, p.89). Such concerns shaped 
the work of the anthropologist Daniel Miller over many years, as he pursued a 
concern with individuals’ making of meaning, and the collaborative project of 
reifying social connections, norms and practices via material objects and practices 
belong to this tendency. Miller’s study of the inhabitants of a South London street, 
for example, consists of a series of descriptions of encounters between researchers 
and participants through home visits in which they discuss participants’ 
relationships, stories, attitudes – in the context of their belongings (2008; see also 
Miller, 1998; 2010).  
It must, I think, be seen as an extension of this narrative of consumption as a set 
of creative (or meaning-making) practices, when, strikingly often, recent studies 
on material culture also include reflexive accounts by scholars of their subjects’ or 
their own experiences with and uses of things. See for example the collected essays 
in Candlin and Guins (2009), which, while mainly comprising theoretical writings, 
devotes an entire section to such ‘object lessons’. Similarly, the collection Evocative 
Objects, edited by theorist of technology and psychology Sherry Turkle (2007), is 
entirely composed, as the blurb on the jacket says, of personal reflections by 
‘scientists, humanists, artists and designers’. These accounts are compelling. 
Turkle herself prods through the cupboard in which family ‘keepsakes […] books, 
trinkets, souvenirs and photographs’ (2007, p.3) are kept, in search of clues about 
her absent dad. We hear of a woman who uses her and her children’s large 
collection of toys from McDonalds’ Happy Meals to substantiate her commitment 
to a warm and friendly bond with her children and to enact her resistance to the 
preoccupations of her own upper middle class upbringing (Miller, 2008, pp.125-32). 
The media theorist Henry Jenkins analyses in memoir form his abiding 
preoccupation with buying, reading and collecting superhero comics. He describes 
the way this consumption practice (the buying, the reading, the keeping) creates a 
scaffold that connects him, in middle age, with the loving care he received as a 
child, entwining with his incipient grief to the extent that as an adult, he ‘bought 
the comics on the way to the hospice’ to visit his elderly mother (2007, p.196). Guy 
Julier, in the context of a general discussion of the design and functionality of the 





wrought via this object carry, for him, a weighty sense of emotional connection, 
too. Choosing particular pieces of music supplies him with a soundtrack; ‘to 
accompany particular activities – commuting, jogging, ironing – turns these 
ordinary actions into filmic experiences’ (Julier, 2009, p.478).  
The pleasure of these accounts has to do with good stories. Indeed, they might 
almost constitute a sub-genre. As the geographer Harriet Hawkins notes 
approvingly in her own analysis of Break Down, Landy’s belongings, collected and 
listed en masse, ‘recall the eloquent objects of disposal tales, inheritance yarns and 
salvage geographies and their reciprocal, creative relations with people and places’ 
(2014, p.123). Such ‘yarns’, however, convey not only a profoundly nostalgic energy, 
but also a pronounced social conservatism, which issues partly from the 
individuating power of such accounts. The focus, as often as not, is upon the 
insides of people’s houses: one might wonder what, for the author, lies beyond 
those four walls. The zenith of this last tendency can perhaps be found in Miller’s 
text The Comfort of Things, in which the author claims material objects are 
centrally important to the maintenance of relationships, which themselves are 
centrally important ‘to modern life’ (2008, p.287). Nevertheless, each house in the 
street visited during the project is, he suggests, self-contained, an entity in itself; 
the street in totality suggesting ‘that concepts such as society or community [do 
not] play much of an immediate role in the lives of people who reside in a modern 
metropolis such as contemporary London’ (Ibid., p.283). Due to the efficient 
running of ‘the state’, he suggests, there is not much of a reason to get to know the 
neighbours – as though it were possible to access ‘basic education, health services’ 
and so on without encountering other human beings. What emerges is an odd 
sense that the categories of ‘relationships’ on one hand and ‘culture and society’ on 
the other are constituted as in some way mutually exclusive.  
In the accounts outlined above, things are handled, kept, trashed, put in boxes, on 
shelves, worn. Nevertheless, they remain inert. Their nature, capacities and 
significance rests entirely in the hands – and eyes - of their human owners. Little, 
if any specific acknowledgement is made of the materiality of the objects discussed, 
whether the bluntest description of the specific physical characteristics of the 
objects under discussion (texture, weight, composition, density) or a more finely 
formed account of matter as a surface of interaction that is formed somehow 





is the work of the literary theorist Steven Connor (2011), the author of any number 
of ‘inheritance yarns’ and other vibrant imaginings of the significance of small, 
seemingly insignificant objects. This can be seen in his writing of the sensuous 
mysteries of the button box in his childhood home ‘which doubtless had once held 
toffees or acid drops’ and now: 
contained an entirely imaginary currency; there were extravagantly large, high-
denomination flat discs, some of mother-of-pearl, that had once surely belonged 
to fancy items of evening wear or dressing gowns; middle-value buttons for coats 
and trousers and the small change of shirt buttons. The extraordinary variety of 
shapes and textures was accompanied by strange, musty perfumes (Connor, 2011, 
p.37). 
Connor’s work is singular in that he imagines ‘magical things’ that accommodate 
and transport human thought, like metaphor made concrete. It is this appeal to 
‘magic’ that provides space for something to happen that is a little beyond the 
ambit of human percept and interpretation. In the case of the button box, the 
shapes and textures of the buttons are examined, but in addition, the compelling 
detail of ‘strange, musty perfumes’ is powerfully suggestive of objects that are 
rightfully possessed of their own vibrancy; inhabiting entirely the potentiality to 
affect and be affected in any number of ways.  
1.2.2 Literatures on Break Down 
I turn, here, to explore the significant influence of scholarship on commodity and 
consumption on existing literatures on Break Down. Most authors who discuss 
Landy’s possessions do so in order to deploy the work as a case study of the 
treatment of different kinds of objects. Few provide a sustained engagement with 
the work, and fewer still discuss the specificities of Landy’s belongings, or the 
procedures that are brought to bear in Break Down. In several texts the work 
appears fleetingly in order to exemplify some other abstract principle that is at 
stake. These include the legalities of destroying works of art (Lydiate, 2001); the 
destruction of art as, itself, a variety of art (Maet, 2013); narratives of refuse as both 
beautiful and closely associated with trauma (Yaeger, 2003); as part of an 
assessment of the viability of some apparently political art works as genuinely 
radical pieces (Charlesworth, 2002, p.357); and in one case, seemingly to facilitate 
the use of Landy’s work P.D.F. (Product, Disposal Facility) (1998; see Figure 18) 






Figure 4: John Landy’s sheepskin coat, in a yellow, plastic tray (Artangel, n.d.). 
In the sub-group of texts that provide a sustained engagement with Break Down 
on its own terms rather than in order to exemplify a different concept (see Crewe, 
2011; Davies and Parrinder, 2013; Harvie, 2006; 2013; Hawkins 2010; 2014; Perry, 
2013), it is possible to identify significant continuities with research in which 
material objects and practices are analysed in relation to concepts of commodity 
and value. In particular, there is a strong relationship between the theme of 
material objects as a kind of prop for the formation of identity, and accounts of 
Break Down in which Landy’s things appear as a direct reflection of their owner, or 
at the very least as fundamentally marked by Landy’s ownership. For instance, the 
art historian Gill Perry (2013) calls up Michael Landy’s use of his father’s sheepskin 
coat (the subject of Chapter 6 of this thesis) to mediate discussion of his family 
home. The critic of theatre and performance Jen Harvie reads signs of Landy – the 
man, the consumer – from his assembled belongings:  
their combined banality-yet-quirkiness betrayed the preferences, foibles and 
modest perversions of a social individual. Multiple bottles of HP sauce suggested 
Landy’s love of the stuff. And a long list of single socks perhaps indicated his 
perennial ill-fortune at the laundrette but his commitment to making do in the 





The geographer Louise Crewe employs Break Down extensively in an account of 
value as a multivalent quality that can inhabit a variety of locations, focusing 
especially on what she calls ‘the autotopographical value of things’ (2011, p.29)9 in 
Landy’s work. The gist of Crewe’s argument is that the ‘absent-presence’ of 
previously owned, remembered objects is revealed through Landy’s use of an 
inventory: 
Clothes are intimate. We wear them and feel them and leave our bodily effects on 
and in them, trapped between the fibres. Our clothes become us. We inhabit them, 
and they tell stories about us: where we bought them; when, where, and with 
whom we wore them; the places we went; the stains from the party, the rip from 
the fall as marks of value not disdain. They touch us and reveal significance and 
memory-value. Clothing is an object in the space between self and surround, a 
second skin, porous, absorbent, soaked in memories and steeped in stories (Ibid., 
p.39). 
Sweat is not directly named here; nevertheless, it seeps through Crewe’s account 
in the pores and the soaking. This underlying image stands for the placing of 
Landy’s clothes as saturated, as if by perspiration, in his existence, his life. In this, 
Crewe performs the notion that our things are marked by – and could be materially 
indistinguishable from - their owners.  
Much academic discussion of Break Down draws upon some notion of consumer 
capital as a kind of discursive runaway train. Within this narrative, individuals have 
no option but to define themselves from within and through the narrow confines 
of practices and concepts of consumption. It is from this standpoint that Break 
Down is positioned as a locus of resistance. The prevalence of such discussion must 
be seen in light of the fact that Landy himself drew on sociological texts on 
consumerism (as previously mentioned, the text Consumerism as a Way of Life 
[Miles, 1998] is especially visible) when preparing for Break Down. I infer from 
statements of Landy's elsewhere, for example in his comment that ‘people don't 
feel the need to question the validity of consumerism as a way of life’ (2008, p.107) 
that he has sometimes drawn Miles’ account of consumption into his own 
discussions of Break Down. This view is also espoused by Harriet Hawkins, who 
comments in relation to the book collection revealed in the ‘Reading’ section of 
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the Break Down Inventory (Landy, 2001b) and the research process presented in 
Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a) that ‘Landy takes consumption 
seriously as a transformative social and cultural force’, and with regard to Miles’ 
contribution in particular, that ‘the influence of this and other texts is clear […] in 
the ways Landy talks about consumption and consumerism’ (Hawkins, 2014, 
pp.114-5). It is necessary to be cautious about the status of the artist’s intentions in 
relation to Break Down, in order to avoid a unitary notion of the work as defined 
by Landy alone. That said, it is clear that the position discussed does make its way, 
via this narrative put forth by Landy, into a number of journalistic accounts and 
thereby becomes part of the public profile of Break Down.10 
It is the moment of identification named by Crewe, in which objects inherit a kind 
of humanity from their owners, that prompts the artist and critic Dave Beech to 
comment that Landy’s destruction of personal items – family photos; letters - 
alongside objects more recognisable as consumer commodities, ‘a toaster or a 
Dyson […] is a grisly excuse for a spectacle’ (2001, p.31). In a notably hostile review 
and then as part of a longer piece of art criticism, Beech (2001; 2002) lays out the 
assessment that Break Down is an anti-political work of art.11 Beech sees such issues 
as alienation and commodity fetishism as implicit in the form and procedures of 
Break Down. However, he argues, the work cannot be seen as a satisfactorily 
‘radical’ critique due to the failings of the artist’s own account of his work: 
Destroying everything in his possession may well imply Landy’s personal 
dissatisfaction with commodity exchange, capitalism or even the world of material 
existence, but Landy went to great effort – and often – to distance himself from the 
radical political critique of private property. His preference for a more religious 
iconography of symbolic self-cleansing may well speak against counting 
Breakdown [sic] as a political work at all (Beech, 2002, p.394). 
Beech's criticism is problematic in its conflation of a number of factors. In 
particular, the category of the political, as proposed by Beech, is a peculiar entity; 
at once intensely narrow and consumingly capacious. This odd ‘politics’ holds itself 
apart from religious modes of expression, which are in Beech’s account considered 
to be absolutely inimical to ‘radical political critique’. As such, in this account, 
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Section 2.3. 
11 He isn’t alone; in an admittedly more measured analysis JJ Charlesworth specifically names 





Landy’s work is ‘anti-political’ due to what is seen as the troublingly religious 
overtones of Break Down.  
In effect, Beech sets up a ‘straw man’ argument in which he engineers an encounter 
between Landy and a set of premises and requirements that are largely imposed on 
the work by himself as the critic. He is especially troubled by the positionality of 
Landy within the work. Rather than generalising from Landy's actions in order to 
expose the alienation of ordinary people, Beech says, Break Down takes an ordinary 
experience of living in alienated modernity and particularises it to Landy. In 
exposing and performing his own experience as Landy does, Beech fears 'that he is 
doing this for us, like some Third Millennium messiah, suffering for our 
consumerist sins in an accountant's version of the crucifixion' (Beech, 2001, p.31).12 
However, the florid and rather specious accusations levelled by Beech are not born 
out by the markedly workaday and routinised mode of destruction employed by 
Landy. Consider, for example, the written procedures; the boiler suits; the cheerful, 
yellow plastic trays and the action taking place as it does beneath the fluorescent 
lighting of a former department store.13 In these respects, it seems that Landy has, 
if anything, attempted to remove the viscera of glamour and sacrifice, replacing 
them with a regime of work, conducted in strict compliance with a set of 
guidelines. 
Finally, it is to say the least odd on Beech’s part that he expects Break Down, which 
as he notes is not described as ‘radical critique’ by Landy himself, will and should 
in some sense pertain to categories of the political as defined by Beech. As he 
acknowledges, Landy rejects Marxian accounts of the work. For example, when the 
critic Julian Stallabrass proposes, in the interview published in Michael Landy: 
                                                     
12 A new copy of his book, presented to Landy by Steve Miles after Break Down, is inscribed by 
the author: ‘To Michael: Commodity? Jesus? …or artist?’ (Hawkins, 2014, p.115) in likely 
reference to Beech’s critique. The image conjured by Beech’s heightened language here is 
reminiscent of Landy’s 2013 National Gallery show Saints Alive, in which a number of images of 
Renaissance saints were made in towering fibreglass and set to self-destruct through the 
operation of pedal-operated mechanisms. 
13 Indeed, in a short interview about Break Down, Landy’s failure to claim a high profile in the 
performance of the work is picked out by the artist Gustav Metzger as a ‘plus’. In Metzger’s view, 
through this decision, which must to some extent be supported by the fact that Landy, like his 
operatives, wore a blue boiler suit, he dilutes the primacy of his own position as the artist, making 
him indistinguishable from the rest of, as Metzger says, ‘a group of a dozen or so people.’ 
Metzger, too, describes Break Down as a piece of political art that works against consumerism 





Break Down, that the work could be seen as a Marxist analysis of cultural capital, 
Landy says that he is ‘more interested in the lifespan analysis of commodities’ 
(Landy, 2001a, p.113). This notably bland response does not come across as the 
utterance of a would-be messiah – and of course, since it was not Landy's intention 
to achieve a political work along the lines proposed by Beech, it cannot be entirely 
surprising that Break Down does not meet Beech’s criteria.  
That said, as the artist himself remarks in conversation with Stallabrass before the 
show, ‘Break Down is critical of consumerism but at the same time it does not 
pretend to stand outside it. You can’t stand outside it’ (Landy, 2001a, p.113), which 
is, at the least, not a non-Marxist position. Following this nuanced statement of 
Landy’s, the work of both Jen Harvie (2006; 2013) and of Harriet Hawkins (2010; 
2014) accommodates a greater degree of complication and contradiction. In both, 
Landy is seen to work from within consumerism in order to produce something 
that works against the grain. Harvie asks how the processes of ‘global consumer 
capitalism’ (Ibid., p.62) might be interrupted through creative practices such as 
installation or performance art. In contrast to Beech, she has no quarrel with the 
way in which Landy deploys his private life in Break Down. Indeed, the notion of 
the personal-as-political is a defining rhetorical strand in an account in which 
Harvie identifies Break Down as an exemplar of what she calls a ‘metonymic’ work. 
This is to say that for Harvie political art is that which challenges the apparently 
unchallengeable and is therefore metonymic of larger-scale change. In her terms, 
such art may be a successfully political work, even in the face of the ‘current 
intractability of...global consumer capitalism’ (Ibid., p.63).  
In Harvie’s estimation, then, Break Down both deploys and interrupts the 
modalities of consumer capitalism. A similar analytic move can be observed in 
Hawkins’ claim that in Break Down Landy deploys the very excess that 
characterises consumer capital. This analysis is written with close reference to 
Georges Bataille’s account of excess, defined here as ‘anything that is unproductive 
in a capitalist means-end economy’ (Hawkins, 2010, p.20). For Hawkins, Break 
Down presents an amplification of the ethic of consumer capitalism such that the 
excess upon which it depends is revealed in its absurdity – a kind of physical 
performance of the reductio ad absurdum. It is this departure from notions of 
proportionality and functionality that forms the seditious quality of the work. 





encapsulated in figurings of profit and loss, but instead escapes. There is, in these 
terms, always a little more than can be accommodated. As such:   
excess, and its glorious expenditure in an art which is itself excessive, offers us a 
critique of the capitalist economy [...] Landy's work, like Bataille's, offers us the 
move from a rational, utility based knowing of the world [...] to a worldview in 
which there is an excess of meaning and moreover an affirmation of that which 
exceeds meaning' (2010, p.20). 
Hawkins suggests that Break Down is ‘generative’ partly because of the way that 
Landy's destruction acts on meaning itself: its overturn of utilitarian terms, which 
opens up new conceptions of social processes, ‘understandings and orderings’ 
(Ibid., pp.21-2).  
The discussions summarised here offer a picture of ways in which Break Down has 
been placed and deployed in relation to ideological debates about consumerism 
both by Landy himself and by critics and academics. Hawkins in particular brings 
a high degree of analytical power to the discussion. That said, none of these 
analyses provide a sustained engagement with the materiality of the work: this 
despite Hawkins’ explicit acknowledgement of ‘the ever-present risk that, despite 
their insistent materialities, the elements of Break Down are written out, buried 
under a wealth of ideas’ (2010, pp.22-3). As I have discussed, as in accounts that 
deploy Break Down as a kind of worked example of consumption, an exploration 
of the very particular qualities of things, which has everything to do with the self-
sufficiency and immediacy of the realm of the material, tend to go unseen and 
unsought. The material effects that surround us – or, that we surround ourselves 
by - are treated as a substrate for human sense-making and particularly for 
biographical narrative. Such discussions instil a fogging interchangeability 
between different kinds of things, and obfuscate, by taking for granted, the nature 
of relationships between person and thing, and the mechanisms through which 
such connections can be made. 
Two existing publications on Break Down, by the geographers Michael Crang (2012) 
and Harriet Hawkins (2014), gesture toward a turn from a superficial account of 
Landy’s belongings as containers for value, identity or autobiography to a 
consideration of how his actions disclose the materiality of these objects. Hawkins 
remarks that Landy’s dismantling and shredding ‘was able to turn attention toward 
the matter and materiality of his commodities – their substance’ (2014, p.129). 





labelled and shredded materials, provides instead a summary of Landy’s treatment 
of matter via processes of dismantlement, sorting and display. Crang, meanwhile, 
proposes that:  
there needs to be a move beyond the histrionic and powerful emotions that get 
picked up in reviews of work like Landy's (focusing on treasured clothes, the prize 
possessions, the artworks destroyed and their ilk) to see the limits of meaning in 
just stuff. Stuff that is so banal it hardly registers (2012, p.764). 
In fact, even these two accounts depart very little from the approach outlined by 
Appadurai (1986) in the sense that here, too, there is a tendency not to study ‘just 
stuff’ or the ‘substance’ of things, but rather, things as commodities that are 
readable because they are put into play in a variety of ways during different ‘life 
cycle’ phases of production, consumption and disposal (Kopytoff, 1986).  
In Crang’s final remarks he returns to his main argument, that discarded objects 
constitute a kind of negative imprint of the priorities and values of contemporary 
Western society. By extension, Landy’s belongings are presumably seen by Crang 
as having a direct and indexical relationship to Landy himself. I would also push 
back against his peculiar turn toward ‘the limits of meaning’; a phrase that suggests 
a hermeneutic concern for unseen significance that seems at odds with his stated 
desire to consider ‘just stuff’. In short, Crang extends significant ideas, but in all, 
his account lacks a unifying logic. Nevertheless, in working against the grain of 
Crewe (2011) and by implication others who limit their discussion of Break Down 
to the longevity of attachments or sedimented meaning/memory, Crang digs 
furthest toward the account of Break Down that I want to progress in this thesis. 
This is especially true of the exciting - if fleeting – notion, also extended in Hawkins 
(2014), that in de-forming his belongings, Landy reveals their materiality. 
1.3 A ‘working of matters’: assemblage, affect, and Break Down 
So, how should ‘meaning’ be defined if as Crang suggests ‘just stuff’, stripped of 
memories, affect, and other such ‘histrionic’ associations, can still ‘mean’? This 
question forms an important marker or boundary point in terms of the 
contribution of this text to the existing literatures on Break Down. Having explored 
how materiality is treated in existing academic publications on Landy’s Break 
Down, in this section I begin to distinguish my own approach in relation to the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari, particularly in their text A Thousand Plateaus 





Here, the authors evoke a vision of the assemblage as an entire (though always 
unfinished or contingent) system, that includes intersecting objects and energies 
that work in a variety of ways and at a variety of scales, all of which are rooted in 
process and change - although such process itself here operates across different 
temporalities and features remarkable complexity and interdependency. As the 
philosopher Manuel DeLanda specifies, the identity of belonging to one 
assemblage in particular is not essential to any part of that assemblage, which 
could break off and work instead as part of a different assemblage (2006, p.18), and 
indeed, may well work as an element of more than one assemblage simultaneously. 
The artist and scholar of new media Chris Salter observes that the term 
‘assemblage’, in Brian Massumi’s translation of A Thousand Plateaus, arose from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s original term agencement, which ‘implies both agency […] 
and arrangement, the ordering or placing of heterogeneous things in a mesh of 
relations’ (2015, p.9; p.251 n.33). The implication here of action and relationship 
combining is helpful. That said, I do not employ the term agency in the coming 
discussions but turn, rather, to the concept of affect; that is, the extent to which an 
entity has the capacity to be affected, or to have an effect beyond itself.  
Signally, the concept of the assemblage is sufficiently capacious to encompass the 
simplest and most complex entities and interactions. However, affect is central to 
a fully realised conception of the assemblage, since no element of this mass or 
gathering is in reality single. In other words, no one element or part can be isolated 
to do its work (its thing; its ‘doing’) away from the rest of the assemblage. This is 
because affect is not identical with any single object. Rather, it is contingent upon 
the composition and mechanisms of the assemblage. The same can be said in 
reverse: ‘A weapon is nothing outside of the combat organization it is bound up 
with’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/2013, p.464), and equally, as DeLanda comments: 
the reason why the properties of a whole cannot be reduced to those of its parts is 
that they are the result not of an aggregation of the components’ own properties 
but of the actual exercise of their capacities (2006, p.11; see also Bennett, 2010, p.21).  
An assemblage, then, is a mass or massing in which relation and affect are co-
constitutive. The concept of the multiplicity is helpful here, to call up the 
persistently emergent nature of the assemblage; a potentiality that is never 
exhausted and that is therefore profoundly concerned with ‘relations of becoming’ 





assemblages, multiplicities (which is to say everything and also every thing) are 
characterised by change; by process. What is revealed in Landy’s dismantlings and 
shreddings is therefore not, as Crang suggests, the ‘unbecoming’ (2012, p.766-7) 
but very precisely the becoming, of physical things. The insertion of ‘un’ is not only 
superfluous. In addition, it incorrectly privileges the form of Landy’s objects when 
whole. Conversely, as I argue in Chapter 3: Fragment / Part / Whole (pages 75-6), 
to examine Break Down through a lens of becoming is to understand that Landy 
does not destroy, but rather, transforms his belongings. 
It follows precisely from this account of becoming that in this thesis material 
objects are taken to possess the capacity for mediality. Even the barest and simplest 
of objects, I observe, expresses through its form the narrative of its structure and 
composition; that is, the story of how it came to be as it is now. In developing this 
approach I take inspiration from the work of the artist and theorist of digital media 
Matthew Fuller, particularly in the pursuit of ‘a materialism that acknowledges and 
takes delight in the conceptuality of real objects’ (2007, p.1). Also salient and 
helpful here is the exploration of the Deleuzian concept of expressivity in DeLanda 
(2006, p.14). Objects possess an intrinsic capacity for expression. Examples 
provided by DeLanda include firstly, the atom whose frequency (and therefore 
chemical type) can be ‘read’ via a spectrograph, and secondly, genetic code. In the 
first example, expression is formed indexically with an external receiving surface 
of some kind – and as such, is bound up with its technicities. As DeLanda observes: 
‘in the absence of astrophysicists (or other users of spectrographs) the patterns 
[made by atoms when they come into contact with radiation] do not perform any 
function’ (Ibid.). In contrast, genetic code encompasses its informationality within 
its function – that is, it incorporates its expressivity in the way it works. This text 
comprises both kinds of conceptual life (it couldn’t fail to). As such the capacity of 
objects to communicate is generally seen to be contingent upon the assemblage of 
which they are currently a part. For example, one might turn to the construction 
of ‘vibrant matter’ by political philosopher Jane Bennett (2010). Here, material 
objects and forces have a life, in that they are possessed of affects (simply that) and 
further, possess an unreadable energy that transcends human experience and yet 
draws us to it. Early in her text, there appears a gathering of objects made eloquent 





On a sunny Tuesday morning on 4 June in the grate over a storm drain to the 
Chesapeake Bay in front of Sam’s Bagels on Cold Spring Lane in Baltimore, there 
was: 
one large men’s black plastic work glove 
one dense mat of oak pollen 
one unblemished dead rat 
one white plastic bottle cap 
one smooth stick of wood 
Glove, pollen, rat, cap stick (2010, p.4).  
In accordance with this meditation upon gatherings and dispersals, I would note 
that Break Down itself is (among other things) a collection of objects that call to 
one another. The proximity of one element to the others enables a narrative to 
emerge. 
In this thesis, my first task is to relocate the materiality; to draw the specificities of 
Landy’s belongings and the fragments and dust he makes of them back into the 
conversation. As such, the approach that I have already described, in which 
discussion of Break Down has often been limited to concepts of commodity and 
consumption, is extended to accommodate the sense in which artistic practice is 
specifically a kind of enquiry. As Salter shows, such work depends on the 
dynamism and vitality of matter – its capacity to be unpredictable or to produce 
the unknown (2015, p.14). I am, therefore, often concerned with the physical 
specificities of the material objects and substances under discussion – their size, 
texture, weight, composition, density – but only to the extent that I can work from 
these admittedly rather blunt parameters into their life, their becoming.  
The fragments produced by Landy provoke questions about the values of part and 
whole; singular and multiple. Further – and still more importantly – the fragment 
in Break Down reveals the intrinsic mediality of material objects. They bear in their 
fabric the story of how they are composed and how they came to be; moreover, the 
basest facts of their formation are in turn constitutive of circumstances, practices, 
processes beyond themselves. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 (pages 59-
60), connections between materiality and what might be called ‘meaning making’ 
can be instantiated through the theory of affordances offered by the psychologist 
James Gibson (1979/1986) in which objects’ concrete features are co-constitutive 
with the physical and cognitive capabilities of the creatures that perceive and 





implicated in a range of interactions, reactions and causalities, politics, states of 
affairs and cognitive and affective processes.  
Therefore, in contrast with Crang’s speculation regarding the ‘meaning’ of ‘just 
stuff’ (2012, p.764), ‘meaning’ appears in this thesis as a verb rather than a noun. 
Deleuze and Guattari present a vision of the book as an assemblage that comprises 
a range of forces or dynamics of joining and un-joining. This ‘little machine’ 
(1987/2013, p.2) occupies a space of both heterogeny and homogeny; singularity 
and multiplicity. It works in ways that are jointed and/or separate, and as such, 
might gather itself into a homogeneous mass and/or split off into discrete, 
heterogeneous parts. Accordingly I begin with Break Down not as a single object - 
‘a’ case study - but rather as a multiple entity that gives rise to effects that are both 
haphazard and manifold. In this context, it makes little sense to speculate as to the 
intentions of the artist or indeed the possible personal significance of his 
belongings. It is more important to consider what the work does.  
In a similar way, if as Deleuze and Guattari suggest such ‘machines’ are best 
investigated through their doings, fusings, re-fusings, inputs and outputs – it is 
important to turn away from any notion of the cultural artefact that makes or 
conveys ‘meaning’ in any simple, direct or unitary sense. The concept of the 
assemblage enables me to project an account of objects as instrumental in the 
telling of stories, the formation of subjectivity and the making and remaking of 
social connections. The things we own are, and are not us. This thesis complicates 
and deepens existing accounts of Break Down, by incorporating the dynamic 
nature of matter to explore conceptualisations of subjectivity and stuff, the extent 
to which material objects might become part of an extended human consciousness, 
and the ways in which we, as human beings, must consider ourselves absolutely 
part of and bound up in the material world. Chapter 6: John Landy’s Sheepskin 
Coat, works at the intersections between three accounts of subjectivity and 
materiality: a Deleuzo-Guattarian conception of multiplicity; Winnicottian object 
relations theory and extended mind theory as employed by the philosopher Andy 
Clark (2009; 2011) and the archaeologist Lambros Malafouris (2013). I argue, then, 
that any account of the material in some way entwining with, supporting or 
augmenting human subjectivity should directly address, and indeed arise from an 





complex account of the subject. It should also include some attempt to account for 
the mechanisms through which this augmentation or entwining might work.  
 
Figure 5: Fragmented matter produced during Break Down (Landy, 2008a, p.192). 
Secondly, this thesis focuses on the material processes that constitute Break Down. 
In relation to the two companion texts to the work, Michael Landy / Break Down 
(Landy, 2001a) and Break Down Inventory (Landy, 2001b), text and practices of 
making text are considered in terms both of materiality and multiplicity. Given the 
emphasis, in Break Down, on the deployment of procedure, I follow Kittler 
(1985/1990; 1986/1999) in investigating bureaucratic writing as a mode that arises 
from, and that itself potentialises, particular historically and culturally specific 
conditions, including material conditions (see also Belknap, 2004; Fuller, 2007; 
Gitelman, 2014; Goody, 1987; Hayles, 2002; Kafka, 2007; 2012; Krajewski, 2011; 
Vismann, 2008). This focus on media as constituted via specifically material 
processes enables the development of a discussion of Break Down that can take on 
board the implications of fragmentation. As such, this discussion is intrinsically 
connected with processes of inventorying and narrativising, dismantling and 
granulating, displaying and disposing.  
As Landy’s belongings are reduced ‘as close as possible to raw materials’ (Sillars, 
2009, pp.25-6), the fragmented sections are revealed as objects that possess their 
own mediality. By this, I mean that they speak very directly of their own 





Break Down reveals the fragment as an object in its own right. The scraps and 
shreds that Landy makes of his belongings are shaken free from one narrative, their 
place and meaning in Landy’s life, and simultaneously gain a new and materially 
intrinsic narrative quality, telling as they do of their own composition and of a 
moment of fissure, of breaking. 
1.4 Chapters; loops; turns 
In the four main chapters that follow the introduction and methodology, this thesis 
explores a series of turns that reveal, in different ways, the pivotal themes of 
mediality and materiality as they arise in Break Down. In this final section of the 
Introduction, I show, by chapter, how the coming argument is to proceed. 
In Chapter 2: Methodology, I consider the scope of this investigation and review 
the theoretical and methodological approaches that underpin this project. Having 
surveyed academic publications here in the introduction, in the methodology I 
review the use of journalistic and other non academic sources on Break Down in 
this thesis. I consider the challenges that inhere in considering a work like Break 
Down, which has no continuing material form. Since this project distinguishes 
itself through its close focus on a single artwork its material composition and 
organisation, I further discuss the methodological implications of this choice. 
Finally, the methodology includes discussion, with reference to Jane Rendell (2005; 
2010), of the strategy of observation and description known as site writing, which 
I adapt for use throughout this thesis. Site writing provides an alternative mode of 
engagement with the subject matter that enables me to explore what it is to achieve 
a sustained focus on the matter of Break Down. 
Chapter 3: Fragment / Part / Whole, attends to the nature of physical matter 
through close investigation of the fragments and dust produced by Break Down. 
The central claim of this chapter is that Landy does not destroy his belongings so 
much as transform them. What he accomplishes through the dismantling and 
grinding in Break Down is to re-narrativise material objects, rejecting their 
seemingly inert form and revealing their mediality. This discussion draws upon 
Deleuzo-Guattarian assemblage theory and Gibson’s theory of affordances 
(1979/1986) to develop an account of the fragment that responds directly to its 
physical form. In Break Down, elements of part and whole emerge at different 





whole bodies, are considered in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the 
multiple. The distinctions between fragments and dust, substances that each have 
their own cultural significance, are brought into play to illuminate their place in 
Landy’s project. Finally, an investigation is established regarding the fragment as a 
narrative object – an object that in its form, tells of its formation. 
The fourth chapter, Manual, explores the significance of the procedures produced 
by Landy to define the work of his team of operatives (the eleven assistants who 
conducted much of the physical work of dismantling and shredding Landy’s 
possessions). The chapter begins by presenting a review of the area of study known 
as new media theory or new German media theory, which will form a theoretical 
underpinning of both this, and the next chapter. Here, the manual for Break Down 
as set out in Landy’s text Michael Landy / Break Down (2001a, pp.33-40) is analysed. 
I read Landy’s manual against his notes on taking apart a radio-cassette player, and 
consider the working hand as an emblem of the Marxian concept of labour power 
(1867/1976, p.270). The significance of the manual as a textual form is further 
assessed through a focus on the use of ‘event scores’ or sets of instructions within 
the known as Fluxus art collective.  
Chapter 5: Line / List / Inventory investigates the significance in Break Down of 
Landy’s operationalisation of inventorying. The material iterations of Break Down 
Inventory (Landy, 2001b), as a printed text and in its earlier form as a spreadsheet, 
are considered in relation to theorisations of the inventory, the line and the list. 
These are forms that summon the modality of the series. The inventory also 
incorporates practices of numbering and the ordering of information according to 
a set of conventions that has its roots at the very beginnings of written language. 
As such, it can be understood as a narrative form, since it is inherently concerned 
with process, relationship and meaning. Further, the inventory, list and line are all 
in different ways fragmented forms that are inherently concerned with a body of 
data as a collection of parts and wholes. As will be seen, the list, in particular, 
appears as a mode in which qualities of dynamism and contingency are of primary 
importance: entries might be (and might have been) shuffled, re-sorted, added and 
excised. 
Building on the discussion of fragment as narrative matter in Chapter 3, Chapter 
6: John Landy’s Sheepskin Coat also projects an extension of existing accounts of 





container for identity and attachments, how this work might be more securely 
accounted for. The final object to be destroyed during Break Down, a sheepskin 
coat owned by Michael Landy’s father, is the fulcrum for an engagement with three 
divergent theoretical positions that nevertheless all contain elements of resonance 
and continuity on the relationship between things and people. These are the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the multiplicity, the object relations theory of 
Donald Winnicott (1964; 1971/2005), and extended mind theory as discussed in the 
work of Clark (2009; 2011) and Malafouris (2013). The chapter comprises an 
examination of the literary trope of the second hand coat that is inhabited by its 
previous owner, followed by a close reading of discussion regarding John Landy’s 
coat. While human affect can be seen to be scattered through and woven into the 
material world that surrounds us, this leads to a notion of personhood and identity 
that is multiple and contingent rather than fixed. Objects may appear to take up 
human qualities, but human beings are also thingly; made of stuff; intrinsically of 
the natural world. 
2 Methodology 
2.1 One Work1 
This chapter introduces three important methodological elements of this inquiry 
into Break Down. First, it explores the implications of devoting an entire, book-
length text to a single work of art and provides an overview of the range of 
materials and sources on which I draw in making this account of the work. I 
consider the fact that this art work, as a live event and an entity that could be 
visited, is in the past; therefore, this discussion cannot draw directly upon Break 
Down and relies on others’ accounts of the work. Finally, this chapter provides an 
opportunity to consider the methodological implications of the questions of 
mediality, materiality and relationships between the two upon which this thesis 
hinges. In considering the material practices that have produced this text, I refer 
especially to the work of the new media theorist Friedrich Kittler (1985/1990; 
1986/1999). This includes the fact, specifically, that it has been written, but further 
the ways in which writing ‘writes’ not only the thesis, but the object of these 
writings, the writer as writer and indeed, the act of writing itself (Rendell, 2010). I 
perform this complex configuration with a particular awareness of writing in my 
deployment of site writing, a strategy derived from the work of the practitioner 
and theorist of art and architecture Jane Rendell (2005; 2010). The coming chapter 
works between the psychoanalytic foundations of this observational writing 
technique and the theoretical approach taken in this thesis, which is inspired by, 
and/or takes after, Deleuzo-Guattarian assemblage theory.2  
                                                     
1 In this subtitle I acknowledge the excellent ‘One Work’ series of texts published by the London 
art organisation Afterall, each of which focuses on a single work of contemporary art. Working 
with texts from this collection has been essential in my own reflections on the methodological 
implications of making Break Down the sole focus of this project. 
2 Here in the methodology it is worthwhile to expand on one technical element of my writing in 
order to contextualise my approach in relation to this thesis. As I move through discussions that 
pertain to a number of objects and surfaces, I employ what is known as the literary present tense 
to discuss texts and art works. My intention here is to convey the sense that the texts under 
discussion continue to speak in the present, despite having been written in the past. I extend this 
convention to my discussion of this thesis itself. In doing so, I hope to communicate that I 
distinguish the chapters of this thesis – and this thesis as a whole - specifically as texts that 
continue to do whatever it is they do, and thus warrant use of the present tense (rather than 
records of work that I have done - although of course, they are that, too). This seems particularly 





To examine just one art work must, itself, be seen as a specifically methodological 
decision that centralises the concept of multiplicity in this thesis. To take up Break-
Down as the sole focus of this project reveals the work as a dense locus of 
intersecting influences, which in themselves provide space for exploration and/or 
ground for analysis. As discussed in the introduction, the substantial analyses that 
take place in the chapters that follow take the form of a series of discursive turns 
or gambits. These demonstrate how Break Down potentiates novel ways to 
understand the themes discussed. The art work appears, therefore, not as a vehicle 
for instantiation (for example of an abstract conceptual theme or theoretical 
argument) but rather as a distributed entity; a pack of connections, objects and 
energies that is ‘always in the middle’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/2013, pp.306-7). 
As the artist and art theorist O’Sullivan remarks, one condition of this dense 
specificity is that the multiplicity has ‘no end […], no origin or final cause’ (2006, 
p.28).  
Odd things happen to scale when working with a single art work over a protracted 
period. Extreme proximity might be expected to summon Break Down in its very 
essence, this-ness or is-ness, but in fact fuzzes the edges, introducing a new layer 
of generalisation and expansiveness. Thinking this fuzzing experience through 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of multiplicity, one might say that through the 
sustained focus of this inquiry, Break Down emerges as almost limitless in its 
potential scope, in that the work is found to contain within itself a fundamental 
connectedness. Almost inevitably, therefore, it is necessary to cut through a dense 
mass of connections or tune out an overwhelming chattering in order to be able to 
speak at all.3 Certainly, to present a sustained piece of writing from a position of 
everythingness would threaten the capacity of these writings to communicate. 
While the discussions to come are provoked by elements of Break Down, this thesis 
is a bus that will not call at every stop. In this sense, the guiding frame of the 
                                                     
perform an encounter with some element of Break Down. Any convention of writing that enables 
me build in some sense of this staging or performing - to foreground in some small way the work 
done by the text rather than me, the author, is therefore a welcome tool in positioning this thesis. 
3 It is precisely the inability to do this tuning-in (or out) that, for Deleuze and Guattari, defines 
the psychiatric diagnosis of schizophrenia. As the cultural theorist Ian Buchanan comments, while 
this experience of intense connectivity with the essential currents of the universe may sound 
great - and even laudable or desirable – this ‘irruption of immanence’ should be understood as 
representing not only a theoretical gambit but a genuine area of human experience that can 





question of materiality and its mediality, as it relates to and is revealed by Break 
Down, is a saving grace that helps me to cut a way through, structuring and guiding 
the formation of this thesis.  
2.2 Gone Work 
Running through the following discussion of the methodological features of this 
thesis is the fact that I did not see Break Down – and couldn’t do so now, since the 
work has no continuing physical existence.4 In this, as much as in Landy’s 
deliberate destruction of his belongings, the work stages loss. By the same token, 
to think and write about this work is to prioritise specifically what cannot, any 
more, be touched, heard, smelt, tasted or seen. The abandoned shop floor where 
Landy's conveyor belt once stood now operates once more as an actual shop floor, 
and his granulated possessions lie in landfill site(s) somewhere, or may even have 
made their way through one of the reclamation facilities mimicked by Landy. How 
can one come to know an art work in these circumstances? 
Observation: 499 Oxford Street, January 2009. The pillars are still here, and the large 
plate-glass window onto the street, and from these landmarks I surmise where the 
production line might have stood and on which wall was displayed that list of the dead, 
the catalogue of Landy’s belongings. In those windows crates containing the desiccated 
remains of these objects were displayed for passers-by to inspect – through them, 
pedestrians would have chanced to glance the process of destruction (or the production 
of dust). In the late-afternoon January gloaming people trudge towards Marble Arch, at 
the arse-end of Oxford Street. Just as Landy observed nine years ago, at least one in every 
two or three holds a carrier bag containing recent purchases. As I enter through the doors 
                                                     
4 In this discussion, reflecting the importance of materiality in the thesis overall, I focus on the 
physicality of Break Down, in particular - and the conundrum presented by writing in its absence. 
I write, not about, but in the knowledge of, developments in contemporary art (particularly since 
the advent of the readymade and of conceptual art) that in any case put into question the 
centrality of the material form of a work of art. Adorno’s assertion that ‘in the modern artwork 
it is its abstractness, that irritating indeterminateness of what it is and to what purpose it is, that 
becomes a cipher of what the work is’ (1970/1997, p.28) can here be run alongside the art 
theorist John Roberts’ discussion of mutations in form and value in art after the advent of the 
readymade artwork. Roberts (2008) identifies that the avant-garde can be seen as a critique of 
previously assumed notions of canonical authority and subjective authenticity in art. The art 
writing and site writing strategies that I adopt in order to pursue the absent materiality of Landy’s 
Break Down are, perhaps, so eminently suitable for this purpose because they have come into 
being specifically in the context of this indeterminacy in which the material form of the work is 





at the corner of Park Street I am confronted by density and monotony above all else. The 
mode of display here is informed not by variety but by quantity. It is impossible to cross 
the floor without brushing against the stock; this is storeroom as much as shop. I take up 
a position opposite the doors where I can gaze across the plane where Break Down once 
was.   
The surfaces of the floor, the walls, the ceiling are uniformly smooth and white. All faces 
and objects are suffused in light, lending an odd sense of vivacity to what, despite the 
continuous through-put of footfall, is an overwhelmingly moribund scene. On the shop 
floor no music plays and the main noise I can hear is the continuous hum of many voices. 
This low chuntering sounds more than serious: grave. As they enter the store each new 
visitor appraises the scene, their expressions speculative, sombre and purposeful. A 
continuous procession moves in through the doors at the corner of Oxford Street and 
Park Street before seemingly being absorbed into the store. Opposite me, a large set of 
shelves holds astonishing piles of knickers, all gorgeousness, polka dots and lace, and 
laden with such excess that the piles are dissolving into disorderly heaps under their own 
weight. As I watch, a worker conveying an overloaded rack of clothes to the shop floor 
unknowingly (unavoidably, in fact) grazes the display as he passes and a single pair of 
pants falls to the floor, where it seems momentarily to hover, all off-pink and cream like 
some delicious, abandoned creature before it is trodden and kicked out of sight. 
This piece of site writing records an expedition, very early in my work on this 
thesis, to the site at which Break Down took place. My pacings of the shop floor at 
499 Oxford Street brings to the surface the physical transience of the work. This 
was not the only visit of this kind. At a certain point in my project, in order to 
create for myself a way into writing about Break Down, I found myself visiting 
spaces where Landy’s works used to be.5 I walked, gazed, consulted photographs 
and sometimes closed my eyes in order to retrieve some remaining element of the 
work, as if some fragment of the piece; some element of the experience of visiting 
in person, might linger. Such expeditions necessitated, I found, an imagined 
superimposition of ‘now’ and ‘before’, reminiscent of the imagining by the  
 
                                                     
5 I also visited the London branch of Louis Vuitton, the designer handbag retailer where Landy 
staged his Credit Card Destroying Machine (2010) and the Duveen Gallery at Tate Britain, where 






Figure 6: H.2.N.Y. Self-constructing Self-destroying Tinguely Machine, Museum of Modern Art, 
17th March 1960 (Landy, 2006). 
geographer Harriet Hawkins of Break Down as a work that summons, 
simultaneously, a number of different kinds of spaces (2010, pp.23-4). 
Landy’s remark, when asked to stage a reprise of the work at the Sao Paulo Biennale 
was that ‘Break Down [isn't] something you can revive like a musical’ (Cumming, 
2002; see also The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002). All the same, the notion 
of restaging the work entertains me. This remark, set alongside Landy’s mocked-
up photo of himself and the artist Jean Tinguely searching through a New York 
dump (Landy, 2009, p.130; see also Tate, 2009b),6 provokes speculation. One might 
imagine his boiler-suited operatives sifting forensically through landfill sites for 
fragments of Landy's possessions; haunting online auctions and car boot sales for 
identical replacements, by catalogue number, of his Grundig satellite dish, his red, 
                                                     
6 This picture appears opposite an imagined interview between Landy and Tinguely, entitled 
Heavy Meta: Landy and Tinguely in the Dump (Landy, 2009, pp.130-4) and was made as part of 
Landy’s project (so far unsuccessful) to re-stage Tinguely’s Homage to New York (1960) in which 
the artist uses machine parts and wheels gathered from the dump to build his auto-destructive 
machine. Landy has said that his request was denied by Tinguely’s estate because, known for 
having destroyed art as he is, he was deemed unsuitable (Landy, 2008b). However, Tinguely’s 
work continues to be influential for Landy, and is cited very clearly in the forms of machine 
structures in the 2013 show Saints Alive and the work Credit Card Destroying Machine (2010). In 






tasselled beret, and his Ikea Ingo chair self-assembly instructions (Landy, 2008, pp. 
113-218); contacting his ex-partners and parents for copies (or faked-up re-
draftings) of destroyed love letters; prints of family snaps. Contacting young British 
artists to ask them to provide re-workings or mock-ups of the works destroyed by 
Landy the first time around.7 Locating, for extra verisimilitude, a stand-in for Landy 
himself – a man who hadn't already destroyed everything once. Workers in 
reclamation centres tend conveyor belts, sorting plastic from metal and textile. 
Landy’s operatives stand alongside cheerful blue-framed disassembly lines, 
hammering, unscrewing, ripping and prying one component from another. Such 
procedures of deciding the destination or deployment of an object (using; 
displaying; storing; trashing) make a playful parallel with the scholarly work of 
pursuing Break Down through the surrounding evidence.  
The scholar of art and architecture Jane Rendell considers the conundrum of how 
to investigate a work that not only isn’t here, but further, may not be anywhere in 
particular: ‘to write a site that one has not visited’ (2010, p.187) or ‘to imagine [a] 
work from the vantage point of another remembered or imagined place’ (Ibid., 
p.149). In this, she brings forward a vision of art writing as a richly generative 
venture that can dynamically connect an investigator with her subject. These 
speculative investigations of Rendell’s, like Landy’s insertion of himself into Jean 
Tinguely’s landfill-picking adventures (Landy, 2009; 2008b), are a kind of 
summoning of the present perfect. The longing to have been there that arises in 
both projects well describes the impulses and dilemmas that inhere in my work 
here. I will admit to having dreamed of a strategy (perhaps the covert release of a 
swarm of electro-tagged nocturnal bees, or the invention of some critical/analytical 
time machine) that could pick up the minute deposits of Break Down dust that 
must linger in the space once occupied by the conveyor belt at 499 Oxford Street. 
In just the same way, I discover, in his research into Jean Tinguely’s Homage To 
New York (1960), itself accessible only via archival materials, Michael Landy himself 
                                                     
7 This did happen the first time around. Gary Hume, on hearing about Landy’s project, swapped 
a painting that he had recently given to him for another version which he considered less 
successful: presumably, this is item A90 in the Inventory, listed as ‘Gary Hume, Clown, gloss paint 
on wood, swapped work with the artist, 54 x 38 cm, 1997’ (Landy, 2001b). As the story goes, 
Hume visited Break Down and, moved by the project, gave back the original gift to be destroyed. 
Another work from the same series had recently sold at the auction house Christies for £170,000 





observes the ghostly white of Tinguely’s whitewashed machine and fantasises that 
it might somehow bring itself back into existence: 
it’s like a silhouette, it’s like an apparition in a way, it’s like a ghost and I quite like 
the idea that once a year it sort of appears out of nowhere and re-enacts itself for 
27 minutes and then it disappears again (Landy, 2008b). 
In Landy’s pursuit of Homage To New York as in this thesis, the lack of a physical 
work to directly observe and describe provides an opening for speculation or 
conjecture. This effect is both amplified through my focus here on a single art work, 
and, as will be discussed, exploited via the intermittent deployment, throughout 
the text, of site writing. 
2.3 Sources 
The introduction has comprehensively surveyed academic publications on Break 
Down; here, an overview of other sources is provided. Break Down trails a long tail 
of media coverage. There exists a large body of journalistic articles, including a 
great many interviews with the artist (see for example Berning, 2012; Cork, 2000; 
Cumming, 2001; 2002; Treneman, 2001; Walford, 2001; Wood, 2001); talks and 
interviews with Landy on video (Institute of Contemporary Art, 2012; Landy 2008b; 
Tate, 2009a; Gaga For Dada, 2016), a substantial section in Landy’s book Everything 
Must Go! (Landy, 2008a) and other texts that provide an overview of Landy’s work 
(Schwabsky, 2007; Sillars, 2009). The website of Artangel, the art organisation that 
produced the work, provides a substantial section on Break Down, which includes 
further interviews and audio-visual material (Artangel n.d.; Artangel, 2010; 
Artangel, 2015; Landy, 2002b; Landy and Lingwood, 2008). Finally, the 
documentary The Man Who Destroyed Everything (2002) was the first programme 
shown on the inaugural evening of broadcasts from the television channel BBC4 
on 2 March 2002 (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2002). As a source, this 
provides a great deal of detailed information regarding the event itself as well as 
including footage of Break Down and of Landy himself, before and after Break 
Down took place.  
The source material about Break Down is itself both iterative and fragmented. 
While the art event Break Down took place over a couple of weeks, the project as a 
whole spanned a period of years, beginning with the exhibition held in Landy’s 





developed, followed by further research and planning. Break Down itself took place 
from 10 to 24 February 2001 (Landy 2001a; 2001b; 2008a), and the project of 
cataloguing Landy’s stuff was only finished a year after the end of the show (The 
Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002). On reviewing accounts of the artwork it is 
striking that through this years-long process of making and speaking about Break 
Down Michael Landy adopts (and resists) a number of different accounts of - or 
warrants for - the work. At different times he presents Break Down as a piece about 
bureaucratic or industrial procedures, consumer capitalism, the utility of 
materials, environmentalism, inbuilt obsolescence, the material culture of identity 
and personal biography, a revolt against everyday life, and spiritual cleansing 
through destruction and a destructive and traumatic trial (see Cork, 2000; Corner, 
2010; Cumming, 2001; Cumming, 2002; Landy, 2001a, pp.107-116; Landy, 2008, 
pp.104-8). This evidence that he has adopted a number of different narratives over 
time does not feel like an exposure of Landy; rather, to honour the several-
headedness of his account of the work feels like an invitation to take seriously the 
notion of Break Down as a distributed entity.  
The nature of Break Down appears to turn and turn about in these iterative tellings 
by Landy in a way that is reminiscent of the account of multiplicity by the 
enthnographer Annemarie Mol. Here, the term ‘multiplicity’ refers to the way an 
object might be defined through more than one set of epistemic conditions or 
perspectives simultaneously. As such, it embodies more than one set of conditions 
– that is, it is implicated within more than one assemblage - simultaneously (2002, 
pp.81-2). It can be seen that this condition, too, attaches itself to Break Down.8 
Writing about the work becomes, more than a recuperative endeavour, a venture 
that is recursive; that goes back over the same ground again and again, and yet 
generates new stories. As Mol says of her research on the treatment of 
artherosclerosis, the disease is the pain experienced by the patient; the perception 
of his family who observe his physical capabilities; the image produced through an 
angiogram; the percept of the physician who physically examines his leg: 
Multiplicity is complicated. Not only are there different “artheroscleroses” enacted 
in any single hospital, but there are also different styles of enacting these. There is 
                                                     
8 In fact, rather than a special case, I would suggest that it would be rather extraordinary to find 
an example of an entity that is not multiple in the sense that it is constituted by, and behaves 





diagnosis, in which the questions “what is the matter?” and “what to do?” alternate 
and intertwine. And there is treatment. In treatment, doing is a matter of undoing. 
Enacting disease takes the form of counteracting it. But however much these styles 
of engaging with reality differ, the object, the “artherosclerosis” that is treated, may 
be similar to the “artherosclerosis” that was diagnosed earlier on (2002, pp.91-3; 
emphasis reproduced). 
A similar multiplicity appears in the psychoanalyst Darien Leader’s account of 
narrative in which the bereaved repeat and replay stories of the lost loved one ‘like 
looking at a diamond not just from one angle but from all possible angles, so that 
each of its facets can be viewed’ (2009, p.28). One might think only of the 
fragments produced by Landy, which appear and reappear in a range of guises. As 
discussed in the introduction, the fragmented matter is, simultaneously - among 
other things - Landy’s lost possessions (for Landy himself and perhaps his family); 
broken and deformed parts of significant art works that were previously whole 
(within some sections of the art world); scrap material that has a market value 
(reclamation and recycling); a spectacle to be placed behind a plate glass window 
(as part of the art work Break Down); a substance the precise size of which is 
defined by the operation of the granulating machines and Landy’s procedures for 
his operatives (within the Manual for Break Down).  
The experience of reading the texts that surround Break Down can be very like 
looking into Leader’s diamond and turning it over and over to see something 
almost – yet not wholly – similar in each of the facets. Landy himself materialises 
and re-materialises through these texts as though the artist were travelling around 
the conveyor belt of Break Down in various states of physical or psychic 
disassembly. He appears in print and in still and moving images, in the first and 
the third person, as a conversant and an interviewee. Inevitably - the artist ‘gave 
an average of six interviews a day’ during Break Down (Landy, 2002b) and in 
following years, continued to speak and write about it - he develops a schtick in 
which some phrases are uttered again and again and stories appear and reappear: 
for example, the work as an escape from consumerism (Cork, 2000; Corner, 2010; 
Cumming, 2002; Landy, 2001c; Stallabrass, 2000; The Man Who Destroyed 
Everything, 2002; Treneman, 2001); the pain of destroying his father’s coat (Cork, 
2000; Cumming, 2002; Landy, 2001c; Stallabrass, 2000; The Man Who Destroyed 
Everything, 2002; Wood, 2001); his decision to throw his crying mother out of Break 
Down (Cumming, 2002; Landy, 2002b; The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002; 





2010; Cumming, 2002; Landy, 2002b; Landy, 2008b; Wood, 2002). It must also be 
the case, since Break Down continues to be Landy’s best known work, that each 
time he does a new project, more material on Break Down is published. This 
becomes rather derivative; therefore, as a general principle, the most recent 
interviews and articles to mention Break Down are only cited if they include some 
new element that has not already been covered in previous accounts. 
2.4 Site Writing 
Observation: Observing myself writing (July 2014). Meta-cite-write. This is paralysing. 
To close my attention in on my own hand as I write short circuits my own attention. I 
write with a fluttery, uneven feeling of claustrophobia - of the inside-myself-ness of being 
a human, sitting here in this body, looking out of a pair of eyes, holding in my fingers a 
mechanical pencil that traces thin, emphatic lines and marks on a pad of yellow paper. 
The way I hold my pencil, not something I’ve attended to for years and yet suddenly I 
remember the paralysis of not correctly holding a pen   M M M m m   m  the satisfaction, 
actually, of carving out, of crafting a row of characters   f f f   k k k   my pleasure at the 
bend of an ‘f’ and its tail lolling comfortably just below the line. The friendly roundness 
of an ‘e’   eee e. It is still,  I have managed to make this external to me somehow, and yet 
it’s still uncomfortable to be constrained to the space of the paper: the unscrolling text. 
Wher The slippery feeling of the lead, worn against the smoothness of the paper: through 
my grip I can feel where the pencil is going. I can become quite distanced from the 
process and then it seems that the letters almost form themselves 
      b b b 
              d d d         n   n n   n  n 
This thesis includes an encounter with, and extension of, the site writing of Jane 
Rendell (2005; 2010). Following her prioritisation of situation in terms both of 
subjectivity and space, I use the term ‘site writing’ to refer to the reflexive practice 
of writing descriptively about the world. Within the current text passages of site 
writing (which are labelled ‘observation’ and appear in blue italics) represent an 
attempt to score the (already absent) materiality of Break Down into the fabric of 
my own writing. This written pursuit of the work is therefore wholly speculative. 
In this methodology I have already devoted attention to the challenges of engaging 
with an art work that, like Break Down, has no physical presence. That said, it 





immediately tangible and visible form could be much less complex or problematic. 
This can be seen, for example, in Jane Bennett’s concept, ‘thing-power,’ which she 
expresses specifically in terms of a certain inimical force between matter and 
human capacities for knowing and understanding. The vibrancy of thinghood, she 
suggests, is all but impossible to pin down or define. In Bennett’s terms, ‘vibrant 
things’ have ‘a certain effectivity of their own, a perhaps small but irreducible 
degree of independence from the words, images and feelings they provoke in us’ 
(2010, p.xvi). I choose to attribute this moment of incomprehension to a limitation 
in human capacities for knowing and expressing rather than a mystical quality of 
all matter. 
In this thesis, then, site writing is an attempt to understand the expressive power 
that suffuses the physical world, and in tandem, to resist ‘this habit of parsing the 
world into dull matter (it, things) and vibrant life (us, beings)’ (Bennett, 2010, p.vii). 
This approach is embodied, for example, in my site writings in Chapter 3, on dust 
and the fragment, which, as I show, narrates its own becoming and the dynamism 
of its form with particular clarity. In site writing I tap into the becoming described 
by Deleuze and Guattari, in which things need to be imagined as essentially 
concerned with process (Buchanan, 2015, pp.29-30). My work therefore owes a debt 
to the project of the critic, Mieke Bal to use writing to achieve proximity to a work 
of art. Her proposal that ‘strong works of art [hover] between’ inert, describable 
‘thing’ and vital, narratable ‘event’ (2001, p.124) is analogous to the Deleuzo-
Guattarian vision of a dynamism that is immanent in the universe and vibrates 
through even the most seemingly inert of objects. This flickering between object 
and event expresses very well the kind of looking I have tried to achieve, and to 
convey in the writing of this thesis. Indeed, as I have mentioned, the subject of site 
written passages that appear in these pages is often not a work of art but an object 
or as seen in the passages of site writing above, scenes from my research process. 
Nevertheless, in writing about art, through the attempt to translate from one 
medium into another, it might be expected that something will be lost. I don’t 
intend this statement to be at all sentimental or melancholic about that lost 
something. As Salter pragmatically remarks, an incompleteness or loss of fidelity 
between subject and written account is simply ‘the contradiction and tension that 
any [written] account of “unruly experience” has to deal with’ (2015, p.14). In this 





capacity to produce new connections lie precisely in this loss of fidelity. Through 
this writing strategy, something new is produced, that was not immediately present 
in the form of the object of observation, and yet was also not hitherto accessible to 
me as the author.  
Bal suggests that there is a tension between the scholarly imperative to weave texts 
together and to write, and the need for the form of the art work to be recognised 
and attended to directly (2001, p.124). This raises questions about the nature and 
life of a work of art as well as the recuperative, not to say constitutive, nature of art 
writing. In particular, it would be odd to claim that site writing is necessarily less 
contingent than the site – or the art work – that is the subject of such writing; this 
especially since these sections of my thesis in particular depend upon my own 
associative work as the author. If site writing presents a break in the formal 
academic register9 generally deployed in this thesis, the practice of writing is itself 
put into play as a tactic for the explication of my own processes of engaging with 
the work. In the context of the ‘inventive methods’ discussed in Lury and Wakeford 
(2012, see also Day et al, 2014, specifically on number), however, this work appears 
as a practical mode of enquiry.10 Site writing, then, is thought that works alongside 
itself, enacting itself, the subject of the enquiry, and the researcher, relaying the 
vitality of the phenomena under consideration through modes of reflexivity and 
speculation. As such, the practice of site writing sits well alongside the following 
reflection from O’Sullivan on art writing as an endeavour in which disciplinary 
discourses and registers are reconfigured and articulated in unfamiliar 
combinations in order to reimagine the subject: ‘By blurring discrete categories, 
                                                     
9 The particular cadences and requirements of academic writing as a mode of discourse are 
explored by researchers in applied English Ken Hyland and Feng Jiang, who define that in 
academic writing, ‘formality helps to avoid ambiguity and misinterpretation by minimizing the 
context-dependence and fuzziness of expressions’ (2017, p.41). However, the observation that 
formality might be seen as a defining feature of academic writing is only useful if brought into a 
context in which academic written language is seen as a communicative strategy that is shaped 
by its specific purpose. Here, ‘formality’ is a distancing tactic that is deployed in order to 
communicate a properly sceptical scholarly approach. For example, Peter Crompton, a 
researcher in discourse analysis, defines that discussions of ‘hedging’ in academic writing have 
generally encompassed ‘impersonal constructions, the use of the passive, and lexis-projecting 
emotions’ (1997, p.271; see also Vassileva, 2001). 
10 Contributors explore walking, tape-recording, making, counting, making, coding, and writing 





producing new encounters and fostering monstrous couplings, new kinds of 
writing and new kinds of thought become possible’ (2006, p.18).11  
Rendell herself begins with Bal in the prologue to her text, Site Writing. If Bal wants 
to place the art with which she engages in her writing at the centre of that writing, 
Rendell further complicates this approach via analysis of the relationalities 
involved in such ‘engagements’. As such, she produces accounts of art works that 
integrate: 
the sites – material, emotional, political and conceptual – of the artwork’s 
conception, exhibition and documentation, as well as those remembered, dreamed 
and imagined by the artist, critic and other viewers (2010, p.1). 
Rendell clarifies her relationship with the works she discusses via an exploration 
of the spatiality that arises in the language employed in her art criticism. Rather 
than imagining a work being ‘under critique’ for example, she considers site writing 
to be a kind of remaking of the work from within, via the unique perspective of the 
writer. Instead of ‘writing about’ the work, therefore, she ‘writes’ it (Ibid., p.7). This 
relationality is constituted via a psychoanalytic account that works within and 
between a complex of mediations – ‘me’ and ‘not-me’, yes, but further the ‘me’ that 
has in fact been taken in from outside; the ‘not-me’ that has in fact been pushed 
into the outside world (and often, into a particular space or recipient) from within. 
For Rendell, these arrayed transactions, introjections and projections pertain 
closely to the practice of site writing (Ibid., pp.9-11). Indeed, such mechanisms 
reside not only in transactions between the analyst and analysand, but are 
                                                     
11 A sampling of the frayed narratives and, in the words of O’Sullivan (2006), ‘monstrous 
couplings’ (and more than couplings) of register that inspire my approach include Rachel 
DuPlessis’ collaged criticism in The Pink Guitar (2006), the rich idiosyncrasies of Carol Mavor’s 
novelistic philosophy, in which photographic images are woven through the text (2007), and the 
sweaty-palmed intercutting of genealogy and journal in Jackie Orr’s sociology of anxiety and 
psychiatry, Panic Diaries (2006). Walter Benjamin’s close description, philosophy and index-card 
flaneurism in Paris (1982/1999) progress somehow alongside W.G. Sebald’s photographically-
supplemented walks through time and loss (via Suffolk) in The Rings of Saturn (1998) and the 
feverish spoutings of lists, footnotes, dialogue, close description and sub-sub librarianship in 
Moby Dick (Melville, 1851/1994). The vivid engagement of Carolyn Steedman in both Dust (2001) 
and Landscape for a Good Woman (2005) transports her from the historical archives into 
altogether more lively – not to say risky – settings. Finally, I am inspired by the reflexive criticism 
of Janis Jefferies (2012), Annemarie Mol (2002) and Chris Salter (2015) in addition of course to 
Jane Rendell (2010): these four texts all model specifically the deployment of closely descriptive 
passages that intersperse passages of exegesis, throwing light, punctuating and animating the 
discussion. My own approach bears a particular resemblance to these last in that I have adopted 





generalizable across a range of contexts and settings, and will be seen throughout 
individuals’ relationships and encounters.12 In transference, a generative space is 
created by the fact that the Other does not reside only within, or only without. 
Rather, as object relations theory suggests, an external object (that exists in reality 
beyond the person – say the string attached to a bobbin, or the figure of the mother 
who has just left the room) has its corresponding internal object (that has been 
introjected by the individual). The two are not entirely separate or entirely joined; 
instead, between them is a midway, or as Winnicott (1971/2005) says, ‘transitional’ 
space.  
It is in this space that play occurs, that infants begin the process of separating from 
their primary carer, and that in adult life our most vivid moments of creative 
engrossment take place (Rendell, 2010, p.24). Such an account brings a doubleness 
– at least – to persons, objects and texts that work themselves through one another 
and yet might occasionally spring apart into singleness once more. In this sense, 
despite the singularity of the psychoanalytic vision of the subject,13 the concept of 
transference brings with it the possibility of an account that can work alongside 
the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of multiplicity that runs through this thesis. In 
both, psychic entities have more than one single location or existence, and any 
object or entity one might name possesses a potentiality which is as multiple and 
diffuse as the number of people who might encounter it. The meeting between 
writer, writing and written that is figured by Rendell is shaped by a psychoanalytic 
account of the formation of meaning through encounter. Here, meaning lurks 
somewhere within, but might be accessed via creative and indirect approaches, and 
via the informative associations that might be made.  
As such, in site writing the critic ‘combines associative and attentive modes of 
writing, including forms of interpretation which construct, conject and invent’ 
(2010, p.13). Following this, an encounter – a meeting – is staged in this writing of 
Break Down, on a number of planes simultaneously: between the viewer and the 
                                                     
12 Here, Rendell draws upon a range of psychoanalytic writers, notably Laplanche, ‘who trained 
with Lacan’ (Rendell, 2010, p.8). 
13 Relationships between a conception of personhood as conceived within Object Relations 
theory – in particular the work of Winnicott – and a Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of subjectivity 
as a multiple entity, are discussed in depth in Chapter 6, Section 6.3. In addition, the Deleuzo-
Guattarian account of psychoanalytic approaches as contrasted with their proposed multiplicity 





work/site/sight that is being observed; between the art work and the system or 
procedure of writing itself; between the viewer and her experience of the act of 
looking and writing (Ibid., p.151). A psychoanalytic account might frame the work 
of site writing as a way to access the workings of the individual, self contained 
psyche as it works to tell itself stories – to place itself. By contrast, in Deleuze and 
Guattari, the unconscious emerges as ‘a capacity or capability of the mind whose 
limits are constantly tested without being reached’ (Buchanan, 2015, p.28; see also 
Holland, 1999, p.98). The emphasis here is on the unconscious as an element of 
psychic plumbing (or, given Buchanan’s mention of capacity which brings to mind 
the capacitor that temporarily stores electrical charge, perhaps electrical 
engineering): a joining point that has more to do with the strength of a variety of 
flows than the qualitative character of these.  
In this context, site writing emerges as a strategy for making contact with an energy 
that not only connects me to the rest of the universe, but makes me in some senses 
indistinguishable from it. Via site writing, I reach from within the structure of this 
thesis into the dynamic, associative energies described by Deleuze and Guattari 
(1972/2013, p.15). As such, I employ the strategy of site writing to prioritise 
throughout this account, not a fixed authenticity but perhaps something of the life, 
the becoming, of Break Down. This site writing, a project of exhaustive looking and 
writing, might be brought into conversation with O’Sullivan on art and ‘the 
perception of affect’, a state that opens up the possibility of ‘the perception of small 
differences’ (2006, p.49). Citing practices including art, meditation, 
sadomasochistic practices and drug use as strategies for ‘accessing that which is 
normally ‘outside’ yourself (that is, outside your signifying self)’ (Ibid., p.47), 
O’Sullivan imagines ‘affect’ not as a fundamentally interior set of experiences, but 
rather as a mode in which we might open up or cut through our own subjectivity 
in order to perceive and connect with the wider world.  In these terms, affect is ‘the 
matter in us responding and resonating with the matter around us’ (Ibid., p.50). 
In imagining a writing practice that takes into account concepts of the multiplicity 
and affect, I turn to Kittler, whose account of ‘media’ that ‘determine our situation’ 
(1986/1999, p.xxxix) relates to the relationship between the speaker or writer and 
the technicity of media. In this account, mediality works directly via and upon us: 
as he comments, in handwriting ‘the body left […] strangely unavoidable traces’ 





of language – as not only determined by the available technicities but, specifically, 
as a corporeal discipline that is shaped by, and shapes, human conditions of 
percept (Wellbery, 1990, pp.xxviii-xxx). This is inverted in Kittler’s argument that 
the technicity of writing does not only record but forms ‘our thoughts’ (1986/1999, 
p.203). This important element of Kittler’s account casts into doubt any notion that 
there exist essential human qualities that can be expressed through more or less 
‘authentic’ methods, since surely if there exists a core or kernel of authentic person-
hood, it is this, rather than the mode of writing, that should determine what is 
written. The idea that writing can be constitutive of, rather than only constituted 
by thought, is significant because it helps to substantiate a notion of human 
subjectivity that accommodates a concept of personhood as a distributed 
phenomenon; an assemblage that comprises a multiplicity of elements.  
In considering the implications of this account for my own site writing practice, I 
draw upon the work of Lambros Malafouris (2013), in which he attempts to find a 
space between philosophy, cognitive psychology, and archaeology to discuss the 
interrelated nature of human subjectivity and materiality. As I discuss in more 
depth in Chapter 6, we find here an account of the cognitive work that takes place 
between human systems of cognition and the material world, drawing out 'a 
cognitive landscape in which brains, bodies and things play equal roles in the 
drama of human becoming' (Ibid., p.2). To speak of ‘equal’ roles as Malafouris does 
here assigns to this unendingly complex and dynamic entwinement more of a sense 
of equivalency – not to say a more evenly weighted influence – than is quite 
warranted. It is difficult to conceive of a way in which we might ever be able to 
attribute the extent to which brain, rather than body, or things, rather than brain, 
may or may not form part of this scene, much of which unfolds in spaces that are 
interior to human thought and thus hardly open to observation or measurement. 
Nevertheless, the notion that personhood is not contained, and the material world 
not excluded by the epidermis, is compelling. Malafouris, following the 
philosopher Andy Clark (2011, p.76), posits that mind is not confined to the physical 
limits of the human body, but inheres through the entire apparatus, including 
extending objects. For example, a pencil and pad can here be seen as conduits for 
cognition (Ibid., p.6). As such, 'mark making' appears 'not as a passive 
representational object but as an active prosthetic perceptual means of making 
sense' (Ibid., p.180). One might therefore constitute the practice of site writing as 





representations relayed and filtered (art work, eye, brain, hand, pencil – and again 
at the point of transcription, via keyboard and fingertips, eye, screen, brain) but as 
thought-objects, or as Malafouris has it, 'enactive projections' (2013, p.180).  
Following Clark’s discussion of extended cognition, one might consider the 
aforementioned set of written notes not as a record of thought, but as a kind of 
residue of thought itself, which is both embodied and made possible via 'the loop 
through pen and paper' (2011, p.xxv); that is, via the practice of doing writing. This 
connects with his conception of language as an example of an outside-the-brain 
apparatus that is intrinsic to the operation and extension of human thought: 
As soon as we formulate a thought in words or on paper, it becomes an object for 
both ourselves and for others. As an object, it is the kind of thing we can have 
thoughts about. In creating the object we need have no thoughts about thoughts, 
but once it is there, the opportunity immediately exists to attend to it as an object 
in its own right (2011, pp.58-9). 
Clark suggests that writing can be not only constitutive of, but identical with 
thought; this work of building chains of words substantiates and makes thought 
concrete. In this particular, writing constitutes an objectification of the experience 
of making observations, in order to enable reflection on and theoretical 
engagement with them. Malafouris’ theorisation of material engagement, too, 
presents a fundamental challenge to received notions of human perception and 
experience as abstracted from the material. He demonstrates, instead, the material 
structures and complexes that make up cognition.  
Therefore, to the extent that site writing works as an attempt to make close, 
exhaustive observations, it does so through the production of a further external 
object. In the terms employed in both Malafouris (2013) and Clark (2011), the 
distributive practice of site writing would be identified with the writer’s own 
cognitive processes and not the processes or characteristics of the object(s) of her 
description. Site writing calls up the sense in which, through writing about an 
assemblage – this ‘working of matters’, Break Down – the processes of writing, its 
material product and the writer all become part of the assemblage. As Deleuze and 
Guattari say: 
There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the world) and a 
field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the author). Rather, 
an assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities drawn from 





one or several authors as its subject. In short, we think that one cannot write 
sufficiently in the name of an outside (1987/2013, p.24). 
In summary, site writing works in the current text in several directions at once. It 
breaks open and animates theoretical discussion. This looking-and-writing 
narrates a moment in which I reach out, attempting to make contact with the 
material essence of the artwork (as it is or was), the theoretical work I use to cut 
into and understand the work, and the various commentaries that surround it. 
Working between registers interrupts the reserved tone of formal academic 
register and foregrounds the contingent and unstable nature of interpretation. 
Beyond this, and in the most pragmatic terms, site writing figures as a stratagem 
for overcoming, or cutting through, one’s subjective point of view in order to 
engage with the universe at large, plugging theoretical exposition into the 
'energetic vitality' (Bennett, 2010, p.5) of the material. Accordingly, the play 
between theoretical and site-written voices employed in the coming chapters 
produce an idiosyncratic perspective, a space from which to explore, and a thesis 
as ‘assemblage with the outside’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/2013, p.24). 
 
3 Fragment / Part / Whole 
In this chapter, the labour of dismantling and granulation in Break Down is 
reframed as a turn toward matter: its impunity and its mediality. The fragments to 
which Landy reduced his belongings form one of the most compelling elements of 
Break Down. The extraordinary tactility of the photographs that record this 
material seems to hold an unwonted charisma: I long to touch, to handle, to press 
my face into the shredded textiles and foam, to run my palm across the trays of 
chippings, to turn over and inspect these fragments, to pick them up and let them 
fall. The fragment opens up and disrupts conceptions of the nature of physical 
matter as stable or inert: through its very form it demonstrates the elementary, yet 
oddly elusive principle that material objects are composed of matter. However 
thorough Landy’s processes of taking apart and pulverising his belongings, 
fragments prevail; that is, matter prevails. In this, Break Down discloses not only 
the immanence of matter but also the innately narrative nature of material things. 
This chapter puts forth an analysis of Break Down that attends to the character and 
agency of physical matter through close investigation of the fragments produced. 
In pursuit of the fragment – and of the intense specificity of a fragment in particular 
- concepts of multiplicity, part and whole are explored through the lens of Deleuzo-
Guattarian assemblage theory. 
In considering human interactions with the properties and qualities of material 
objects the psychologist James Gibson’s influential theory on affordances is also 
brought into play. Through Gibson (1979/1986) it becomes possible to understand 
objects via their properties in relation to the physical and psychological attributes 
of human beings or animals who interact with these objects. The quality of 
affordance is not to do with utility per se, but more precisely, interaction. A sharp 
edged object, for example, might afford either useful cutting or physical injury. It 
is salient to note a coherence that exists between Gibson’s affordance theory and a 
Deleuzian account of affect,1 defined as the extent to which an entity can ‘[affect] 
other bodies or [be] affected by other bodies’ (1970/1988, p.123). An explicit 
connection can be observed in the following section from Deleuze on ‘animal 
worlds defined by affects and capacities for affecting and being affected’, in which 
                                                     





it is shown that the tick is entirely enmeshed with its habitat via the small 
repertoire of affects that it possesses: 
the first has to do with light (climb to the top of a branch); the second is olfactive 
(let yourself fall onto the mammal that passes below the branch); and the third is 
thermal (seek the area without fur, the warmest spot). A world with only three 
affects, in the midst of all that goes on in the immense forest (Deleuze, 1970/1988, 
pp.124-5). 
Gibson’s work is employed here to launch a comparative investigation into the 
fragment in relation to the capacities and characteristics of the human being. In 
this chapter, two related arguments are extended. The first is that material objects 
are in themselves medial; they are narrative in that through their very form and 
composition they communicate events. To appropriate the artist Gustav Metzger’s 
formulation regarding auto destructive art (to be discussed further below) material 
objects can then be seen as bodies that comprise time, matter and process (1996, 
p.42). The second stratum of my argument here is that material things, through 
the specificities of their material composition, hold or receive narratives. This 
stratum approximates closely to the positioning in much existing scholarly work 
on Break Down on Landy’s objects as holders of different kinds of value (e.g. 
economic value, personal, social or cultural value or significance).2 It is here, 
therefore, that we might think of objects and substances as substrates for human 
thought or meaning-making. In short, the current chapter stages an investigation 
of affordance theory and Deleuzo-Guattarian conceptualisations of assemblage, 
affect and multiplicity. In so doing, I put forward the argument that the physical 
form of objects inform the stories that they tell, and that are told about them. 
Observation: Photographs of fragments in refuse bags (Landy, 2008a, pp.186-93). 
Metal shards, bright from recent cuts.  Red edge-pieces, right-angled, have retained their 
shape the most, and lie alongside snippets of grille, mesh, black-painted, beige-painted, 
twisted. In a box of broken china the fractured edges show biscuit against the broken 
glaze. Shredded textiles lie densely together; worms of deep red velvet and pink felt are 
interpellated into a field of custard coloured foam stuffing sliced to angular chunks. 
White paper, cut into even spools. Wood lies in shards that devolve into splinters, their 
                                                     





newly exposed surfaces clean under the light. Red plastic granules form a charismatic 
sea, faceted, glamorous, with a giddy density of colour. 
In considering the fragment as a narrative object, I bring dust into focus as a 
comparator. It is a variant of the fragment that is helpfully both similar to - and yet 
dissimilar from - the larger shards and scraps produced by Landy. In considering 
the implications of affordance theory, dust provides a useful foil to the larger 
fragment in the coming discussions, because this fragmentary substance 
nevertheless possesses a very distinct set of properties and characteristics. One 
might observe that fragments and dust are granular and may be differentiated 
through description of the texture, size and shape of the component elements. To 
understand the importance of scale one might consider the affordances of 
differently sized fragments of stuff. The fragments of a broken china tea cup don’t 
float; we do not risk inhaling them, and if they fell and somehow hit us in the head 
they might scratch or cut, but would be unlikely to cause a concussion. Stepping 
on either a grain of house-dust or the large, flat surface of a concrete breeze-block 
will not cut painfully into the arch of your bare foot as a shard of china might 
(difficult though it may be to envision, one might nevertheless accidentally step on 
a breeze-block). 
The narratives that are projected onto both dust and the fragment – their value in 
meaning making – relate directly to their material composition and behaviour in 
space. Dust grains, which can be microscopically small, become visible when they 
gather together to form a loosely structured physical substance. Here one might 
think of the substances described by the writer on curious matter Steven Connor 
as ‘quasi-choate’ (2010), indicating the discrete nature of the flakes, particles, 
scraps, shreds, shards and crumbs in each; the way they ‘hang together’ without 
being entirely attached. Gibson alludes to scale in relation to the quality of 
‘affording support’ – which is available from water in relation to a river-boatman, 
but not to creatures that are heavier or less well equipped to make use of surface 
tension (1979/1986, p.127). In a similar way, the floating or slow falling that is 
peculiar to dust, while rendering it disruptive and dreamlike in our reading of the 
substance, is not a distinct property of dust itself, being conditional not only on 
the size and density of the object but also on the resistance of the air in which it 
hangs. In comparison, the larger fragment – the granule, shred or splinter – is made 





of the fragment allows a different kind of interaction: it lies where it fell and invites 
touch. The fragment therefore invites – or affords – use as a souvenir: a piece of 
history that one might pick up, turn in one’s hand, rub with a thumb, put in a 
pocket. 
This chapter, then, sifts through the friable substances produced by Landy. The 
first section investigates the layers and stages of fragmentation included in Break 
Down. A contextualising discussion of Deleuzo-Guattarian assemblage theory is 
extended: in the fragmentation produced during Break Down, matter can be seen 
to have its own, distinct power to make changes in the world. This notion of 
matter’s own facility for causation is deployed as a frame to think, in the second 
section, through the fragments produced by Landy as fragments, or wholes, or 
fragmented wholes. The fifth section of this chapter incorporates a more dynamic 
and applied focus as is appropriate for investigation of the dynamic character of 
the fragment.3 Finally, this chapter surveys the cultural uses and interpretations of 
fragments. Through these investigations I construct the central argument of this 
chapter, which is that what Landy does by ‘reducing’ his things ‘as near as possible 
to raw materials’ (Sillars, 2009, pp.25-6) is to give back to his belongings their 
essential properties and characteristics: to re-narrativise them on their own terms. 
3.1 Processes and stages of fragmentation 
This discussion begins with a summary of the processes undergone by Landy’s 
belongings during Break Down, posited specifically in terms of fragmentation. In 
each of these phases the objects used by Landy are constituted in terms of different 
kinds of narrative. In this section, conceptualisations of wholeness and 
fragmentation are interrogated at a number of levels: the ‘whole’ made up by the 
entire collection of Landy’s possessions; specific objects both as parts of the 
collection and whole things in themselves; the discrete parts of which objects are 
composed before dismantling; the fragments and dust that are produced when 
                                                     
3 Thus this section incorporates more intensive use of illustrations and passages of site writing 
through which I work the discrete properties and qualities of materials and objects into a 
theoretical analysis of bodies and parts – and vice-versa. As discussed in detail in the 
methodology (section 2.4), this writing practice, adapted from the work of the architecture and 
art writer Jane Rendell (2005; 2010), creates moments of displacement as the chapter shifts 
between registers of academic prose and close observation - sensual experience, daydreaming 
and description. These moments of textual fragmentation are signalled through the use of italics 





these are fed through the grinder. Here, it is pertinent to consider the argument of 
the archaeologist John Chapman that both ‘the relationship between parts and 
whole’ and that between ‘complete items and sets of items’ have their significance 
(2000, p.7). This tendency can be observed in Break Down, where Landy 
deconstructs not only each individual object but also the collection itself. It is the 
unsparing nature of Landy’s venture that speaks. While dismantling and shredding 
each of his belongings, he maintains the contiguity of the collection by treating 
each object alike and destroying the lot (this principle can also be seen in the work 
through which every single object owned by Landy is enumerated in the 
Inventory).  
3.1.1 Collection 
The objects begin as constituent parts of the entire assemblage of Landy’s 
possessions. The appearance of this collection as an entity in its own right is 
supported by discussion of the ‘7227 possessions’ owned by Landy before Break 
Down (Landy, 2001b). This figure, 7227, is called into play in order to support a 
discourse about consumerism which runs through Landy’s discussion of the work 
especially before it takes place. For example, it helps Landy to position his act, 
wryly, as ‘a kind of luxury […] the ultimate consumer choice’ (2001a, p.109). Within 
the work, the import of each individual, entire object arises only in as much as it 
forms part of this particular body of objects. This interplay between part and whole 
is also emphasised by the material form of the Break Down Inventory (Landy, 
2001b), described by Landy as ‘a material history of my life’ (2001a, p.109), the sheer 
heft of which seems to emphasise the magnitude of the collection. In summary, 
the perceived significance of Landy’s later reduction of the collection to fragments 
– the grandiose nature of the deed - depends heavily on his having as a starting 
point a cohesive and substantial collection of belongings, structured (as argued in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2) via his own biography – his memories and experiences. 
3.1.2 Entire things 
When viewing the entire assemblage of Landy’s belongings, then, each object can 
be read as a fragment – a part of the whole collection. But of course, viewed in its 
own right, each coat, saucepan, piece of furniture or electrical gadgetry; each mug 
can be seen as a separate and self-sufficient entity: that is, a whole. That these 





(Landy, 2001b), where (as discussed in Chapter 5, pages 156-7) the ‘description’ 
column incorporates and to some extent conflates direct, objective description and 
biographical discussion about the provenance and use of these objects, and their 
personal value for Landy. Many objects also have value independently of Landy’s 
story; for instance, his jeans, gadgets and souvenirs all have a cultural life that 
works beyond him (see Harvie, 2006). In particular the art works that he destroys 
include some that have a clear art historical significance and in some cases, a high 
market value. This is seen most vividly in the example of Gary Hume’s painting 
Clown (1997 [Item A90, Landy, 2001b]): a work from the same series as that reduced 
to chippings by Landy had at the time recently sold at Christies for £170,000 (The 
Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002).4 
 
Figure 7: Operative dismantling Landy's Saab (Landy, 2008a, p.186). 
3.1.3 Components 
In an interview with Julian Stallabrass before the show, Landy alludes to his lifelong 
interest in taking things apart: ‘I was inquisitive about the mechanism, being able 
to see what was inside’ (2001a, p.107; see also Stallabrass, 2000; Landy, 2008b; The 
Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002).5 Accordingly, the next step is dismantling. 
                                                     
4 Though one wonders whether Landy’s plans were known at the time of sale: might the effect 
have run the other way, the price of this work bolstered through Landy’s intervention? See also 
page 46, footnote 7. 
5 This tableau from Landy somewhat echoes Baudelaire’s description of children who dismantle 
their toys, ‘“to see the soul” and, to this end, turn the toys in their hands, shake them, strike 





Some objects, such as items of crockery, are composed of one continuous piece and 
therefore reducing them to pieces involves just one step which is to smash them 
up (Artangel, 2015). Others require more attention. In order to meet Landy’s 
requirement (in accordance with the procedures of the reclamation facilities at 
which he conducted research) that different materials – wood, plastic, metal, paper 
- be kept separate, objects are dismantled before being granulated.6  
 
Figure 8: Landy's experimental dismantling of a radio-cassette player; illustration in the ring 
bound publication Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a, pp.72-3). Photograph by author, 
June 2015. 
It is Stallabrass’s suggestion that in dismantling consumer goods Break Down 
might constitute ‘an exemplary piece of Marxism’ (Landy, 2001a, p.113) in that it 
exposes to scrutiny the myth that is constituted by the apparently perfect whole of 
the consumer object – always already complete. In deconstructing objects, the 
                                                     
p.57). However, Landy’s ‘inquisitive’ dissections can be distinguished from this caricature of child-
like behaviour. That Landy reminisces, in the sources cited, about his difficulties in putting the 
objects back together indicates that he did at least try to do so. Indeed, his mother, Ethel Landy, 
affirms that ‘he’d actually put them back [together]’ (The Man Who Had Everything, 2002). His 
earliest dismantlings seem, therefore, distinguished by a curiosity about – and a respect for – 
objects’ workings, rather than any straightforwardly destructive or chaotic impulse. 
6 For further discussion on how this work was undertaken, see Chapter 4 (pages 107-8, and the 





narrative exposed by Landy is that of production: that is to say, his action makes 
plain the fact of these objects as produced. The act of opening up an object might, 
Stallabrass seems to suggest, disclose or dispel the nature of its power or 
significance or to ascertain the underlying nature of the thing. Landy, however, 
explicitly resists Stallabrass’s reading of Break Down as working against commodity 
fetishism: instead, he is more concerned about narratives that are perhaps more 
closely concerned with the material properties and affordances of the objects 
themselves: utility, re-use, inbuilt obsolescence and cycles of use and disposal. 
Accordingly, and despite its apparent violence, Break Down is not a frenzied work. 
Rather, a principled care can be seen in Landy’s endeavour, in the process of 
researching and planning Break Down, of dissecting a radio-cassette player – a 
process that is recorded in detail in Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a, 
pp.51-74. See Figure 8 and Chapter 4, pages 120-2).  
At the end of the dismantling stage, car parts revolve on the conveyor belt, clothing 
has been torn apart at the seams, plastic pried from metal, rubber tires separated 
from metal wheels and canvases taken off their wooden frames, which themselves 
have been dismantled, the metal pins that hold them together laid aside for 
another tray. These dismantled pieces are both components and fragments and 
they themselves can be seen as both whole objects – a whole piece of wood, for 
example – and parts of previous wholes.  
3.1.4 Fragments 
The final step of Landy’s process is granulation. Granulation is achieved via a 
number of methods, depending on the affordances of the material being broken 
down. However, in most instances, the dismantled parts of Landy’s objects are put 
through industrial shredding machines to produce sacks of granulated matter of 
roughly similar sized pieces. As the critic Richard Shone remarks: ‘When broken 
down and put into plastic crates on a conveyor belt, a Savile Row jacket (inventory 
number C 16) has much the same presence as a rag picked up off the pavement; a 
copy of THE BURLINGTON MAGAZINE (R70) as much interest as a Synfibre 
Industrial Clothes Catalogue (R191)’ (2001, p.236). That said, through the various 
grains, textures and the different behaviour of granules of metal as compared with 
plastic or wood, a narrative of matter-in-itself – stuff-as-stuff – begins to emerge. 
Here, it is worthwhile to consider Landy’s intention, at the outset, to weigh the 





stuff was constituted. Operatives are instructed to weigh ‘broken down 
components’ (Landy, 2001a, p.38) and then record the weight of the material 
produced in a dedicated spreadsheet. This plan to observe and preserve the 
distinguishing features of the material ‘reclaimed’ from Landy’s belongings reveals 
the following neat inconsistency: where the process of fragmentation removes from 
matter its previous context and meaning, desingularising and homogenising, the 
fragments themselves emerge as a force for singularisation and specificity, in a final 
signal of the tenacity of physical matter.  
 
Figure 9: Fragments displayed in the shop window at 499 Oxford Street (Artangel n.d.). 
3.1.5 Display 
Finally, although not a fragmentary process, it is worthwhile to consider display as 
a companion to the phases presented above. On disassembly, the charisma of the 
whole object is found to have an unwarranted impunity, as neatly enacted by the 
visitors to Break Down who wanted Landy to display the granulated stuff that had 
been produced: 
...people wanted to see all of the granulated and shredded goods.  Originally it [the 
shredded material] was stored in the back room but [later on] we had them in front 
of the paned glass windows at the front of the store so that everyone could actually 
see the evidence.  It was really important for people to see the material residues 
displayed (Landy, 2008a, p.108). 
Here is a return to the collection. It is the collected mass of the granulated matter 





(the former department store where the work takes place) that lends it a sense of 
significance. At the end of Break Down, Landy’s stuff is brought back together to 
form a whole: a graphic demonstration of the scale of the endeavour for the benefit 
of passers-by. The shredded material originally understood by Landy as a mere by-
product of the project is unexpectedly reconstituted as something between 
evidence and aesthetic. 
3.2 Fragment and multiplicity  
The preceding discussion lays out the stages of Landy’s processes of dismantling 
and shredding in terms of the various parts and wholes that emerge, and the 
different kinds of interpretation attached to these stages of fragmentation. I move, 
now, to elaborate on these initial discussions through exploration of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assemblage theory and in particular, their conception of the multiple, 
which offers new ways to understand the plurality of Landy’s project of 
deconstruction and granulation.  
It is entirely in the spirit of the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of multiplicity that the 
archaeologists Marcus Brittain and Oliver Harris (2010, p.589) contend that ‘the 
fragment […] is neither part nor whole but an integral element in a connective flow 
incorporating a range of other substances’. That is to say, rather than imagining a 
finite ‘whole object’ that when shattered produces a number of self contained and 
finite fragments, one might choose instead to prioritise consideration of the 
constant change (if of a highly variable range of temporalities) that is inherent in 
all matter. Deleuze and Guattari envision the assemblage as a gathered, multiply 
connecting and reconnecting body or mass that is heterogeneous, dynamic and 
that produces and reproduces its own stability and instability (see for example 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/2013, pp.15-16; 1987/2013, pp.7-13). This schema 
accommodates the particularities of things and their power to ‘happen’ – or cause 
things to ‘happen’ - in the world, and as such offers opportunities for 
understanding fragmentation and wholeness, both in general terms and 
specifically in relation to Landy’s project.  
To project a more complete account of the multiplicity in contrast with the more 
unitary psychoanalytic model against which it was developed (Buchanan, 2015; 
Holland, 1999) I turn to the brief psychoanalytic reading of Landy's project in 





fact he was trying to register the loss of only one, specific thing' (2009, p.35). This 
notion of the singular lack, the ‘only one’ lost thing, recalls the characterisation by 
Deleuze and Guattari of the psychoanalytic representation of desire as shaped 
around one lost or missing object in particular. In their analysis, this forms a logical 
paradox in which ‘the world does not contain each and every object that exists; 
there is at least one object missing, the one that desire feels the lack of’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1972/2013, p.39).  
Deleuze and Guattari want to resolve this logically invalid proposition by 
introducing the element of production to the concept of desire. Rather than 
appearing as a negative image formed around its missing obect, desire reappears 
in their work as a dynamic force, a thing in itself that propels and produces (Ibid., 
pp.36-40). But this counter argument is itself logically flawed and misses 
something important about the psychoanalytic account. Much like the frustrating 
parent who isn’t currently in the room (and no matter what the baby might think) 
the lost object of psychoanalysis is not non-existent - it simply isn’t here. When 
Freud’s grandson plays fort/da (Freud, 1955/2001, p.15)7 the cotton reel doesn’t spin 
out of existence (some baby!) - the point of the game is that no matter how many 
times the game is repeated, when pulled back out of the cot the lost object is found 
still to be attached to the end of its length of thread – da! One might suggest 
                                                     
7 This refers to the game fort/da, famously devised by a boy of 18 months old, who, Freud 
observes, seems to mediate for himself the troubling disappearance and reappearance of his 
mother by inventing a game of disappearance and reappearance or gone/here:  
The child had a wooden reel with some string tied round it. [...] What he did was to hold the reel 
by the string and very skilfully throw it over the edge of his curtained cot so that it disappeared 
into it, all the while uttering his expressive 'o-o-o-o' [which signified 'fort', or 'gone'].  He then 
pulled the reel out of the cot again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful 'da!' 
(Freud, 1955/2001, p.15). 
While the object of this game might be the rehearsal of loss and the payoff, the celebratory 
reunion – ‘da!’ - for Freud, the most interesting element of this scene is the recursivity with which 
the baby undergoes the pain of separation again and again through this act of throwing away. 
While acknowledging the necessarily speculative nature of his theory, Freud suggests that such 
iterative actions signal a ‘repetition-compulsion’ that arises from a desire, written into us at a 
primordial or cellular level, to repeat the life-cycle of previous generations of organisms. In this 
sense, it is ourselves that we endeavour to return, through repetitive acts such as listing. Freud’s 
vivid writings on human death as a space of continuity and regeneration at the microbial level 
recall the declaration by Deleuze and Guattari that ‘we make no distinction between man and 
nature’ (1972/2013, p.15). In the context of Freud’s writing, which as Deleuze and Guattari argue 
privileges the figure of the single and independently viable human ego, it is striking to be given 






endless further instances in which an entity that does not precisely exist in the 
world is nevertheless thinkable and directly present for the thinker. The closest to 
hand may be the experience of bereavement. Here, the figure of the lost loved one 
is immanently - and imminently - present precisely because s/he no longer resides 
in the world. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that to be thinkable, an object must 
have some presence in the world. They infer from this that lack is a manufactured 
value that conceals, ‘as a function of market economy’ (1972/2013, p.41), the nature 
(literally) of human existence. But their reasoning here is inwardly flawed, since if 
the thinkable is included in the category of things that are in the world, this must 
include loss itself, and lost things.8  
I do not aim to solve this impasse within the current discussion (as if I could). I 
opt, rather, to follow in this thesis the impunity of matter, which as will be 
discussed more fully in the coming section may change its composition but cannot 
disappear. Water may dissipate into steam; wax may melt and run; energy formerly 
contained within a stick of wood may escape as heat; the edge of a stone pavement 
may wear away; elements of an object that is put through a shredder may dissipate 
and escape in the form of heat and particles. Even so, no part of these changed 
substances and materials leaves the system. Everything that begins in the universe, 
remains in the universe, and everything changes. The concept of multiplicity, then, 
enables a move beyond notions of material and psychic artefacts as mutually 
discrete, static, whole and impermeable. Instead, we see a body of ‘deterritorialized 
intensities’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/2013, p.36) that work at a range of levels of 
complexity, the elements of which attach and detach with one another and with 
the whole, and are defined by their connections and movements; their force and 
composition in relation to each other. In order to understand this constellation of 
elements the notion of the internally-ordered and self-sufficient organism needs 
to be abandoned to be replaced by that of a distributed functionality: ‘a body 
populated with multiplicities’ (Ibid., p.34).  
                                                     
8 I do not mean to suggest here a notion of multiplicity – or indeed ‘things that are in the world’ 
as a set of sets, however. The assemblages that are loss itself, and lost things, will be made up of 
countless smaller bodies, will have an energy and affect and will join and unjoin with other bodies 
or entities, gaining and losing clarity or definition just like any other entity. Moreover, the set of 
‘things that are in the world’ is suggestive of another set; ‘things that are not in the world’, which 
I imagine would be difficult to discern to the extent that it could be put to work in any useful way 





In its centralisation of the ‘only one’ specific, whole and totalising lost object, the 
psychoanalytic lack-story summons Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion that for the 
neurotic ‘it is at one and the same time that they apprehend the object globally and 
perceive it as lost’ (1987/2013, p.30). However, they contend firstly that multiplicity 
is the space in which psychosis distinguishes itself from neurosis, and secondly that 
‘the unconscious itself [is] fundamentally a crowd’ (Ibid., p.33). Where Leader 
(2009) imagines that Landy is looking for ‘only one, specific thing’, it seems that in 
the schizoanalytic terms of the multiplicity ‘only one’ is precisely what he cannot 
have, unless ‘only one’ is taken to refer to the entire sum of the universe. In the 
disjointed profusion of Landy’s belongings on the conveyor belt, or the more 
uncompromising blending of fragments of stuff tipped together into disposal bags, 
then, are the specificities of Landy’s life – or indeed, just his stuff - to be crowded 
out by the endless, shifting proliferations of the multitude? How in this case is it 
possible to speak of fragment and whole – and how might one be thought of in 
relation to the other? This concern for immanence, and intense specificity as 
understood via relationality, can be seen in the following discussion of the nature 
of the body by Deleuze: 
a body, however small it may be, is composed of an infinite number of particles; it 
is the relations of motion and rest, of speeds and slownesses between particles, 
that define a body, the individuality of a body […] You will define an animal, or a 
human being, not by its form, its organs and its functions, and not as a subject 
either; you will define it by the affects of which it is capable (1970/1988, p.123).9 
                                                     
9 In considering these questions I turn to the work of the philosopher Eugene Thacker on univocity 
and essence; ‘the relationship between Creator and creature, or between Life and the living’ 
(2010, p.153; see also Deleuze, 1968/2004; Widder, 2009). Thacker identifies this as an important 
point of intersection between the Scholastic philosopher John Duns Scotus and the work of 
Deleuze, particularly in respect of his ongoing concern with the multiplicity. Where Deleuze and 
Guattari say that ‘we make no distinction between man and nature’ (1972/2013, p.15), ‘nature’ 
or Life appears – roughly - in the space that is, in Scotus, occupied by the Creator. The larger 
implication here is that the universe can after all contain within it elements that differ from one 
another (Ibid., pp.124-5), while also being united by a fundamentally defining creative force. As 
Thacker has it, the furthest reach of univocity would be a pantheism that ‘not only entails the 
negation of the divine, but […] also entails a radical distribution of the divine, such that it cannot 
be separated from the earthly, or even the material’ (Ibid., p.135). Univocity appears here as a 
vision of Life and the living as profoundly immanent in one another and working within and 
between difference and particularity. The multiplicity, which as I have indicated might be 
imagined as a dynamic complex of relationality, does its thing on a ‘plane of immanence’ that, 






The Deleuzo-Guattarian account of multiplicity as a kind of distributed 
functionality – which is therefore concerned precisely with affect - recalls the 
nature of interactions between the physical properties of small particles and 
granules of matter. Consider the way that dust softly plays a three-dimensional 
game of TETRIS10 with itself to land in an even layer on smooth surfaces, or the 
mechanism through which, if granules, shards and flakes of china are placed into 
a tray which is then gently agitated, the larger pieces will stay near the top (the 
position of each determined by the comparative size of the other granules in the 
tray). The behaviour and properties of each element (fragment) and those of the 
assemblage overall are mutually constitutive. Such chance yet ordered interactions 
are exquisitely captured by Brian Massumi in a description of the formation of 
sedimentary rock. I reproduce this at length since the form of the following excerpt 
is itself alluvial: one clause lands against another, clause upon clause, line upon 
line, repetition upon repetition; laying themselves horizontally across the page, 
one upon the next: 
A grain comes to rest. Another joins it. Many grains follow from a variety of 
sources, brought to a point of accumulation by chance. Not brute chance. Chance 
discrimination: the accumulating grains are in the same size and weight range and 
share certain chemical properties. Not all grains answering to the description join 
the gang. Given a particular grain, no one, however savvy in sedimentation, can 
predict whether it will be one of the select. All that can be said is that a number of 
like particles probably will be. A statistical process of this kind, combining chance 
and approximate necessity, can be called “selection.” A selection is an act of 
perception, since something, in this case a set of natural laws, “perceives” the 
grains that come together in a layer. […] Layer accumulates upon layer, stratum 
upon stratum (1992, p.48).  
This account of the behaviour of small particles in a process of sedimentation 
arises, in its original context, as an illustration of the contingencies inherent in the 
formation of personhood and the absolute synonymy of human and nature in the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari. Here, I draw back from that broader narrative (a 
detailed examination of which is the chief task of chapter 6 as a whole) to observe 
that this passage from Massumi is directly informative regarding the mechanisms 
that govern gatherings of stuff, whether in a river bed, in Landy’s trays of 
granulated matter, or under my bed. In each case, we see material objects with a 
                                                     
10 TETRIS is a computer game that ‘displays images of various two-dimensional geometric shapes’ 
and requires the player to make judgements ‘concerning the potential fit of such shapes into 





facility for causation, not passive but vibrant; causing and undergoing change. This 
is matter as narrative; medial matter. The notions of facility, narrative and 
multiplicity sketched here form an underpinning structure for the discussions of 
fragments and dust that follow. 
 
Figure 10: Yellow, plastic tray of ceramic fragments on conveyor belt (Landy, 2008a, p.190). 
 A final moment of consideration is owed to the notion of the Body without Organs. 
As Buchanan (2015, pp.25-7) suggests, this is not a concept, which is to say that it 
is not formed in a way that easily affords its direct application in analysis. Instead, 
I read the Body without Organs as a postulation that has to do with the relationship 
between part and whole. Massumi’s ‘muck’, which pertains to connection and 
isolation, continuity and fracture, within and without, directly speaks to this 
scenario. Schizophrenia appears, then, as a mode of consciousness characterised 
by an inability to tune out one’s absolute interconnection with the entirety of the 
universe (see for example Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/2013, p.32). In a similar way, 
a hearing aid user might find herself unable to filter out background noise in order 
to organise what she is hearing. While the organism is organised via points of 
intercourse (see also discussion of schizzes in pages 187-90 of Chapter 6), the Body 
without Organs arises as a strategic move in which these stratified relations are 
sealed off. Description of this entity as an entirely sealed carapace raises the image 
of the smooth, warm skin of a dolphin (without eyes, mouth, blow-hole, anus, 





nor is it an individual psyche in compacted form, like a curled-up woodlouse, since 
in schizoanalysis this second notion, the individual psyche, is itself a redundancy. 
Instead, it is more like an interruption of individualised experience – a rejection of 
the organismic in favour of the multiple; the fluid. The Body without Organs is also 
not a fragment, since fragments require for their existence an originary whole: this 
stratified narrative that could only occur in one order is contrary to the multiple 
vision offered by Deleuze and Guattari. And yet, in considering the part and the 
entirety, and the fragmentary nature of the entirety, and the wholeness of the 
fragment, the Body without Organs, in its ability to be universe and fragment, 
broken and whole, might assist in resisting the most prescriptive 
conceptualisations of matter and the fragment in the discussion to follow. 
3.3 Tenacious stuff 
In this section I bring the critical implications of the impunity of matter into 
conversation with the figure of the fragment in Break Down. Here, the reference I 
make to stuff as something that continues and prevails is not metaphoric, but 
relates to the actual behaviour of matter. The logic of the chemical equation 
depends on the underpinning assumption that stuff can move around, but nothing 
entirely vanishes.11 For a reaction (e.g. C + O2) to be resolved – that is, for it to reflect 
the behaviour of matter in the world – it must balance (C + O2 = CO2); as that old 
chestnut of environmentalists has it, ‘there is no away’. A similar set of 
considerations is at play in the affirmation by the social historian Carolyn 
Steedman that dust: 
is not about rubbish, nor about the discarded; it is not about a surplus, left over 
from something else: it is not about Waste. Indeed, Dust is the opposite thing to 
Waste, or at least, the opposite principle to Waste. It is about circularity, the 
impossibility of things disappearing, or going away, or being gone (Steedman, 2001, 
pp.163-4; emphasis reproduced).  
Steedman's indispensable contribution on the tenacity of physical matter opens 
consideration of differing theorisations of matter and culture. Her implicit 
designation of waste as inversely being to do with ‘going away’ should however be 
                                                     
11 It is perhaps worth acknowledging here that energy is dispersed as a result of some chemical 
reactions – for example, in the form of heat. However, since energy does not (as far as it is 
possible to know) leave the universe, this does not disrupt my point here, which is that things 





read alongside the great body of work on waste as, specifically, stuff that prevails, 
thus obliging us to deal with it (see also the following examples on rubbish and 
dissipation: DeSilvey, 2006; Edensor, 2005; 2007; Hawkins and Mueke, 2003; 
Laporte, 2002; Min’an, 2011; Rathje and Murphy, 2001). In three representative 
accounts, we see the writer on waste Gay Hawkins (2006), who theorises rubbish 
precisely as stuff that stays with us, the geographer Kevin Hetherington providing 
a persuasive account of 'disposal,' as 'a continual practice of engaging with and 
holding things [...] in a state of abeyance' (2004, p.159) and the art historian Julian 
Stallabrass who considers that we might ‘think of commodities as deferred trash’ 
(2009, p.407). This article by Julian Stallabrass was originally published in 1996, 
five years before Break Down and it contains directly some of the points made in 
his interview with Landy, published in Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a, 
pp.107-116; see also Stallabrass, 2000). For example, he rehearses precisely a point 
he makes when interviewing Landy (cited on pages 65-6 of this thesis) when he 
posits that when objects are thrown away: ‘Unmade, their polished unitary surfaces 
fall away, reinscribing in them for a time the labour that went into their making’ 
(Stallabrass, 2009, p.408). Similarly, it is difficult to read the following passage 
without wondering whether Landy read it too: 
In becoming rubbish the object […] gains a doleful truthfulness, as though 
confessing: it becomes a reminder that all commodities, despite all their tricks, are 
just stuff; little combinations of plastics or metal or paper. The stripping away of 
branding and its attendant emotive attachments reveals the matter of the object 
behind the veneer imposed by a manufactured desire (Ibid., p.416). 
The title of the BBC documentary that depicts Landy's production of Break Down, 
The Man Who Destroyed Everything (2002), suggests the hygienic notion of a 
uniform and inclusive annihilation. However, rather than ‘destroying everything’ 
it is more accurate to consider that Landy transforms his belongings into 
fragments, granules, and shreds. This may feel rather counterintuitive, but makes 
sense when thought through from the perspective of the molecules that had 
previously been participating in the event we would call a plastic crate, and 
following Landy’s intervention were instead participating in a tray of red, plastic 
granules. Molecules follow the laws of physics, but – as far as it is possible to know 
- do not prefer to be part of one kind of thing or another. To cite Shone (2001), 
atoms are probably not disappointed to form part of a dishrag rather than a 
designer suit. The sacks of granulated material displayed by popular demand in 





defined by change and that prevails. This moment in the work presents a profound 
challenge to human intentionality in the face of the properties of stuff. 
That said, form does matter, and not only at the level of molecular structure. In 
considering this, I return to the concept from Deleuze and Guattari of affect – that 
is the capacity of an object or entity to receive and make effects beyond itself. The 
preceding discussion of affect concentrates specifically on the most starkly 
material configurations in which affect might be observed. However, an object can 
(probably will) participate in – or become - more than one assemblage at the same 
time. Moreover, the nature of assemblages is to incorporate different levels of 
signification and complexity. Therefore, Landy’s red plastic crate is an assemblage. 
While it does incorporate the molecules that physically comprise its material form, 
it also draws together – or arises at the intersection of – innumerable other 
currents. These include the technologies that enable its mass production, the 
grocers’ crates on which its design was based, and Michael Landy at Home (1999), 
the show of Landy’s of which the crate was previously a part. 
Here, we see again that affect does not ‘belong’ innately to the entity under 
consideration. Rather, it works relationally between the entity, and the assemblage 
in which it is implicated. Gibson’s (1979/1986) demonstration of this has already 
been discussed in terms of the direct material features of the objects under 
discussion. In another example, the anthropologist Mary Douglas’s seminal study 
on unruly stuff, Purity and Danger (1966/2002), we see how the affordances of 
different kinds of substance and object are interpolated in the making of cultural 
meaning. Here, the assemblage under question is not a material object – like 
Landy’s red, plastic crate – but a cultural construct, ‘dirt,’ memorably defined by 
Douglas as ‘matter out of place’ (Ibid., p.44). The tenacity of matter is implicit in 
Douglas’s account of depositions and gatherings of material that never simply 
disappear, but, if we are to maintain order, demand constant attention and work.  
As well, one can see in this account the sense in which relationality is at work in 
defining matter that breaches our expectations if found in one place, while being 
fine in another. This matter possesses a different range of affects – that is, its 
potential impact on (and from) its surroundings - differ, then, depending on the 
particularities of the assemblage in which it is implicated. It might be expected that 
when Landy shreds his belongings and mixes the granulated fragments he messes 





Firstly, since Landy aims to separate different materials (2001a, p.39) the fragments 
produced are therefore rather homogenous: metal with metal, wood with wood, 
textile with textile (1966/2002, pp.47-8). Secondly, Douglas suggests that once 
objects decay beyond the point of being recognisable in their previous form, they 
lose their risky aspect (Ibid., pp.197-8), and indeed, this is the state of the fragments 
produced by Landy. They are dry, stable, comparatively large, easy to contain and 
somewhat unrecognisable; therefore, they are ‘clean’.  
There may be more transgression in Landy’s mixing up of his private belongings 
(cooking utensils with socks; car parts with books). To communicate the way that 
domestic order (ostensibly based in modern scientific knowledge, for example, 
about the workings of pathogens) quickly blends into the symbolic, Douglas 
examines how objects from one area of the house feel polluting when moved to 
another: ‘outdoor things indoors; upstairs things downstairs’ (Ibid., pp.44-5). A 
toothbrush on the mantelpiece; a trowel in the bathroom sink; pants on the 
kitchen table. In this light, Landy’s work does seem to wriggle out from the 
conventions discussed by Douglas. Is it possible to imagine such troubling pairings 
as ‘pyjamas and mantlepiece’, ‘lego and bath’ or indeed ‘trowel and kitchen sink’ - 
as openings?  
Such misplacements appear, in this light, as moments in which, through 
accidental, productive misplacements, new lines of flight are opened up. A specific 
objects’ proximity to other specific objects in a collection or assemblage lends 
different kinds of significance or perhaps makes available a broader range of 
readings or meanings.12 As the archaeologist Mats Burström relates, regarding the 
interpretation of broken finds, ‘fragments create tensions both between each other 
and with the other elements in the picture, effectively acquiring new meanings’ 
(2013, p.316; see also Fuller, 2007, pp.1-2; Lichtenstein, 2009, pp.121-3).13  
  
                                                     
12 The medial potentiality of what I call vertical relations between elements in an assemblage is 
considered in more depth in discussion of the list in Chapter 5 (pages 146-8). 
13 In this chapter, reference is made both to work of philosopher and art historian, Jacqueline 





3.4  ‘Quasi-choate’ matter 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, dust appears here both as a sub-
category of fragments (so dust might be seen as small fragments) and as a point of 
comparison with the larger granules produced by Landy. Alongside the range of 
parts and wholes that arise in the work, as surveyed earlier in this chapter, it could 
be said that there are other more obvious ‘parts’ that might be employed as a 
comparator with the granulated fragments that Landy displays in sacks. However, 
taking the next-biggest kind of ‘part’ defined above, the dismantled but as yet not 
shredded components of objects (the plastic casing of Landy’s radio cassette player 
for example) it is clear that these are much more fundamentally different from 
granules. The component (the plastic casing) suggests a possibility that it could be 
reunited with the rest of its originating whole object (the radio cassette player). 
Inversely, one might also observe that the loss of direct utility in granulated matter 
exposes its base materiality. The granulated fragment and its smaller companion, 
dust, are beyond use, unless considered as raw materials. Finally, the fact that 
similar characteristics are shared between dust and the fragment particularly befits 
these substances for instantiation of affordance theory (Gibson, 1979/1986). 
I can only imagine that the processes outlined in the first section of this chapter – 
the banging, tearing, wrenching, unscrewing and smashing undertaken by Landy's 
operatives – must have produced quantities of dust along with the fragmented 
plastic, fragmented metal, fragments of sponge, of textile and of wood that are the 
most visible physical products of Landy's Break Down (Landy, 2008a, p.108). 
However, dust is not incorporated in any of the documents and accounts of Break 
Down. Dust is an unruly substance: ubiquitous, insidious, inhalable – both 
ephemeral and enduring - escaping and persisting (see for example Olalquiaga, 
1999; Steedman, 2001). It is imagined by Steven Connor (2010) as a kind of ‘quasi-
choate’ matter – part of a ‘great, diffuse class, undeclared, rarely described,’ which 
also includes:  
mist, smoke, dust, snow, sugar, cinders, sleet, soap, syrup, mud, toffee, grit. The 
category of the ‘quasi-choate’ is rhizomatic in its quivering, mobile vision of a 
material world that comes apart from, and re-joins, itself. Such pseudo-substances 
hover, drift and ooze between consistency and dissolution, holding together even 
as they come apart from themselves.  
This is a useful starting point for the study of amorphous categories of material: 





substances, and want to suggest that they should be considered separately from 
the powdered and the fragmented (although it depends on the soap; it depends on 
the mud - and snow, being crystalline, is different again). In the current discussion, 
substances that are broadly fragmentary in character – sugar, dust, cinders, mud, 
grit, perhaps smoke, since that is made up of small, airborne solid particles – 
pertain, where substances that are oozing, gummy or gelatinous and hang together 
more resolutely – mud, soap, toffee – do not. 
 
Figure 11: House dust, gathered and photographed by the author, July 2017. 
Dust might appear as a subset of the category, ‘fragments’; however, as already 
outlined, its primary use here is as a comparator with larger granulated fragments 
since as will be seen the properties of the two differ extensively. I follow the 
definition of dust as comprising a variety of fragmented and friable matter, as well 
as discrete items such as bacteria and skin cells. As the writer on dust Hannah 
Holmes defines, it is: 
the individual fragments of a disintegrating world: the skin flakes, rock flecks, tree 
bark, bicycle paint, lampshade fibres, ant legs, sweater wool, brick shards, tire 
rubber, hamburger soot and bacteria (Holmes, 2001, pp.1-2).  
As suggested by this list, dust can be envisioned as a collection of fragments on a 





that strain the notion of a ‘disintegrated’ or ‘fragmented’ substance: bacteria, pollen 
microspores and human skin cells, while issuing from or previously belonging to a 
larger body, are also discrete and complex objects, carriers of DNA that are 
uniquely fitted for purpose and environment (and therefore complete and whole).  
I offer a reading of dust, therefore, that has to do with its unruliness and rejection 
of form. Its pleasures occur at odd moments, marking a slip from productive 
activity to an idle gaze: to place my finger on a dusty table-top and draw it through 
the grime to leave a shining path of exposed wood; to observe from my bed on a 
summer morning the dust motes shimmering, swimming and shifting in a shaft of 
sun. The constant falling-onto-surfaces of dust is not afforded by larger fragments, 
and perhaps it is to its effects in the domestic sphere – the drifting, the coating; the 
labour required in perpetuity to maintain dust-free surfaces in the home – that 
dust owes its troublesome reputation.  
Observation: House dust (March 2010).  I am compelled to note firstly that I do not want 
this substance near me.  A handful of dust, once the contents of my vacuum cleaner, 
shaken from containment onto a piece of white A4 on my desk.  I wash the smooth/sticky 
patina from my fingertips before returning to observe.  I imagine it smells – but does it 
really – this nest of stuff collected from the floors of my house?  In my anxiety to avoid 
inhaling anything untoward, all I can detect is an edge of sweetness.  It must be essence-
of-house, containing all the life, all the movement, all the objects, somehow sloughed off 
to fall in drifts like post-apocalyptic snow.  Plaster and lathe and paper-dust; the minutest 
motes of cotton from bedsheets and pillows.  Hair.  Skin.  I do not want to attend to this 
substance; I do not want it near me. This gathering of stuff raises questions about what 
it is to be nondescript. Certainly, I can describe the origins of dust and its behaviour, lying 
like a tidal deposit to either side of my wooden steps, caught up in drifts resembling 
mountain ranges or cumulous clouds beneath my bed, resting like grey-green velvet or 
the bloom of a grape, over the floor, the shelves, the tops of books, the clock. I sweep 
with the side of my hand, make a little bout of dust, gather it into my cupped hand, walk 
to the window, careful not to lose any, release it and watch it fly apart in the wind.  But 
looking at dust, just-dust, gathered hygienically on a sheet of white A4, not on the floor, 
not in the vacuum, not in the bin – I can find very few words to describe the stuff itself. 
Grey. That’s the main thing; the odd lack of colour. Soft and slightly tacky to the touch, 
giving so easily that it can hardly be felt in a cupped hand. Then, aery, fractal, 





light penetrates it unevenly to make internal fields of light and dark. The mass of it 
quivers as I exhale, held together by who-knows-what like an uncanny felt – almost-alive 
and therefore ghastly. 
This piece of site writing stages a confrontation with house dust (my dust) that 
brings us face to face with the impulses and sensations that inhere in Douglas’s 
account, discussed earlier, of dirt as ‘matter out of place’ (1966/2002, p.44). This is 
a narrative that conveys panic and revulsion. Where dust threatens to usurp and 
engulf, cleaning brings with it fantasies of social order. Bataille conveys a notion of 
dust as a grotesque invading force when he remarks that the purpose of dusting 
and vacuuming is to exorcise 'the injurious phantoms that cleanliness and logic 
abhor' (Bataille et al, 1995, p.43). The dream of dust as matter with a life of its own 
is intimated by the appearance of ‘phantoms’, here pitted against the regulatory 
regime of the hoover. But it is matter that will 'gain the upper hand [...] Invading 
the immense ruins of abandoned buildings, deserted dockyards; and, at that 
distant epoch, nothing will remain to ward off night-terrors' (Ibid.). This thread of 
horror and disgust continues through Carolyn Steedman’s upending of ivory tower 
fantasies of the researcher in the archive (2001, pp.17-28). Here she summons, 
instead of white gloves, archive dust coating clammy skin – and the hallucinatory 
fear of inhaling a fatal virus from the scraped sheep-skin parchment found in the 
grimiest vaults of the library. 
Steedman's account of dust in the factory and in the archive dances between the 
specific and the distinct: the historical past acts on the present, freighted with 
disease, filling the nostrils and gritting the hairline. This is a vision of dust as a 
consuming, clogging substance that affords the congestion of the lungs of the 
children who work in the sorting of paper, leather and textiles (Steedman, 2001, 
p.20).14 In Marx's account of the 'unhealthy jobs' engendered by large scale 
mechanised production, these shredded materials carry the spores of disease 
(Marx, 1867/1976, pp.592-3; 552). Marx also gathers evidence of the presence of 
                                                     
14 While there is too little space here thoroughly to discuss the dusty jobs that children do now, 
it is essential to acknowledge that such violently consuming occupations cannot and must not be 
relegated to the past. Globally, there continues to be a strong demand for children's labour 
power. Small children continue, in large numbers, to undergo the punishing rigours of physical 





fragmented matter, specifically delineated as: 'alum, soap, pearl-ash, chalk, 
Derbyshire stone-dust and other similar agreeable, nourishing and wholesome 
ingredients' (Ibid., pp.278; 358-9) added to the bread flogged to factory workers by 
their employers in nineteenth-century England. While sitting indigestibly in the 
stomach, dust also whirls in the disturbed space of the textile mill. To the factory 
owner, this 'devil's dust' (Ibid., p.313) or 'shoddy' merely represents lost value, to be 
entered in the 'out' column or if the price is right, repurposed as mattress-stuffing 
(Steedman, 2001, p.20). In the factory, however, it fills the air so completely as to 
transform human bodies into negative space. A contemporary report supplies:   
... it is exceptionally unpleasant to stand even 10 minutes in the spinning rooms: 
for you are unable to do so without the most painful sensation, owing to the eyes, 
the ears, the nostrils, and mouth, being immediately filled by the clouds of flax 
dust from which there is no escape (Marx, 1867/1976, p.337). 
Similarly, the dust that fell at Ground Zero is described by the cultural critic Marita 
Sturken (2007, p.180) as an enveloping and form-defying cloud: an ambiguous 
substance that appeared and reappeared as relic, forensic material and lethal 
pollutant. This ambiguity is mimed particularly clearly in the instance of the 
remains of a dust-covered shop display from nearby, which, when moved to a local 
museum, 'was treated not only as "historic and possibly sacred" but also as 
dangerous and toxic, attended to by a crew wearing hazard suits working in a 
sealed bubble' (Ibid.). The remains of the twin towers were variously washed from 
the hair, clothes and fingernails of survivors, scrubbed from walls and pavements, 
blessed, and forensically analysed in the search for evidence and human remains. 
It was also much-photographed, producing as it did 'haunting images of a cityscape 
coated in dust as if it were a few inches of snow, transforming the outline of debris 
into strange, layered shapes' (Ibid., p.175; see also Bird, 2003). 
As this writing on 9/11 shows, dust contradicts, interrupts, disfigures and troubles 
intentionality and form. The theme of contamination emerges vividly in these 
accounts, yet dust also conveys a troubling and rather melancholy attraction. 
Celeste Olalquiaga catches the delectable passivity of this 'patina of shattered 
moments' (1999, p.94) in her mulling-over of a domestic dust that, like the dust of 
the twin towers, makes things new in its transfiguring shrouding of everyday 
objects - yet could be 'the last breath of tradition' (Ibid., p.91). As Bataille observes:  
The storytellers have not realised that the Sleeping Beauty would have awoken 





invade earthly habitations and uniformly defile them: as if it were a matter of 
making ready attics and old rooms for the imminent occupation of the obsessions, 
phantoms, spectres (Bataille et al, 1995, p.42).15   
The sedimentation that mounts inexorably; the powdery substance that lies 
between sheets of paper and waits to be disturbed. Settling in drifts on the tops of 
shelved books, behind the attic door and under the bed, dust remakes the world in 
soft focus, accreting inaudibly while one is reading or sleeping. In short, the 
example of the dust covered room conveys most clearly the charisma of dust.  
3.5 The mediality of fragments  
In short, dust gains its narrative force from its facility to convey through its falling 
and coating a sense of time having passed. If dust works through the motif of the 
dust-covered and abandoned room, the affordances of the fragment play into its 
cultural life through the trope of the souvenir. Here and in the final section I 
explore the way that larger fragments enable apprehension of a different kind of 
event. That is to say that they embody a moment of fracture; a specific moment in 
which a break occurred. This idea arises in an essay by the scholar of museum 
studies Susan Pearce (2009), in which she says of flakes of paint employed as 
forensic evidence in a detective story that they: 
have their own biography, as all objects do. They […] have life events, which can 
be reconstructed through the study of physical analysis and records, written and 
unwritten. In many ways this material life history operates as a parallel life to that 
which the flakes lead in their ‘real’ life; it is a constructed narrative of events, 
presented as an explanation of why and how the traces come to be where they 
actually are at each specific moment. It would, of course, be equally true to say that 
paint traces generate their own narratives; it is their physical nature and the events 
they have been involved in which drive the story (2009, pp.463-4). 
Here, apparently drawing on the methodological approach (from Kopytoff, 1986) 
of object biography,16 Pearce confronts the ways in which a material object might 
both have meaning inscribed upon it from without, and also carry and convey its 
                                                     
15 Bataille’s dusty spectres recall the stillness of the abandoned, dust-coated room that was 
discovered in the synagogue at Princelet Street. This scene is absolutely antithetical to Landy’s 
project. When it was reopened by workmen (Lichtenstein, 1999, p.30), twenty years after the 
silent departure of its last tenant, the abandoned room presented a seductive tableau of time 
passing 'ragged clothes still hanging in the wardrobe, a fur dangling down through the collapsing 
ceiling, a pile of 78’s, lamps and odd bits of candle, an old gas mask, scattered and prophetic-
looking books in Hebrew, Russian, Hindustani' (Wright, 1987). 





own meaning or narrative (no matter that the full extent of the narrative might be, 
‘quite recently, this piece of crockery broke’) through its very form. In this final 
section of the current chapter I develop this second concept further, suggesting 
that the particular interest of the fragment arises from the narrative qualities of 
broken matter. The fragment has the capacity to express change; to record and 
mediate information about events happening in time. Where dust refers to time 
through its cumulative work to cover a surface, the fragment refers graphically to 
a specific moment in time in which the form of a single, concrete object changed: 
the moment of the cut, the break, the snap.  
Observation: Workshop on destruction with Michael Landy – online video (Hayward 
Gallery, 2012; see Figure 12). It begins horse-shaped, hung all over with scraps and 
chunks of material – plumbing stuff maybe? Pans? Plates? Tubes? Kettles? The casings 
of computers and microwaves? The entire structure has a quality of indeterminacy partly 
owing to distance, and partly to the fact that it is entirely white – a uniform, off-white 
that makes me think of whitewash. We’re in a concrete courtyard – a sunny day – a 
background of pebble-dashed panels and the sound of a helicopter close overhead. 
Plugged in, the thing lurches into some kind of mobility and in movement it becomes 
clear that it is composed of a revolving platform – a drum – onto which objects have been 
attached - with string? Chain? Wire? A pole projects out at a diagonal. From the apparent 
density of its formation in movement the thing flies apart, revealing its own fragility. It 
sheds itself into its own works – stops itself – and one of the men (Landy?) swings a lump 
hammer at it until it begins to move again. The next time it fails some element of the 
machinery continues to twitch: troublingly a row of wires like tines of a garden rake play 
delicately in a movement like reflex knee-jerks, the fluttering of eye-lids or the legs of an 
upturned beetle. As it destroys itself the machine takes on more and more delicacy. Even 
its sound transforms from a flat clank to a sibilant tinkle like fragments of ceramic in a 
tray or shattered glass suspended by threads. Eventually, the machine gives off a refined 
little puff of smoke, which hangs opaquely against the concrete, its single arm still 
reaching quixotically toward the sky. Once the machine finishes its work, the camera 
picks its way across to survey the extruded remnants: wire basket; bracket; metal plate; 
canister.  
The first comparator to hold up against category of the fragment is that of the 





material properties and the forces acting upon it, may have an indexical, jigsaw-
piece relationship to) a previous whole. The loss of that previous thing inheres in 
the resulting fragments. Simultaneously, each fragment acquires its own 
wholeness immediately it splinters free: immediately Landy feeds his red, plastic 
crate through the shredder, the ‘whole’ of the crate disappears and each of the 
resulting shining, red, plastic granules assumes the quality of ‘wholeness’ in its own 
right. The fragment reveals the instability of the singular, exposing as it does the 
immanent possibility that seemingly stable, gathered entireties might break (or be 
broken) apart. Even the discrete bodies of the resulting shards need to be 
considered both as objects composed of particles, and as active participants in the 
material world beyond the finite limits of the space they themselves now occupy.  
Along these lines, Jacqueline Lichtenstein (2009) proffers the criteria that a 
fragment should be defined as ‘a compact object one can touch’ and ‘the whole 
from which it derives is a whole that can be broken up: divided into solid, compact 
pieces’ as a result of ‘a process of fragmentation’. Other specifications listed here 
have less credibility, however. Lichtenstein suggests that ‘we must believe [the 
fragment] to be a detached piece of something. It cannot be a fragment of just 
anything’ – she terms miscellaneous and indeterminate broken material mere 
‘pieces’ (2009, pp.115-6). Later in the same discussion it is further defined that a 
fragment should be a remaining or ‘surviving’ piece: ‘it is the missing pieces that 
confer on the surviving pieces […] their status as fragments’ (Ibid., p.119). In view 
of this last adjustment, the category of ‘fragment’, as proposed by Lichtenstein, 
takes on a rather self-erasing character. In these terms, on one hand the only thing 
standing between a random ‘piece’ of discarded marble and its canonisation as a 
fragment is our knowledge of its origins; while on the other, the status of an 
individual fragment depends on its status as a surviving part of an otherwise 
vanished object. 
3.6 Narrative object  
In the remainder of the current chapter an account is extended of the fragment as 
a narrative object and a souvenir; a pocketable token for – and perhaps a container 
for - violence. The seemingly comprehensive and self sufficient form of fragments 
comprises extraordinary complexity and plurality. If the fragment is narrative, the 












coming discussion, I consider fragmentation in the light of two layers, or 
gradations, of narrative that might be associated with an object. A first stratum, 
which is immanent in the material composition of the object, has to do with the 
indexical relationship that can be traced between the form of the object and events 
that have occurred in the past, through which the current composition of the 
object was reached. A second stratum relates to the entire range of human 
memories, inferences and interpretations that might be projected upon the object. 
In analyses of the fragment it appears that this second strata refers to and is 
intrinsically shaped by the first; that is, by the form of the object. As previously 
argued, if the fragment were the precise opposite of the whole. This is to say that 
if processes of breaking, splitting, flaking or splintering into many discrete parts 
were situated on one side of a flat binary in which a thing is either fragmented or 
it is whole, the category of ‘multiplicity’ would stand against that of ‘fragment’. In 
fact, rather than operationalising this oppositional logic, it is my suggestion that 
the multiplicity configures the fragment – and in fact, matter itself - as containing, 
immanently, process and transformation.  
The artist Gustav Metzger provides the useful specification that auto destructive 
art deploys the conjoined factors of ‘material’, ‘process’ and ‘time’ (1996, p.42). A 
member of the Fluxus group and author of three manifestos connected with auto 
destructive art, written in 1959, 1960 and 1961 (Ibid., pp.59-60), Metzger’s work is 
concerned precisely with matter, its qualities and affects (in the Deleuzian sense: 
the propensity of a particular body to affect, or be affected). He is a Holocaust 
survivor who has consistently discussed his work in explicitly and directly political 
terms, and has campaigned for nuclear disarmament over many years. Metzger’s 
anti-violence gave rise to his initiation of the Destruction In Art Symposium in 
1966, a three-day conference followed by a month of art events and shows. This 
influential event was attended by ‘some fifty avant-garde artists from ten countries 
[…] as well as scientists, philosophers and psychoanalysts’ (Wilson, 2013, p.144; see 
also Cox and Landesman, 1966; Tate, n.d.; The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 
2002).17 
                                                     
17 Metzger is seen visiting Break Down and, with evident pleasure, closely inspecting items on the 
conveyor belt as they pass him by in the documentary The Man Who Destroyed Everything 
(2002), which also includes a short section on his acid works. In order to work against ‘personal 





Observation: Gustav Metzger making an acid painting - online video (Contemporary 
Films, 2011). Monochrome footage. A shot from below. Metzger holds a gas mask over 
his face and positions the strap around the back of his head. A coil of tubing descends 
from the mouth piece and hangs, protruding slightly. He puts on a large pair of goggles 
and a white helmet. Using a large brush attached to the end of a long stick, he begins to 
make lunging and slicing movements: precise, canny, forceful, and abrupt. The shot 
shifts: he stands at a large piece of nylon that is stretched taut on a rectangular metal 
frame. Another shot, this time of the fabric after it has received the acid and the 
paintbrush has been removed. The surface springs, seizes, puckers, gapes. Holes travel 
and lengthen in a way that seems purposeful; alive. They ladder, and the ladders 
transform into viscous drips. The fabric shrinks away from itself. Holes leap together. 
Now, fabric hangs down in ribbons and sheets. Through an opening in the fabric we are 
shown a shot of St Paul’s Cathedral. We are by the Thames. A boat chugs east toward 
Greenwich. Curls of nylon are lapped by the breeze. It is a bright day.  
Metzger’s concern with material, process and time can certainly be identified in 
this inquiry into the behaviour of nylon when daubed with acid. The work was 
performed during the Destruction In Art Symposium, but Metzger also describes 
making an acid painting on the South Bank in London five years earlier in 1961,18 as 
an artist member of the anti-nuclear group, the Committee of 100: ‘It was partly 
me attacking the system of capitalism, but also inevitably the systems of war, the 
warmongers’ (Philpot, 2009, p.25). The way the nylon curls and shrivels and the 
holes continue to spread and grow after Metzger has painted the acid is both 
compelling and repulsive. As I watch the online video of Metzger’s happening on 
the South Bank, I am forcefully reminded of the stories of survivors of the atomic 
bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, whose skin was burnt from their bodies by 
the heat of the blast, and hung down in ribbons. The work presents a direct 
confrontation with violent power, recalling the fragility of human flesh and 
opening up a visceral encounter between fragility and violence. The importance of 
                                                     
it happens, far more memorable) image of the back of his head, a cap, the outline of his ears and 
shoulders in silhouette. 
18 The online video cited here (Contemporary Films, 2011) is attributed to a member of Regent 
Street Polytechnic in 1965, the year before the Destruction in Art Symposium. Metzger wears a 
gas mask and goggles as described in his discussion of the demonstration he gave with the 





Metzger’s acid works as anti-war pieces arises from an awareness of human bodies 
as made of stuff; bodies as fragile entities that suffer and fail when subjected to 
violence. What is demonstrated so directly in Metzger’s acid piece is the function 
of violence itself as a substrate of government power. In this age of mutually 
assured destruction, our constant awareness of the threat of violence is in itself a 
violence. It is precisely this awareness that Metzger deploys (see Wilson, 2013, 
p.144) and works against by making visible the human, bodily implications in his 
work. Yet, much as this acid painting is an anti-war art work, it always continues 
to be ‘about’ what happens when acid is applied to nylon – how one substance 
reacts to the other.  
To understand this further, one might turn again to Metzger’s identification that 
‘auto-destructive art is material that is undergoing a process of transformation in 
time’ (1996, p.42; emphasis added). This formulation, in which Metzger attempts 
to understand material/process/time as a single conjoined element, connects 
precisely with my own conception of the fragment as narrative object. There is no 
little accordance between the account of affordances in Gibson (1979/1986), in 
which the properties of objects and matter are considered in relation to the 
humans or animals that interact with them, and Metzger’s discussion of the 
behaviour and capacity of certain materials to be transformed. Metzger considers 
matter and process in an especially Gibsonian manner when he discusses ‘the 
aesthetic of falling bodies’: 
The movements in space of every part of the material is of the greatest importance. 
Different materials in various stages of transformation have differing speeds, 
rhythms, convolutions though space. Some forms are ejected and describing an 
arc, hit the ground. Forms may slide. Materials may liquefy and reach the earth as 
drops. Falling bodies include aerosols, dust, smoke, water droplets. All these forms 
are potential aesthetic phenomena (1996, p.43). 
In discussing fragmentation itself Metzger observes that while some auto-
destructive art works via processes of decomposition that might be very slow, even 
indiscernible, destruction might take place via more confrontational processes: 
Matter leaves a work in fragments. These fragments could be in the form of solid 
blocks which hit the ground without shattering and are eventually removed. It is a 
misconception that all parts of an auto-destructive art sculpture have to 
disintegrate. Other fragments shatter on impact. Fragments leave the work as a 
result of explosions. Vibration may shatter fragments. Forms implode. Matter is 






In a similar way, it can be observed that in Break Down, different materials afford 
different methods of destruction. Landy’s photographs afford tearing and 
shredding; canvases must be prised from their wooden frames; his lentils have 
merely to be emptied into the hopper, the foam from his furniture goes easily 
through the shredders; his car must be dismantled by a qualified mechanic 
(Artangel, 2015). This emphasis on the fragment as expressive of process, then, can 
be related directly to Landy’s project to return objects ‘as near as possible to raw 
materials’ (Sillars, 2009, pp.25-6) and his focus, long before the show began, not 
on disposal but on object life-span and cycles of use (Landy, 2001a). In these 
moments, even while de-forming them, Landy makes visible in his belongings their 
most basic and inherent material properties, an action that incorporates a kind of 
grace, almost a moment of justice in which meanings imposed by human beings 
are erased in favour of the innate meaning – which is to say, the physical properties 
– of the objects he dismantles.  
Observation: photograph of materials retrieved from radio-cassette on weighing 
scales (Landy, 2001a, pp.72-3; see Figure 8). Copper wiring, bundled in short, even 
lengths like bright straw. Oblong and L-shaped sections of flat metal in a dull grey retain 
their screw-holes; like shapes from TETRIS, a mass of right-angles, they lie and half-slide 
in a pile to one side. Some white plastic sections (for corners or edges perhaps?) and a 
twist of red flex, plus, toward the back, something less easy to identify, flat and iridescent 
blue, fluted like foil from the neck of a bottle of wine.  
The charismatic qualities of the fragment – the peculiar ‘aura’ of shards, flakes, 
splinters and scraps – is discussed in depth by the archaeologist Mats Burström 
(2013, p.311). This can be seen in all of the fragment photographs that emerge from 
Break Down. An assemblage of fragments, photographed on Landy’s electric scales 
(sadly, the number display is not quite in focus), is deeply tactile: one’s first impulse 
is to hold and touch, to twist the lengths of copper wire, palm, arrange, and count. 
These fragments possess an attractive quality that emerges directly from their 
form. Burström projects two complementary accounts for the charisma of the 
fragment. He argues firstly that as somewhat anomalous objects that cannot always 
easily be accounted for, fragments leave space for interpretations of histories 





Secondly, projecting that if ‘all fragments were to fuse together into a complete 
and convincing whole, the magic would be lost’ (2013, p.318), Burström explicitly 
connects the attraction of the fragment with the space these objects leave for 
conjecture and interpretation, which exceeds the actual preceding whole object. In 
this moment of ‘more than’ and ‘beyond’ I see a re-emergence of the psychoanalytic 
conceptualisation, discussed earlier in this chapter, of desire as emerging from the 
gap left behind by a single and unitary loss. Here, however, since the archaeologist 
presumably has the fragment but not the whole thing, the site of that loss is 
ambiguous. Is it the gap formed by the remaining, missing pieces of the originary 
object that lets in this transcendent quality, ‘the magic’? Or alternatively, is the 
fragment itself a kind of gap in solid form? The classicist Glenn Most (2009, p.22) 
treads similar ground in a survey of the treatment of material and textual fragments 
from antiquity, conjecturing that ‘the very condition of fragmentariness’ holds a 
particular attraction, and positing that in its fractured and unbalanced 
incompletion the fragment speaks to the breaks and discontinuities inherent in 
human life and experience. Like Burström, Most presents a vision in which some 
element of the whole is always, necessarily, hidden - but where Burström expresses 
no wish to complete the picture, for Most the fragment obsesses scholars more 
than the (imaginary) perfect whole precisely because we get to fill in the gaps, 
making an imaginary wholeness in lieu of the ‘shattered hopes of our own 
existence’ (Ibid., p.18). This phrasing feels somewhat sentimental, but perhaps a 
fragment really can be imagined as a gap in material form. The fragment is 
attractive, I propose, because it reifies, in the form of a small object, the splintered 
and contingent realities of human life.  
In other words, the value of the fragment is that it affords use as a memento or 
souvenir, in the sense that it is a small, portable object that embodies a space, time 
or event and makes it – literally and figuratively – easy to handle. Here, I look to 
the work of the literary critic Susan Stewart (1993), who imagines the souvenir as a 
device that acts as a proxy for experience: ‘as experience is to an imagined point of 
authenticity, so narrative is to the souvenir’ (Ibid., p.136). As Stewart comments, 
part of the point of the souvenir is that we take it away with us. By definition, its 
purpose is to end up in places where it in some sense does not belong. Regarding 
practices of taking souvenirs – or fragments - away, the archaeologist John 
Chapman (2000) presents an important account of practices of breaking, relating 





theory deals with the fact that many fragments of ancient, broken objects cannot 
be reconstituted at the find-site (because they are found incomplete). Chapman 
posits that the ostensibly ‘missing’ fragments may have been given to others and 
taken elsewhere in order to signify and reinforce social relationships through 
practices of breaking and distribution.  
As Stewart suggests (albeit with some scepticism) in a similar way, the souvenir 
might be seen as an attempt to make an enduring connection with a particular 
place. However, for Stewart, the souvenir – like the fragment – is always missing 
something. It is metonymic of the experience for which it stands. This holds 
whether, as in the case of the fragment, this metonymy is ‘homomaterial’ – that is, 
taken physically from its referent – or not. Here one might consider the Medieval 
British practice of sealing a deal using a broken knife, one part of which is held by 
each party to a legal agreement, or later, a legal document that was itself cut in a 
‘unique, zig-zag manner’, again for purposes of authentification (Chapman, 2000, 
p.38). In both cases, the authenticity and reliability of the agreement made is 
signalled through the direct material continuity between the fragments kept by 
each party. In a similar way, in Stewart, the souvenir gains authority if there is some 
direct, indexical relationship between the keepsake and the object it signifies. 
Nevertheless, what it stands in for, it cannot entirely fulfil. Indeed, the entire 
function of the souvenir is precisely to act as the incomplete receptacle for ‘a 
narrative discourse which articulates the play of desire’ (1993, p.136), which is to 
say that the souvenir not only depends on a supplementary narrative to animate it, 
but exists in order to provide a space for this narrative. 
In the literature on fragmentation, the story of the fragment as a manifestation of 
mortality in pocketable material form appears and reappears as though revolving 
on Landy’s conveyor belt. For instance, the endeavours of forensic scientists at the 
gigantic Fresh Kills landfill following 9/11 suggest themselves as a worked example 
here, as tiny fragments of bone the size of a fingernail are found in the dust and 
debris and taken as direct referents for ‘the body […] to verify that such a person 
existed, and was there’ (Sturken, 2007, p.209). The motif of mortal remains 
contained in a ‘dirty’ substance reappears in a study of preservation and 
memorialisation at the former concentration camp Sachsenhausen. Here, the 
anthropologist Howard Potter ‘steals’ soil samples from around the site: ‘Tower A, 





p.44). He dries and sterilises them in his oven before placing them in labelled glass 
jars to make an ethnographic object – a collection of vials – in an attempt to explore 
‘how this materiality, the substance of the site, appears to produce memories, both 
for the former prisoners and the present-day staff’ (Ibid., p.41). In both examples, 
our mortal remains haunt the soil. Only through diligent sifting and processing 
can they be ‘found’ again – either figuratively or literally. 
 
Figure 13: Shot of fragments on the ground in online video of Break Down (Artangel, 2015). 
Gabriel Moshenska chronicles children’s engagement with ‘the material culture of 
warfare and violence’ (2008, p.108) via the widespread practice in Britain during 
the Second World War of gathering and swapping collections of shrapnel, ‘carrying 
them around, handling them and allowing others to sort through them as a form 
of display’ (Ibid., p.112): 
As a commodity, shrapnel is […] unique in its explosive means of production and 
distribution, being created very suddenly at high temperatures and altitudes and 
spreading itself across wide areas in an admirably democratic way. As a tradeable 
man-made commodity it was remarkable in being free, abundant, endlessly diverse 
and continually in production: in the world of collecting these are characteristics 
more usually associated with natural history specimens such as seashells (Ibid., 
p.111). 
As Moshenska posits, testimonies from collectors suggest that these fragments 
helped them to represent the violence of their daily experiences to themselves. 
Indeed, such practices of collecting munitions continue to date; he provides a 





often shiny, sometimes bearing traces of its manufacture and its destructive 
journey; it is hard, and crucially, often small enough to pocket.  
In relation to my framing discussions, earlier in this chapter, of concepts of affect 
and affordance, it is important to note, here, that the physical properties of the 
fragment– are intrinsic to its significance and usefulness for these children. In a 
similar way, the example of the souvenir postcard in which a small crumb of 
concrete from the Berlin Wall is presented safely encased within a plastic blister 
(Van der Hoorn, 2003, p.191) emphasises this move. Here, taking possession of a 
fragment of a monstrous object may have had an inoculating or perhaps even a 
homeopathic effect. The bearer might be protected in some way from the violent 
power of the historic events symbolised by the object. Alternatively, like the bearer 
of a religious relic, she might take into herself some of that momentous force. 
There is a coherence therefore between the case of Berlin Wall fragments and that 
of shrapnel collecting. In both, the ability to hold and touch the fragmented trophy 
– the ability to have it - is of central importance (Ibid., p.193). In light of Stewart’s 
work on the souvenir more broadly, I propose that the role of these pocketed pieces 
of shrapnel and granulated concrete is to bring the experiences they represent 
down to size and enable their introjection by the collector: 
to [reduce] the public, the monumental and the three-dimensional into the 
miniature, which can be enveloped by the body, or into the two-dimensional 
representation, that which can be appropriated within the privatized view of the 
individual subject’ (1993, pp.137-8). 
In all four of the examples rehearsed above - mortal remains in the 9/11 dust, dried 
soil from Sachsenhausen, shrapnel collected by children, and commoditised 
crumbs of concrete from the Berlin Wall - the fragment is presumed to have an 
indexical relationship with its originating ‘whole’ object. It is specifically this that 
fits it to act as a referent of or stand-in for the original. In the latter two examples, 
a sense of authority – a kind of embodied authenticity - is further reinforced 
through the connection, within the form of the fragment, to the moment of 
fracture. As Van der Hoorn says of shattered architecture: 
Slashed into pieces, recycles, transformed, it can continue to live in fragmented 
form and act as an intermediary onto which people can project their memories, 
frustrations or experiences with regard to the object that used to occupy an 





Meanwhile, Sturken (2007, p.208) relates, a piece of metal from the jet that collided 
with the Pentagon is canonised through preservation, gathered by FBI agents and 
ends up in the possession of Donald Rumsfeld. This anecdote resonates in 
interesting ways with those previously detailed. Where collectors of shrapnel and 
Berlin Wall rubble are arguably attempting to make sense of violent events not of 
their making, Rumsfeld was in a position to become the architect of further shells; 
shrapnel; rubble: more deadly souvenirs for the children of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
One might speculate, indeed, given the sheer extent of the destructive power at his 
disposal, about what need Rumsfeld could possibly have had for souvenirs. 
Certainly, for the shard to proceed through the system as it did, presumably 
beginning as forensic evidence, labelled, contained, recorded and analysed, before 
finding its way to Rumsfeld’s desk (as a trophy of sorts?) is not insignificant. Is it 
too much to imagine that in this case, the forensic and the magical combine to 
make a talisman that incorporates empirical proof (to echo Sturken, the plane was 
there: it existed) and a symbolic capture of chaotic, violent power that can be held 
and displayed?  
M: I seem to remember you sprinkling some of my shredded Saab car underneath 
a sacred tree in India. Not that anyone was allowed to take any of the parts, but 
you somehow managed to get some out. 
D: It was the sacred Bodhi tree in Bodhgaya, which is meant to be the fifth 
incarnation of the tree that Buddha sat under. But it wasn't actually the Saab itself, 
just some plastic granules. For some reason I just felt moved to sprinkle some as a 
kind of offering. Break Down formed part of a spiritual journey that I went on. I 
went to India a couple of days after it had finished (Artangel, 2010; see also Landy, 
2008b) 
 
I periodically wanted to rescue (for which read 'have for myself') some of his things, 
or to take a little bit of shredded paper or a knife blade as a souvenir (Walford, 
2001). 
As this pair of quotations show, Landy’s fragments are also treated as souvenirs – 
which is to say that they are picked up and taken away, and, more than that, seem 
to possess a kind of narrative potency of their own. In a conversation between 
Landy and Dave Nutt, the mechanic who dismantled his car, the fragments are 
stolen and carried elsewhere. When Nutt takes a handful of plastic granules to 
Bodhgaya, he enacts enchainment theory (Chapman, 2010), as a fragment from one 





to enact meaning and relationship. This transformation of plastic pellet to 
sprinkled offering draws very clearly on the same repertoire of narrative and 
material strategies found later that year in the treatment of the fragments and dust 
of 9/11. Now, they are treated as a sacred relic-like substance; now as a source of 
forensic evidence; now as rubbish. Finally, since the granules are also stolen by 
members of the public (Cumming, 2001; Walford, 2001), I connect this act of taking 
with my earlier discussion of the fragment as inoculation or homeopathic particle.  
Informed in particular by the work of Van der Hoorn (2003) on the fragment in 
war tourism, I propose that in the act of scooping granules from a tray when no-
one was looking so as to ‘have [them] for myself’ (Walford, 2001) such visitors 
hoped in some sense to take in a fragment of the power of Landy’s act. To pocket 
fragments of Landy’s de-formed stuff was to place themselves within the narrative 
in some small way and possibly to inoculate themselves – perhaps against the 
transgressive nature of the work – or alternatively, against consumer capital itself.  
However, the aptest moment in Break Down takes place after the show has 
officially ended, when (Landy’s assiduous labour of destruction notwithstanding) 
the resulting sacks of granulated matter have to be removed by refuse-collectors. 
Here, a sleight of hand occurs. In a doubling movement Landy appears to have 
destroyed his stuff – yet simultaneously we know that he has in fact converted it 
into a heap of scraps that '[end] up in landfill' (Landy, 2008a, p.105). After the show, 
the granulated remains of Landy's belongings manifest the impossibility of 
disappearance. Dust and the fragment signal a stubborn assertion of durability of 
physical stuff. In shredding his stuff, Landy exposes matter as multiple, dynamic, 




Figure 14: Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a), open to show ring binding. Photograph 
by author, June 2015. 
The coming chapter takes as its central provocation a single artefact from Break 
Down; the manual written to guide the progress of the work. In etymological terms, 
the noun, manual, is rooted in the Latin term, manus, for hand, and is also 
connected with the adjective manuālis, which describes an object – often a book - 
‘held in the hand, of a size to fill the hand’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017).1 This 
sense of the term is suggested in its synonym, handbook, although manual is also 
strongly connected with a notion of work done with the hands. As a counterpoint 
to the manual, therefore, the hand is explored in this chapter as an emblem of 
labour-power in the sense proposed by Marx – that is, ‘the aggregate of those 
mental and physical capabilities existing in the physical form, the living 
personality, of a human being’ (1867/1976, p.270). Thinking from the perspective 
of the human being using her hands makes possible an account that takes in some 
                                                     
1 This is mirrored by the term used for the codex, which at that point took the form of ‘wax-
covered wooden tablets hinged together’, in ancient Rome – pugillares – so named because, in 






of the potentiality of personhood. As this chapter will show, this richness and 
complexity is overwritten by the manual, which contains within it the elision of 
labour power described by Marx. The manual is, I propose, a textual form that 
brings a purely conjectural state of affairs into being through the definition of 
specific actions or modes of behaviour. It works obliquely by predicting and 
marking the capabilities of the instruction-follower as well as the behaviour and 
capacities - in Gibson’s terms, the affordances (1979/1986) - of the tools and 
materials that will be brought into play. In particular, the manual functions 
through the operationalisation of aspects of work, thought, behaviour and 
materiality, and simultaneously, by obscuring others (which, nevertheless, 
continue to be essential to the task).  
Chapter 3: Fragment / Part / Whole, stages a close encounter with the fragments 
produced through Break Down and explores how their physical form, and Landy’s 
processes of destruction, reveal concepts of fragment, whole, and multiplicity. 
Chapters 4: Manual, and 5: Line / List / Inventory, further progress the central 
original contribution of this thesis by exploring how Break Down works between 
materiality and mediality. As Harriet Hawkins remarks in her analysis of Break 
Down, the two texts that are most closely identified with this work, are ‘[o]ften 
marginalised, written out of accounts of Break Down’, and yet should be treated as 
‘pivotal’ to a thorough understanding the work (2010, p.20). I build upon her 
observation in this and the next chapter, by offering close analyses of the two texts 
that accompany the work, Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a) and Break 
Down Inventory (Landy, 2001b). As such, Chapters 4 and 5 also constitute a 
significant advance in relation to existing literatures on Break Down.  
Deleuzo-Guattarian assemblage theory, which provides the conceptual frame for 
this thesis, is revealed in distinctive ways through the new media theory approach 
used here and in Chapter 5. Through this lens, new media theory provides an 
account of media as an assemblage (Horn, 2007); that is, as a coming together of 
social and political conditions and technicities that may also produce certain social 
and political conditions and technicities. As such, the notion of a media object 
becomes broader and more inclusive. One might consider, for example, the 
mediality of a book; a desktop publishing program; an art work, but also a sock; a 
sandwich; a pile of dung; a plastic bag. Like more conventional media – like a book; 





resides specifically in how they ‘[mobilise their] resources as a physical artefact’ 
(Hayles, 2002, p.33). Further, an account of the material form of media can be 
supplemented through a consideration of the technicity of their genesis – their 
writing or their making - ‘[layered] with a sense of their own fabrication’ (Fuller, 
2007, p.2). 
This chapter opens with an introductory discussion on new media theory. The 
material form of the text Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a) is 
investigated, and I perform a close reading of one of its sections; the ‘Manual’ in 
which a set of protocols are laid out for use by the eleven blue boiler suited 
operatives who assisted Landy (Ibid., pp.33-40). This reading of Landy’s manual is 
placed alongside an anatomisation of the manual as a textual form. Landy’s 
procedures are investigated in the light of practices of making, using and 
publishing instructions or ‘event scores’ within the Fluxus group, an informal 
collective of artists, working internationally, which achieved prominence in the 
early 1960s. They are also set alongside Kittler’s account of literacy as a specifically 
bodily disciplinary strategy, in relation to which I consider the operationalisation 
in the manual of the hands of the work. Here, it is salient to turn to the 
compendious written commentary by Landy on his dismantling of a radio cassette 
player, performed as preparation for Break Down. This account, which seems in 
some ways to resemble the form of the manual, offers in fact a fundamental 
challenge to the form of the manual in its prioritisation of the sensual experience 
of working with one’s hands.  
4.1 Material media 
The main argument put forward in Chapter 3 was that fragments possess a 
narrative potentiality - a certain mediality that arises specifically from their form. 
This concern regarding the expressive capacities of Landy’s granules echoes studies 
that examine as media objects a range of technologies, events and entities that are 
all in some way or another conductive. The media historian Ben Kafka estimated, 
in 2012, that a ‘technical turn’ in which ‘humanists have started to think seriously 
about the technics of knowledge’ had taken place over the previous ‘decade or so’ 
(2012, p.110). Exploring closely related territory, the scholar of cultural studies Eva 
Horn introduces a special edition of the journal Grey Room on ‘new German media 
theory’. Here, she makes the provocative suggestion that such work moves beyond 





they the transfer of a message [or] the emergence of a visual object’. She proposes, 
further, that media that ‘are in themselves events: assemblages or constellations of 
certain technologies, fields of knowledge, and social institutions’ (2007, p.8): 
Doors and mirrors, computers and gramophones, electricity and newspapers, 
television and telescopes, archives and automobiles, water and air, information 
and noise, numbers and calendars, images, writing and voice (Ibid., p.7). 
Joseph Vogl, in the same edition of Grey Room, notes that the ‘field of inquiry’ 
known as media studies encompasses: 
physical transmitters (such as air and light), as well as schemes of notation, 
whether hieroglyphic, phonetic and alphanumeric. It includes technologies and 
artifacts like electrification, the telescope, or the gramophone alongside symbolic 
forms and spatial representations such as perspective, theatre, or literature as a 
whole (2007, p.15). 
Horn also acknowledges the mediality of everyday ‘cultural techniques’: ‘body 
techniques (such as cooking or hygienics), elementary cultural practices (such as 
cultivating the soil), and symbolic operations (such as cooking, counting or 
measuring)’ (2007, p.12; see also Siegert, 2007). These objects and practices are 
themselves analogous to the pivotal positioning by the media theorist Marshall 
McLuhan of the light bulb as ‘pure information’ (1964/2001, p.8), and the inclusion 
by Kittler of ‘all kinds of cultural exchange’ within ‘the concept of medium’ 
(Wellbery, 1990, p.xiii). 
In considering this exciting array, what becomes clear is that due to their transitive 
and necessarily relational nature, media cannot be considered as having an 
existence, nature or set of effects that are inherent or inert. The scholarly 
approaches introduced by Horn require a decisive step away from hermeneutics: 
from ‘the quicksand of such predicaments as “sense,” “meaning,” “interpretation,” 
and “beauty”’ (2007, p.9). Instead, the field of new media theory produces a 
historiographical account of media in which they are treated as assemblages, 
comprising, among other things, technical capabilities and systems of knowledge 
(Vogl, 2007, p.16).  
This approach is identified by both Horn and Vogl as Foucauldian or post-
Foucauldian. As Wellbery says in his excellent introduction to Kittler’s Discourse 





Kittler’s discourse analysis follows the Foucauldian lead in that it seeks to delineate 
the apparatuses of power, storage, transmission, training, reproduction and so 
forth that make up the conditions of factual discursive occurrences. The object of 
study is not what is said or written but the fact – the brute and often brutal fact – 
that it is said, that this and not rather something else is inscribed (1990, p.xii). 
A clear connection can be drawn between this approach and the assemblage theory 
of Deleuze and Guattari that underpins the analysis projected in this thesis. This 
connection appears distinctly in Vogl’s discussion of media that arise ‘in a coming 
together of heterogeneous elements – apparatuses, codes, symbolic systems, forms 
of knowledge, specific practices, and aesthetic experiences’ which, in certain 
precise, historically specific ways, constitute media ‘as an assemblage, a 
“dispositive” (in Foucault’s sense) of heterogeneous conditions and elements’ 
(2007, p.16).2 As Horn suggests, the work of Kittler forms an indispensable 
contribution to the field of new media studies. His work further resonates with 
that of both Foucault and McLuhan in offering the narrative that the apparatuses 
we use to write are not neutral but rather remake the work of writing itself. Much 
as technological advances emerge only via ‘a specific assemblage of diverse 
conditions, factors and elements’ (Vogl, 2007, p.23), such apparatuses shape the 
nature and capacities of textuality.  
In Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, Kittler’s opening statement, ‘media determine 
our situation’ (1986/1999, p.xxxix), might initially be read as a comment on the 
experience of the reader who takes up, or is taken up by, one inflected account 
rather than another. In fact, as will be discussed, it has much broader implications. 
These include the ways in which technicities of writing intervene in and form upon 
the body of the writer, configurations of social and cultural power that give rise to 
new forms of media, and the ways in which new forms of media also form surfaces 
from which new configurations of power can arise. As Matthew Fuller suggests, if 
Foucault lays out a historiographical account of discourse as an operation of power 
that emerges from specific institutional formations, Kittler’s work, in tracking their 
                                                     
2 While Horn does not directly reference the work of Marshall McLuhan, his contribution must 
be acknowledged. McLuhan’s sense is that media both influence ‘the form of human association’ 
(1964/2001, p.9) and work as an ‘extension’ of ‘our human senses’ (Ibid., p.23). His insight is that 
the form of media must be afforded significance beyond what might be called its ‘content’ or 
‘message’, which he considers irrelevant. In this, the work of McLuhan accords strongly with that 
of Kittler, who is nevertheless cited more often here because the particular specificity and 






transformation or translation into specifically material strategies, represents an 
important further expansion. Kittler, however, occludes important elements of 
Foucault’s work in considering that, due to his methodological focus on printed 
text, his work ceases to be applicable ‘at the point where modern electronic media 
emerge, between 1860 and 1870’ (Fuller, 2007, p.61). Inversely, to follow this line 
would be to overlook a Foucauldian account of the ‘dynamics of composition and 
arrangement’ to which the texts he examines refer, including ‘the “apparatuses,” 
“instrumentalities,” “techniques,” “mechanisms,” “machineries,” and so on by 
which they are wrought and made available’ (Ibid.). As such, Kittler, like Foucault, 
exposes the inadequacies of conventional humanities analysis in which form and 
content are opposed, or imagined to occupy separate (if overlapping) ontological 
categories.  
Indeed, a common discursive thread that unites the texts discussed in this section 
is the notion of the assemblage in which an entity works in a particular way due to 
the relationship of the element to the rest of the assemblage. This constitutes an 
important moment of congruence between new media theory and the Deleuzian 
concept of affect (1970/1988). Here, as previously discussed (see for example 
Chapter 1, pages 32-4, and Chapter 3, pages 59-61 and 71-2) the capacity of an object 
to effect change upon, and be changed by, objects and forces outside itself is 
defined in relational terms. This is to say that the capacities and affordances of any 
entity in particular are determined by the assemblage(s) in which it is implicated. 
Horn concludes that inquiries within the field known as ‘new German media 
theory’ have moved beyond a focus on the technicity or putative ‘ideological 
contents’ of media, toward an emphasis on media as a ‘process’ or ‘event’. As such, 
she describes a body of work that, I suggest, coheres with and can work alongside 
the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the desiring-machine (see discussion in 
Chapter 1, pages 36-7, and Chapter 6, pages 187-92). Horn’s assertion that ‘the 
refusal to specify what media are leads to a focus on what they do’ (Horn, 2007, 
p.11; emphasis reproduced) is akin to Deleuze and Guattari’s, that: 
We will never ask what a book means, as signified or signifier; we will not look for 
anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with. In connection 
with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in what other 
multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed (1987/2013, p.2).  
In both cases (and in the current text) it is the working of the object under 





relates to the act of meaning – meaning is something that is done, not a singular 
object that might be unburied and examined. 
4.2 Michael Landy / Break Down  
Observation: Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a) (March 2017); see Figure 14. 
The text is presented in a plastic ring binder. On opening, the binder lies flat on my desk; 
the metal ring mechanism attached to the back cover with studs. The pages are held in 
place by a clip that can be pushed down onto the rings. To open the pages, one must 
loosen the clip. It is also possible to remove pages by looping one’s fingers into one of 
the rings and prying it apart (and indeed, when I received my copy, the pages needed to 
be put back in the right order). The text is organised using shiny, yellow card dividers 
with titled tabs that stick out to the right, and include a numbered guide to the contents 
and page numbers of that section. The pages themselves are a soft, grainy, white paper, 
which is a little yellowed at the edges. As well as printed text, the binder includes a 
number of reproductions of images in black and white - of Landy’s sketches of his 
belongings, documents associated with the work, and handwritten notes on dismantling 
a radio cassette player – as well as colour photographs and scans of documents, objects 
and collages associated with the process. An A3-sized fold-out, printed in colour, shows 
a collage, including texts, handwritten notes, promotional materials and objects such as 
a toy refuse lorry, gathered as part of Landy’s research process. 
This chapter examines not only a specific text - a manual written by Landy – but 
the manual as a type of media object. This chapter works between two sections 
within the text, Michael Landy / Break Down; ‘Manual’ and ‘Case Study’ (Landy, 
2001a, pp.33-40; 51-74). Before looking further into the content of these sections, it 
is worthwhile to observe that the material form of Michael Landy / Break Down 
prefigures Landy’s use of the manual as a textual mode that is bureaucratic in 
character. For this reason, I begin this section with some discussion of bureaucracy 
as an operationalisation of mediality.  
A number of important studies on bureaucracy draw to some degree upon the 
previously discussed insights of new media theory. As such, the material and 
technological basis of administrative texts and procedures is given precedence in 
these texts. An excellent example can be found in Lisa Gitelman’s (2014) history of 





creation of ‘blanks’ into which certain kinds of information must be added. Other 
prominent contributions come from Markus Krajewski (2011) on the card index, 
and Cornelia Vismann (2008) in her superb history of the file. But it is Ben Kafka 
(2007; 2012) who most compellingly expresses what is at stake in such discussions 
in his vivid anatomisation of bureaucratic paperwork as an ideological apparatus 
that channels – that is, both takes in, and gives out - need. Kafka, investigating the 
praxis of paperwork, provides insights into the significance of seemingly 
inconsequential developments in the technicity of writing and record-keeping. He 
traces the first recorded use of the term, bureaucracy, to the mid-1700s: as he 
observes, by the mid-1800s it was widespread in France, Germany and England 
(2012, p.79). This explosion of the term gives onto a matching explosion in 
bureaucratic work as a mode of centralising power. As such, seemingly inexorable 
proliferations in the collection, organisation and strategic deployments – including 
the storage and retrieval - of information are commonly viewed as the output of a 
‘manic’ state (Ibid., p.82). Such practices are resistant to logic, overwhelming in 
volume and often curtail, if not paralysing, individuals’ capacity for sensible self-
determination. The form, the filing system, the stamp: these mundane and 
seemingly neutral artefacts appear anew, not only as filters for state power, but as 
harbingers of a chaos that is seemingly ungovernable (even by governments). 
Like Kafka, Cornelia Vismann, in her history of the file, introduces an account of 
material technicities that arise from and give onto particular configurations of state 
power. The technology of the ring binder develops, Vismann explains, in step with 
the popularisation of the typewriter (further implications of which are discussed 
later in this chapter) and, one would assume, the hole punch. In particular, the 
typewriter necessitates the use of single sheets of paper (rather than the 
handwritten record-keeping books and ledgers that had previously been used). It 
facilitates the easy production of identical carbon copies of documents which can 
be filed instead of drafts, therefore removing the potential for gaps in 
interpretation between the draft and the final document (2008, pp.129; 133). 
Vismann provides a material and technological history of the ring binder, 
including a first iteration secured with a bolt, the introduction of a lever to open 
and close the arches, and a clamp to secure the pages within. Finally, slits were 
added to the front to enable the file to be closed without pressure on the cover, 
and a circular hole on the spine to enable easy retrieval from the shelf (Ibid., pp.129-





demonstrates that the binder also binds together two disciplinary currents: ‘the 
mechanized world of the ordering apparatus and the alphabetical world of letters’ 
(Ibid., pp.132). The lever arch file and its alphabetised sub-dividers impose an 
externally produced, pre-existing logic upon their contents.  
Landy’s unusual deployment in Michael Landy / Break Down of a ring binder with 
dividers, rather than the book-like binding more often deployed in published 
exhibition catalogues, can therefore be viewed as more than a mere stylistic twitch. 
In view of the cultural significance of the ring binder as discussed in Vismann 
(2008) and Kafka (2012), this can be considered a significant choice. The material 
form of the published text in which Landy’s manual appears draws upon narratives 
of bureaucracy – or, as Kafka has it, ‘paperwork’ (Ibid., p.118). As such, the reader 
is placed in the role of the clerk who is obliged to locate or file a particular 
document in the correct place – or indeed, the operative who must find the right 
passage in the manual in order to know how to proceed. The apparent neutrality 
of the bureaucratic system – a neutrality that has been exploded by both Kafka and 
Vismann – is ironised in order to claim for Break Down a heightened authenticity. 
The impassive flatness of the capitalised section titles protruding from card 
dividers and the numbered sections and tables in the manual clash with wilfully 
wavy line drawings of Landy’s possessions (see for example Figures 26 and 27), 
collages, and grainy photographs of objects, mid-dismantling. The ring binder 
form of Michael Landy / Break Down expresses the centrality, in Break Down, of 
narratives of procedure working against another quality that might be called 
personhood or humanity. As Vismann suggests, in the wake of the introduction of 
the lever arch file and its dividers judgements about the classification of documents 
do not fall to human operatives. Rather: ‘[t]he entire order of the bureau can now 
rely on prefabricated ordering automatisms’ (2008, p.133; see also p.138). In this 
sense, the binder and its dividers works in much the same way as the manual. 
Specifically, through the strategic operationalisation of readers’ eyes and hands, 
the manual overwrites their critical capacities. 
4.3 The manual  
The manual is, I want to argue, a disciplinary formation that works as an extension 
of the reader’s cognitive and bodily engagements with the materials and objects at 
hand. The operation of the manual depends upon an occlusion of the act of 





upon objects that must be adjusted, disposed and positioned in certain, specific 
ways but, in fact, works upon the mind and body of the reader and instruction-
follower. While constructing and placing her in relation to the work that must be 
done – literally, the task at hand - the manual does so invisibly. As the linguists 
Jerry Samet and Roger Schank suggest, ‘instructional texts’ incorporate, 
intrinsically, a kind of alienation, since in such texts:  
the basic connections […] are not exactly the causal links between the steps; it is 
more the contribution that the ordered execution of each step makes toward some 
specific end (1984, p.77).  
In other words, the procedural text does not tell the reader why it advises one 
action rather than another. It is, rather, designed to drive toward a practical 
outcome that may or may not be explicitly named within the text. As such, the 
manual effects a contained and limited set of changes. For this reason, the 
experience of working with a well-designed set of instructions to build a piece of 
furniture or kit, or to operate a gadget, often contains an obscure pleasure. The 
functions and capacities of the object spring suddenly into relief. The significance 
of work that one has already done becomes clear only after the fact. Following a 
manual requires us as readers to give over our sensory, bodily and cognitive 
processes to a set of intentions and relationships that is not of our making and the 
logic of which we may not entirely perceive. Anticipating the sense of the 
instructions; hopping a couple of steps ahead; guessing: such misapplications of 
independent thought have the potential entirely to ruin the process. 
In Landy’s manual, a set of procedures is provided for the operatives’ use. The text 
was prepared for Landy in advance of the show by his friend and colleague Clive 
Lissaman, who also compiled Break Down Inventory (Landy, 2008b; Tate, 2009a; 
The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002). This manual was written not by the 
management at a reclamation plant but an artist’s assistant. Given that, one might 
say that Landy’s manual mimics bureaucratised process through its numbered 
form, use of imperatives, and the formality of the job title, ‘Operator’ or ‘Operative,’ 
as applied to the assistants who will perform this work. Landy’s manual focuses 
particularly on the disposition of objects and dismantled and shredded matter in 
the space, the display of objects and the operation of the accoutrements of the 
show – for example, the yellow trays that revolved on the conveyor belt, and the 





whole project’ (Landy, 2001a, p.33), including references to the need to seek his 
guidance regarding what should be placed on the conveyor belt and the size of the 
granules to be produced by shredders. ‘Michael Landy will retain the keys’ to the 
cage in which as-yet whole possessions are stored before processing (Ibid., p.34). 
Processes regarding the granulation of dismantled objects are carefully defined, as 
seen in the below extract: 
Shredding and Granulating 
1. The wheeled containers holding the dismantled components will be moved 
manually from the area below the Sorting Platform to Work Bay 2, the 
shredding and granulating Work Bay. The containers below the chutes cannot 
be moved without the approval of Michael Landy and will only be moved when 
a suitable quantity of material has been accumulated. 
2. Each material will be shredded and granulated separately in order to keep the 
potential of cross contamination to a minimum. 
3. Only trained Operators can use the shredding and granulating equipment. 
4. A list of materials suitable for shredding and granulating will be made available 
to those working in this area. Large bulky items, such as cast steel from a car 
engine casing, may not be suitable for shredding in the UE45 shredder.  These 
will be put on one side. 
5. The screens that determine the size of the shredded material can only be 
changed with the approval of Michael Landy (Ibid., p.39). 
 
This section includes the arrangement and operation of the containers, sorting 
platforms, and shredding and granulating machines. It explicitly defines the 
relationships that hatch onto the operation of these machines. For example, 
Michael Landy oversees the process and shredding is an activity open only to those 
operators who have undergone training. However, predominant use of the passive 
tense throughout this procedural document has the effect of divorcing the work 
that is to be done from the person of the worker, effectively neutralising their 
labour by rendering it invisible. In this light, Landy’s manual can be seen to enact 
what I argue is a key principle of the manual more generally in that it works 
specifically by obscuring the worker and the energy, thought, and manual skill they 
draw upon in their work.  
As such, the manual for Break Down exemplifies my argument that the manual - as 
a textual form – offers an opportunity to observe on the page the abstraction of 
labour power (Marx, 1867/1976, p.270; see also Hawkins, 2014, p.126). It is, for Marx, 
precisely the process through which the vital energy of the worker is extracted and 





(Ibid., p.165). Alienation – wherein the worker sells her own labour power ‘as a 
commodity’ (Ibid., p.271) – is the traumatic moment in which, in order to live, one 
is obliged to snap off bits of oneself and slot them into the system like coins into a 
giant gas meter. This is why Hawkins (2010) is able to discuss fetishisation (that is, 
the elision of layers of the production process, and in particular the concealment 
of labour power within the commodity as described above) as a rejection of 
‘ourselves’. Break Down, she suggests, engenders a ‘nested space’ that incorporates 
factory, shop floor and rubbish dump (Ibid., pp.23-4). These occluded spaces act 
as vessels for rejected parts of the production process that are disavowed or un-
known because they are expressive of the mere materiality of consumer objects in 
a way that threatens to puncture the veneer of consumerism.   
These observations are significant in the context of Break Down because this is a 
work that plays with dynamics of labour relations. The very reason that Break 
Down could take place at 499 Oxford Street was that the department store, C&A, 
that had previously occupied the space had recently ceased trading in the UK, 
resulting in around 4800 redundancies, although the company continued to trade 
in other countries (Cope, 2000). Indeed, Landy describes the way that during Break 
Down, former customers of C&A would attempt to return purchases made on the 
site a couple of weeks previously and ‘[w]e would have to explain to them that they 
wouldn't be able to get their money back or exchange them with other items’ 
(Landy, 2002b). 
 





The proximity of Break Down to the recent, high-profile losses of income and 
occupation that resulted from the closure of C&A is a compelling detail. It is 
difficult not to make a connection, here, with a recurrent theme, in Landy’s work, 
of the empty shop. For example, visitors to his 1990 show Market were confronted 
by an enormous, open, warehouse space filled with the kinds of stall structures, 
made of plastic crates and fake grass, often found in markets. However, these stalls 
were empty; cast adrift in a space denuded of the usual markers, objects and 
practices (Landy, 2008a, pp.15-32; 102). In another example, Landy’s mischievous 
show Closing Down Sale (1992; Figure 15), the gallery of Karsten Schubert in 
Charlotte Street, London, was temporarily transformed into a lurid, and markedly 
downmarket, shop, crammed with supermarket trolleys of ‘unwanted consumer 
goods, including stuffed toys, broken electrical equipment and laminated day-glo 
signs’ (Landy, 2008a, p.43).3 
Other works by Landy show that labour power and labour relations are, for the 
artist, an enduring concern. Most pertinently, in the caustic installation piece 
Scrapheap Services (1996; Figure 16), acquired by the Tate in 1997 (Landy, 2008a, 
p.55; see also The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002), Landy established a 
corporation for the disposal of ‘people who no longer had a role to play in society’ 
(Ibid., p.103). The work includes a logo, an advertising slogan (‘we leave the scum 
with no place to hide’), a uniform for its workers and an assemblage of branded 
equipment, including litter-pickers, a dust-cart with brushes, and a giant shredder 
called ‘the Vulture’. Thousands of ‘waste people,’ cut by hand by Landy from 
discarded tin cans, litter the ground, helplessly awaiting collection. The physical 
appearance in Break Down of the operatives who must follow Landy’s instructions 
forms an interesting point of connection between the two works. Landy’s use of 
blue boiler suits (which Landy himself also wears) echoes the red boiler suit he 
proposes as the uniform for workers in Scrapheap Services. This telegraphs a 
certain interchangeability between the operatives. Like the yellow plastic trays or 
items in the inventory, they are incorporated, through the uniform they wear, into 
the logic of the piece as ‘units’ rather than individuals.4 
                                                     
3 As a result of this show, in which no sales at all were made, Landy was dropped by Karsten 
Schubert in 1992 (The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002). 
4 In addition to the clear critique of unemployment and the narrowing of ‘human value’ to 






Figure 16: Scrapheap Services (Landy, 1996). 
4.4 Event scores 
With one eye on the massed, and absolutely interchangeable tin people in 
Scrapheap Services; and another on the boiler-suited operatives in Break Down, one 
might ask, what is it to be an instruction-follower? This question is asked in 
interesting ways by members of the Fluxus group. This collective came to 
                                                     
been linked closely with the impact of John Landy’s industrial accident in particular (Steiner, 
2008, p.311; see also Hawkins, 2014, p.127). This narrative in which Landy’s father is discarded 
once he loses the ability to do manual labour is discussed in depth in Chapter 6. However, it is 
worth noting here that this narrative is clearly implicated in the terms of the discussion, above, 





prominence in the early 1960s and are known for their use of event scores – 
instructional texts for actions or performances. The work of the Fluxus group – its 
works, gatherings and other projects – is often described as being constituted via a 
pragmatic response to the conditions and opportunities that happened to occur. 
Commentators observe that Fluxus formed around the spaces, funds and 
combinations of individuals that arose, such that the art historian Owen Smith 
describes it as a ‘need-based “movement”’ (1998, pp.5-6; see also Higgins, 1998, 
pp.220-22).5 This spirit of pursuing fruitful exigencies also shapes Fluxus works 
themselves, which deploy DIY, and mackled-together strategies, often 
incorporating inexpensive materials or objects that happened to make themselves 
available. Fluxus is perhaps especially well known for putting on ‘concerts’ and 
performance pieces, directed or shaped via event scores (Dezeuze, 2002, p.78). 
Fluxus event scores are considered sufficiently interesting, and have been 
produced in sufficient quantity, to merit an entire exhibition at the Museum for 
Contemporary Art in Roskilde, Denmark in 2008, which also gave rise to an 
excellent set of reproductions in the accompanying catalogue (Hendricks et al, 
2008). They vary in form and complexity; for example, one might view the work 
Proposition (Knowles, 1962), the instructions for which read, simply, ‘make a salad,’ 
alongside TRACE (Watts, 1963), a contrivance through which the card on which 
the instructions are written is marked by a long scorch-mark, caused, presumably, 
by the procedure indicated in these instructions: 
1. Remove Box on scored line; hang card on wall 
2. Open box, remove contents 
3. Take down card & place on horizontal surface 
4. Place contents in center of card, light one end with match 
                                                     
5 Conversely, some accounts reflect an impulse toward creating an identity for Fluxus that had 
longevity and stability, as embodied in the naming of the group, the periodic ejection of group 
members who were deemed not to comply properly with this identity, the production and 
publication of Fluxus documents and objects, and the writing of a manifesto and a history of 
Fluxus (Friedman, 1998c, p.252; Higgins, 1998, p.220; Ono, 2008, p.40; Smith, 1998). In such 
accounts, this second impulse is strongly embodied in the figure of the artist and leading 
organiser George Maciunas (Friedman, 1998b; Friedman, 1998c). There is also a suggestion that 
a Fluxus identity has sometimes been superimposed over work – and artistic reputations - that 
had already been made (Ono, 2008, p.39; Owen, 1998, p.7). This lends to my own sense that 
Fluxus is best seen as a term that describes a tendency - a loose and somewhat mobile grouping 
- rather than being deployed as a descriptor that could be applied in any more straightforward 





5. When extinguished hang card on wall (Watts, 1963) 
 
It might be observed that while, as procedures go, ‘make a salad’ might seem the 
simpler of the two, both works incorporate and make use of complexity in that they 
can be followed in many thousands of different ways. Indeed, the more simply and 
minimally stated (and therefore more open) the instruction, the more iterations 
will be possible. One might make a salad using different salad ingredients, different 
kinds of utensils and containers (or no utensils and container), while naked, 
wearing a diving-suit and so on. One might decide to test the definition of ‘salad’ 
by making it minute, or gigantic, or entirely from raw meat. Indeed, in 2008, 
Knowles performed Proposition at the Tate Modern, and in 2016, at Art Basel (Tate, 
2008; Neuendorf, 2016). Both times, she made an enormous salad in a tarpaulin the 
edges of which were held by assistants. At the Tate, the ingredients were cast into 
the tarpaulin over a balcony, from which the dressing was also poured. Knowles 
mixed the ingredients using a rake (but it would be fine just to make a salad).  
Further, while one might follow the instructions in order to stage a Fluxus 
performance, as the artist Marianne Bech suggests, event scores – the documents 
- should themselves be thought of as creative works (2008, p.10). In considering 
this point it is worthwhile to keep in mind that the audiences attending Fluxus 
performances generally did not have sight of the score – they ‘were usually given 
the title and author of the piece and sometimes the name of the performer’ 
(Dezeuze, 2002, p.78). That said, the art critic Anna Dezeuze asserts that they are 
a valuable focus of study in their own right. This is supported by the anecdote in 
which, when George Maciunas wants to publish a collection of event scores, the 
artist George Brecht asserts that the ‘each score’ should be treated as ‘an artefact 
as well as a reflection and an initiation of a process […] the score itself had to be 
scrupulously right’ (Andersen, 2008, p.22; see also Hendricks, 2008, p.15). 
As textual artefacts, event scores can be seen to play around with exigency, defining 
some conditions while leaving others open in order to bring an unending stream 
of different outputs from the same originating instruction. Bech comments that 
event scores provoke new possibilities via ‘misunderstanding, error and confusion’ 
(2008, p.10) and another Fluxus member, Eric Andersen, describes the instruction 
that incorporates ‘a maximum of implications’ (2008, p.22). These remarks both 
accord with a definition of the Fluxus score by Dezeuze as intervening in a ‘field of 





audiences the sheer extent to which any instruction is subject to unending 
variation: 
all Fluxus scores operate as a means of isolating specific events, moments, 
concepts, or perceptions […] [to signal] a continuum of infinite interpretations 
(Ibid., p.30). 
This concern with potentiality is explored in more depth by Dezeuze in an article 
in which she positions ‘chance and choice’ (2002, p.82) as two arenas in which a 
range of possible outcomes proliferate. Dezeuze describes a move, in Fluxus 
instructions, from the implementation of mechanisms that operationalise ‘chance’ 
– for example, via cards that can be distributed at random or dice that can be 
thrown, to the use of simple (and often somewhat gnomic) instructions that force 
the performer to ‘choose’ a response. As she observes, these contrasting strategies 
can be seen in a pair of scores by George Brecht. The first, Motor Vehicle Sundown 
(1960), works across two pages. It incorporates a set of forty-four instruction cards, 
each specifying an action – ‘accelerate motor’, ‘pause (1 – 13)’, or ‘inside light on (1 
– 5), off’ – and a system of shuffling and dealing the cards in order to randomise 
these actions, and coordinate the sequence of events, since this is a work for ‘any 
number of motor vehicles’. The second strategy appears in Two Vehicle Events 
(1961), which incorporates the following pair of instructions, presented as a bullet-
pointed list:  
* start 
* stop 
The concepts of multiplicity and fragmentation discussed in Chapter 3 reappear in 
relation to the operationalisation of combinatorial potential in Fluxus works. 
Multiple possible outcomes are arrayed around each instruction. Here, it is 
instructive to consider the work of Ben Kafka on bureaucracy. With reference to 
the early, journalistic work of Karl Marx, Kafka makes what seems to me the central 
statement of his text when he comments that bureaucracy contains a fundamental 
instability, since procedures that may appear entirely impermeable are in fact 
vulnerable to exigencies. Processes may therefore lead in any number of 
unpredictable directions. It is, Kafka suggests, therefore ‘paperwork’ itself that 
must be scrutinised, over and above the possible motives of those who operate 
bureaucratic procedures. In a similar way, event scores deploy not only plurality, 





multiplicity, in which the instruction can stand for all of its possible outcomes at 
once. As the artist and cultural theorist Brandon LaBelle suggests, in the event 
score: 
language becomes the work; the event score articulates, implies and performs the 
very thing written, yet only in the moment of being read. In this way, the work 
functions as a conceptual space – of proposition, of imagination, of enactment. […] 
Meaning is found in the event itself, not as a singular interpretive moment, but as 
an extended and reverberating multiplicity (2002, p.49).6 
Landy’s manual for Break Down is not an event score in the sense that it does not 
summon eventualities in the same purposeful way. It was written in response to a 
direct need, since Landy was attempting to direct a team of assistants to complete 
a complex, practical task, set in front of an audience of members of the public, and 
with a strict time-limit. In other words, Landy’s manual differs from a Fluxus score 
in that the latter tactically, and in a spirit of exploration, make spaces in which a 
range of eventualities might develop.  
Nevertheless, some of the most interesting moments in Break Down occur, as 
Dezeuze has it, in ‘chance and choice’ (2002, p.82), when instructions and practice 
fall out of step. This happens where the instructions provided are impossible due 
to constraints that they do not anticipate, or, relatedly, where they simply fail to 
encompass the full complexity of the task. In the first, significant amounts of 
direction concerning the labelling, weighing and recording both of objects and 
their dismantled parts is outlined in these instructions. Grids are shown that 
provide a method of recording the weight of various material components of 
objects, for example. One section of video shows a series of actions that would 
conform with the instructions. When Landy’s mug is smashed with a hammer, the 
resulting shards are weighed and the weight is recorded in a spreadsheet against 
its serial number (Artangel, 2015). However, in practice it seems that these 
instructions were not consistently followed. Evidence from both Michael Landy 
and Leo Walford, a visitor to the show, suggests that in practice there was 
insufficient time to follow the procedures (Tate, 2009a; Walford, 2001). Landy’s 
own 244-step dismantling of a CD radio cassette player (Landy, 2001a, pp.51-74; to 
                                                     
6 See also the account by the performance theorist Natasha Lushetich (2012), in which the Fluxus 






be discussed in the next section) demonstrates that to strip each object down to 
the extent that its material components might be separated, weighed and recorded 
would have been an entirely more monumental task.7 This becomes clear when 
one considers the practical implications of the fact that the range of materials 












In addition to the instructions that were not, in the event, followed, one might 
observe that the obverse is also true. Almost inevitably, in the manual for Break 
Down some significant elements of the work are not anticipated. For example, the 
instructions include scarce indication regarding the treatment of granulated 
material save one note that ‘yellow trays should contain either a possession(s), 
broken down components or shredded/granulated matter’ (Ibid., p.37; emphasis 
added). This supports my observation in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1.3 and page 96) that 
Landy’s own plans for and narratives of Break Down do not, in prospect, 
accommodate the fragments that were produced (Landy, 2008a, p.108).  
The range of component materials that might be encountered has been listed. 
However, in a second instance of the instructions failing to incorporate important 
                                                     
7 One might conjecture an alternative, very interesting piece of work in which a space is given 
over to the much more painstaking dismantling of the artist’s possessions suggested in the 
instructions, for however long it might take. As I picture this work, I imagine serious quiet; a 
devotional scene of processing, weighing and displaying in which the copper wire shines in one 
enormous mound; the insulation material from around the flex in another. Suits could be 
unpicked, stitch by stitch, and sellotape picked away from abandoned pieces of packaging. 
Perhaps, in a sense, this long serenade is what Landy’s belongings really deserved. This 
alternative work however would take a number of months rather than the fourteen days that 





elements of the work that had to be done, no guidance is provided regarding the 
correct approach to dismantling and shredding various types of objects and 
materials. Turning again to online video footage of Break Down (Artangel, 2015), 
the operatives seem to conduct their work in a uniformly sober and competent 
fashion. Their faces, no matter what they are taking apart, show absorption in the 
work they are doing, and they work methodically and deliberately. They are 
engaged in a performance of ‘following the instructions’ – and yet, in lieu of precise, 
written instructions to organise the particular tasks they undertake, they must 
deploy their own creative imaginations to find the best way to take these objects 
apart. This is especially interesting where an object does not accommodate 
‘dismantling’ in the same way an appliance like the radio/cassette player (which 
can be unscrewed and levered apart) might. An operative is seen looking at a pen 
and ink work by Landy. He tears the work first into lengthwise strips, and then into 
squares. Similarly, garments appear to have been taken apart at the seams before 
being shredded – this, despite the likelihood that the shredder could have taken 
both the paper and the fabric without this treatment.  
Landy’s manual for Break Down attempts to anticipate and circumscribe the range 
of possibilities. Like a Fluxus score, this text engages with potentiality in that some 
actions are allowed to proceed while others are stopped. That said, a manual must 
have a certain amount of relevance to the practical task at hand; where given 
instructions do not pertain (because it would take too long to separate Landy’s 
belongings by material, for example) they are dropped. Indeed, the sense of the 
manual as a text in which directions are given without being accompanied by a 
rationale is as present in the moments when the operatives must invent their own 
processes as anywhere else. These are the moments in which the parameters 
defined in the manual – the kinds of material that might be encountered; the work 
that would need to be done to shred and sort them; the amount of time this might 
take – collapse. One might, here, revisit the related observation in Samet and 
Schank (1984) regarding the particular kind of knowledge or sense that is given to 
us by instructions, which tell us what to do next, but not what will result, or why 
this might be desirable. Landy’s procedures, again, in a moment of accordance with 
the Fluxus score, require only that the instruction-follower or operative should 
enact the instructions. The manual, as a form, is a conjectural text – as such, it does 
not allow for the dilemmas it presents in the moments when it either fails to 





instruction that is impossible to follow. It contains within itself, therefore, a logic 
of functionality that may or may not produce an actual function or utility. 
4.5 Hands 
 
Figure 17: Hands of an operative unpicking John Landy's sheepskin coat (Landy, 2008a, p.162). 
The manual, I have said, is a disciplinary strategy that works upon, while also 
obscuring, the body, and the embodied power and intelligence of the worker or 
Operative. In this respect, Kittler’s maxim that ‘media determine our situation’ 
(1986/1999, p.xxxix) opens up an account of the ways in which media technologies 
have a constitutive relationship with their operators. The typewriter; the desktop 
publisher; the spreadsheet program: all remake, in their different ways, practices 
of writing as well as the written product itself. Kittler suggests, in relation to the 
new capabilities of the typewriter, that ‘our writing tools are also working on our 
thoughts’ (Ibid., p.203). The example of the typewriter – its arrayed type-bars which 
fly up to imprint each letter onto the paper; the way in which each key must be 
individually struck by the fingertips with a certain, determined force – illustrates 
especially well Steven Connor’s observation that writing ‘digitises’ language, 
breaking it into units that have, between them, a relationship of equivalency: 
Writing broke up continuous events into discontinuous objects; indeed, writing 
made it possible for speech to be considered as consisting of distinguishable or 





Connor suggests that this logic of fragmentation or unitisation, in which 
recognisable chunks of sounds can be reproduced and recognised, also inhabits 
speech itself. All language, therefore, includes as part of its logic and its 
replicability an element of digitisation. It is salient, in the context of the current 
argument, to read this alongside Kittler’s earlier historiography of phonics in the 
early 1800s, a system of literacy teaching that continues to be used in British 
schools. This schema breaks language into a series of phonemes. The child is 
instructed to reproduce these sounds with her mouth as part of a strategy for 
teaching reading through the memorisation of signs and the ‘oralisation’ of sounds. 
As such, Kittler demonstrates, turning first to reading and then handwriting, the 
teaching of literacy becomes a ‘coercive’ technique that works via the body of the 
learning child: 
The phonic method culminated in the description or prescription of a new body. 
This body has eyes and ears only in order to be a large mouth. The mouth 
transforms all the letters that assault the eyes and ears into ringing sounds 
(1985/1990, p.33). 
To adapt Kittler’s vision of a human body that is remade via phonic disciplines of 
literacy teaching, one might imagine that in the case of the manual, the body of 
the reader ‘has eyes and ears only’ to facilitate the operation of an enormous pair 
of hands that take in written words and translate them directly into a precise series 
of actions; specifically, into manual work.  
Indeed, in his work on the typewriter, Kittler remarks that in industrialisation: 
‘[w]hen men are deprived of the quill and women of the needle, all hands are up 
for grabs – as employable as employees’ (1986/1999, p.187). Here, Kittler traces how, 
through the introduction of this machine, gendered roles relating to intellectual 
and manual work were operationalised in the figure of the female typist from the 
late 1800s onwards. He provides a devastating series of eight case studies of literary 
texts that were produced via dictation and typing via ‘literary desk couples’ (Ibid., 
p.214) in which the role of the typist is simply to take in and reproduce in type the 
words of the author. The typing woman becomes an extension of the typing 
machine. I describe, at the beginning of this chapter, the experience of using the 
manual in which one’s own critical faculties are overwritten by the procedure. In 
just the same way the typist is constituted through typing not as a writer but as an 
operator or cipher; an ear or eye and a pair of quick hands through which written 





words into the typewriter and see them emerge in print. A moment of 
correspondence arises in a discussion on the history of software by the theorist of 
culture and media Wendy Hui Kyong Chun. Here, the figure of the woman-
machine reappears in the shape of the female ‘computer’ whose work was, like that 
of the woman-typewriter, routinely overwritten. As Chun comments, 
‘programming became programming and software became software when 
commands shifted from commanding a "girl" to commanding a machine’ (2004, 
p.33).8 During World War II in Bletchley Park, ‘Wrens’ (members of the Women’s 
Royal Navel Service, referred to by Turing as ‘slaves’; a designation that, as Chun 
observes, continues to be extant in computing) assisted in the operation of 
computers. However:  
this man-machine synergy […] treated Wrens and machines indistinguishably, 
while simultaneously relying on the Wrens' ability to respond to the 
mathematician's order (Ibid., pp.33-4).  
Implicit in both scenarios is – among other things - the systematic erasure of 
women’s labour power: ‘“Typewriter,” after all, signifies both: machine and woman’ 
(Kittler, 1986/1999, p.216).9   
This eliding tendency is keenly conveyed in the ink sketch P.D.F. (Product, 
Disposal Facility) (Landy, 1998; see Figure 18) which gives considerable prominence 
                                                     
8 It is instructive to think, here, of the work of Stafford Beer on the cybernetic factory. As Andrew 
Pickering (2011) relates, input and output units would ideally be enabled to communicate via 
some lively and responsive entity. This has tended to mean that there is a requirement for human 
beings who enable machines by making judgements and managing the interface between ‘in’ and 
‘out’ units. Beer turned to a number of highly interesting alternatives to human operatives, 
including the ecology of fauna and flora found in a pond (the composition of which alters 
dynamically in response to factors such as oxygen levels). One might observe that pond life here 
occupies roughly the same position in relation to the transmission of inputs as do the male 
instructors to computing machines in Chun (2004), while the woman-computers might seem to 
form part of the machine itself. Chun’s main work in the text cited above is in fact to expose a 
cross-cutting moment of invisibility. While labour is obscured by the instruction manual, she 
suggests that the ways in which the instruction manual – or the software programme – might 
write us or reconstitute our desires, is also obscured. 
9 One might compare these two cases with Ben Kafka’s account of the emergence of the 
bureaucrat, which he rightly identifies as a moment in which the state depends on a mass 
‘alienation of clerical labour’ (2012, p.84). As Kafka observes, early anxieties about bureaucracy 
arise from the fact that the sheer volume of work to be done demands that the state should 
employ a great number of – to use Landy’s term - operatives. As a result, inevitably, ‘the proximity 
of clerks to paperwork invested them with a degree of power completely out of proportion to 
their social and political status’ (Ibid., p.81). Here, it appears that their attachment to 
mechanisms of power increases male bureaucrats’ visibility and power rather than decreasing it 





to working hands, while still maintaining a certain distance from the notion of 
persons doing work. It is important to take into account the rhetorical function of 
this ink on paper work, which was made in the planning stages of Break Down and 
in effect forms part of a proposal for the later work. This and other similar works 
were exhibited at the show Michael Landy at Home in 1999, at which Landy first 
discussed the practicalities of staging Break Down with James Lingwood, the co-
director of Artangel, the arts organisation that ultimately supported the 
development of Break Down (Landy, 2008, p.104). As well as showing how Break 
Down might work, P.D.F (Product, Disposal Facility) also constitutes a sort of visual 
Curriculum Vitae. Landy’s belongings include elements of previous works such as 
the extensive collection of red plastic crates used in his show Michael Landy at 
Home (1999), and, resembling the sign on a men’s toilet, a cut-out figure like those 
used in Scrapheap Services (1995). Hands and bodies appear everywhere in P.D.F. 
(Product, Disposal Facility); however, those performing the labour of dismantling 
Landy’s stuff are represented either by an apparently empty (headless, handless) 
sweatshirt, or by disembodied hands. The hands carry, place, pick fragments from 
a conveyor belt, wield tools and hold objects as though exploring the easiest way 
to twist them apart. In one place, in a particularly strong moment of resonance 
with Kittler’s account of the fragmenting discipline of literature above, we see a 
row of disembodied hands and eyes at a sorting table. As a further extension and 
representation of this trope, we also see the tools wielding themselves. This is 
particularly unnerving when a knife, saw or screwdriver seems to bear down of its 
own accord upon objects such as Landy’s slippers or iPod. This is a logical 
extension of the modality of the manual, containing as it does the illusion that it 
works directly upon the materials at hand, overwriting the presence of the operator 
who loses ears and eyes and eventually becomes nothing more than an extension 
of the pliers; the scissors.  
In a counter movement to the alienation that inheres in the form of the manual, 
then, we might think ourselves into what it is to experience our own labour power. 
What is it, specifically, to work with one’s hands, using the fingers, thumbs, palms 
and wrists to manipulate objects? Another text included in Michael Landy / Break 
Down assists in this. In a painstaking account of dismantling his CD radio cassette 
player Landy describes (rather than, as in a manual prescribing) an extended series 







Figure 18: P.D.F. (Product, Disposal Facility) (Landy, 1998) [Image rotated]. 
sorting into component parts of this single object, writing down each individual 
step as he works. The entire process takes the artist about ten days (Landy, 2001a, 
p.108). He encounters wires, circuit boards, plastic casing, and obscure numberings 
and labellings; his notes are full of the tools he uses, the precise actions he takes 





the course of Landy’s exploratory dissection, in his hand-written notes on the 
entire process, the schematic simplicity of the manual dissolves into thousands of 
hand movements. Through Landy’s description of the work, we as readers are 
called into the perspective of the individual who is absorbed by his work. He is 
absorbed, in fact, in an observation not only of the object he is dismantling, but 
the full richness and complexity of his own energy, ingenuity and dexterity – 
precisely, his own labour power:10 
I run a knife along cable – and then pull away  
blue/brown electric cables  
AND then pull first blue plastic away from cooper wiring – as it expands  
turns a lighter type of blue – running knife  
along prising away blue cable cover away from  
BLUE cable cover for mains wiring (Landy, 2001a, p.57). 
This written account continues at some length, since the entire process is 
documented in full. It is, precisely, an inversion of the opacity of the instruction 
manual, written as Landy works on and discovers the affordances of the object in 
relation to capacity of his hands and tools to dismantle it. Like a manual, Landy’s 
language here is spare and functional. Nevertheless, the verbs that appear – run; 
pull; prise – convey a vivid sense of a brain thinking; hands thinking too; wielding 
a knife; the knife thinking; exerting more or less force in one direction or another. 
Landy also notes observable changes in the materials (observe, for example, the 
plastic becoming a lighter blue as it is stretched away from the copper wiring 
within). In addition, he occasionally records his own feelings as part of the process: 
‘unwind – cooper – exasperated – cut it with a knife’ (Ibid., p.65). 
Observation: Dismantling and granulating in Break Down – online video (Artangel 
2015). Tear pages from a book and feed them into a shredder. Use a jigsaw to cut 
through the wing of a car. Carefully lay a large photographic print on a table and then 
tear into strips about five inches wide, and then tear the strips across the other way, and 
then lay the pieces in a pile and then put them in a yellow tub. With great care and 
delicacy hammer a mug into fragments of about one inch square, and tip them into a 
ziplock bag. Place an armful of stuffing into the hopper and watch it surrendering softly 
                                                     
10 The note quality and episodic updating by Landy creates repetitions, misspellings (reproduced 
here), and a tone that might at first feel rather breathless in the quotation above. If read slowly, 
I think this more properly conveys Landy’s deep absorption in the work. For this reason, Landy’s 





to the revolving teeth of the granulator. Watch the teeth consuming rolls of paper, which 
vividly twitch and writhe. Cut through a passport with a pair of scissors. Pull plastic off 
copper wire with a pair of crimpers. Wrangle wires from their shell with your fist. 
Unscrew the parts from a washing machine drum, then take out and dismantle the 
engine with a screwdriver. Lever apart the delicate components of a camera lens. Using 
a stanley knife, cut the upper from the sole of a pair of brown leather shoes. Slice open 
the plushy back of a teddy and empty it of fluff. Using a hacksaw, remove the head of a 
toilet brush; an electric toothbrush. Scissor apart a floppy disc. With a hammer, bludgeon 
apart the opening mechanism in the base of a pedal bin. Systematically beat fissures into 
a large piece of plate-glass. Fold a vinyl record in half until it cracks. Turn the wooden 
frame of an armchair upside down; locate and remove the screws. Lever the cotton from 
the sticks of cotton wool buds using a knife. Allow film to spool to the ground, holding 
the reel by your fingertips.  
This site-writing attends to the manual ingenuity that Landy’s operatives employ. 
It is written as a series of directives in search of the fineness of detail required for 
Landy’s manual truly to have anticipated the material specificities of the task. 
Seeking a centralisation of the experience of working with the hands, I review, here, 
a run of references that specify and explore manual expertise and the sensual 
experience of working with the hands. A first example arises in an ethnographic 
study in which the media scholar Sarah Pink and her colleagues explore how health 
care workers use intuitive insights that arise from touch while drawing upon a body 
of formalised expertise in order to prevent infection. Deploying the hand as a site 
of analysis, the authors consider expert practices of touching, hand-washing and 
antibacterial hand gel application that are mediated via workers’ medical training. 
Such practices, it is observed, are highly routinised, with (for obvious reasons) a 
striking degree of uniformity and precision in their execution by participants. 
Nevertheless, these routines were supplemented by workers’ finely detailed, 
intuitive, physical knowledge, which took in the feel and texture of the 
antibacterial gel. They: 
appeared to feel and know themselves to be safe (or protected from acquiring and 
transmitting microorganisms) through the embodied, sensory, and affective 
experience of the material qualities of the gel. For instance, participants 
commented on its strong alcohol smell (associated with antiseptic properties); wet, 
yet quickly evaporating, or even ‘tingly’, sensation (negating the need to physically 
dry hands); and sticky residue (enabling them to feel and judge adequate coverage) 





This vivid sumnation is consistent with Chris Salter’s comment, in the process of 
learning the procedures involved in growing a tissue culture as part of an artist’s 
placement at a laboratory, that: 
The smell and feel of ethanol sprayed onto latex glove-encased hands in order to 
disinfect before beginning the culturing process forces a sensorial experience 
tensioned between clinical sterility and tactile heightening. It almost beggars 
description, this sense of moist, alcohol-covered hands at one moment feeling 
watery and irriguous but all too soon dry and rubbery (2015, p.141). 
As in Pink et al, hand hygiene appears here as a bodily discipline that arises from 
an area of professional expertise. In a reflexive account of his emersion, as an artist-
practitioner, into the working context of the laboratory, Salter seems to feel these 
procedures as an imposition of this discipline upon his person. His description is 
almost erotic in the passivity it summons; simultaneously, it mobilises an anxious 
and somewhat eerie dissociation. Salter’s hands are, perhaps, not quite his own 
(and what is a rubbery hand if not corpse-like). Later in the same passage, Salter 
puts forth an account of tissue culturing as a procedure that is done specifically 
with the hands. His account is richly illustrated with photographs of his and his 
mentor’s gloved hands manipulating pipettes and containers. In observing his 
mentor’s work, he admires the ‘fine touch’ and ‘steady hand’ (Ibid., p.150) with 
which she manipulates containers and pipettes to perform the necessary processes 
while avoiding cross-contamination between the different materials used. In his 
first attempts at doing this work himself, the full extent of her expertise becomes 
clear as his own unskilled body leaks and blunders:  
my hand shakes with nervousness and sweat drips onto the hood’s metal grill; the 
result of my position standing directly before the hood results in mismatched 
coordination between my hands and the rest of my body. I now suck the cells into 
the pipette. Unfortunately, due to the angle at which I hold the gun, I also cannot 
see the tiny measurement marks on the glass (Ibid., p.147). 
Salter repeatedly calls upon the markers that reveal him as a non-expert and 
outsider in the environment of the scientific laboratory. However, it is in this 
laborious encounter between Salter’s hands and the materials and equipment used 
in culturing - in the comparison between his mentor’s hands and his own – that 
the nature of this field of expertise is fully revealed. 
Writings on the hand as a sensing and working organ bring forth that which is 
obscured in the manual as a textual form. Like Break Down, the foregoing pair of 





a set of pre-decided protocols. The instruction manual does not include 
instruction-followers’ intuitive, sensory engagement with their work, which is 
nevertheless essential to the task. To draw again upon Marx’s account of labour-
power, this obscured category encompasses the abiding capacities of ‘human 
brains, muscles, nerves, hands etc.’ (1867/1976, p.134). As such, it encompasses the 
entirety of personhood - that is, our native physical strength, manual dexterity, 
mental acuity, percepts, and attachments. It is this that writings that detail and 
examine the work of the hands prioritise. The close conjunction in Marx of ‘hands’ 
and ‘brains’ summons, too, the notion of the hand as a thinking thing. In Andy 
Clark’s extended mind theory (as discussed in the methodology, pages 56-7 and 
Chapter 6, Section 6.4) the concept of thinking via the hands would be 
uncontentious. Here, the ‘goings-on’ of cognition ‘prove perfectly and productively 
able to span brain, body, and world’ (2011, p.xxviii). In Clark, the hand writes, pokes 
and pushes to gain information about the nature of objects, and feels the way using 
a white stick (Ibid., pp.xxv; 17; 31). The tips of the fingers are not the edges where 
‘me,’ or ‘thinking’ ends and ‘not-me,’ or ‘not-thinking’ begins. Rather, they are 
joining surfaces – as Malafouris puts it, also in relation to the stick used as an aid 
by a person with visual impairment, ‘a pathway instead of a boundary’ (2013, p.244).  
The strength, dexterity and sensitivity of the hands is, then, an important element 
of the range of human capacities that afford the extension of cognitive processes 
into the surrounding world. This can be seen in a tableau by Mitchel Resnick, a 
researcher in technology and education, in which he discovers, in a school physics 
lesson, a puzzle that, unlike the ‘paradoxes’ - logic problems and questions about 
deep space - that he has already encountered, can only be solved by manipulating 
the object. It was:  
remarkably simple: two wheels and an axle, with a pin hanging down from the 
middle of the axle (not quite hitting the ground) and a string at the end of the pin. 
The teacher asked: What happens when you pull on the string? Since the string is 
attached to the end of the pin, it seems that the pin should come toward you. At 
the same time, it seems that the wheels should come toward you. Both can’t be 
true […] Another paradox! But this object was different from the stars of my 
childhood: you could hold it in your hands and test it out. Indeed, I went home, 
took apart an old toy truck, and made my own version of the puzzle, testing pins 
of different lengths. Even after I “knew” the answer, I loved tugging on the string 
and thinking about the paradox (2007, pp.40-1). 
Resnick means to demonstrate the notion of material object as aid to thought – a 





this reader at least, certainly not this written description, which sadly is not 
accompanied by an illustration) that enable him to solve the problem – firstly by 
making his own version of the object - and then, more directly, by ‘holding it in his 
hands’. Precisely similar, and undeniably easier to visualise, is the example in 
Steven Connor’s work on ‘magical objects’11 of an infant engaged in a similar kind 
of manual puzzling: 
The baby was entirely absorbed in a game that involved stretching and releasing 
the strap of its mother’s handbag, while sliding the buckle up and down its length. 
[…] I have never seen such absorption and intentness, and have never forgotten it. 
The baby was simultaneously concentrated and abandoned, utterly in and at the 
same time utterly out of this world (2011, pp.1-2). 
Again, while the author intends to discuss the way in which humdrum objects can 
seem inhabited with a life or potentiality beyond human intention, it is the hands 
that conduct this ‘push-me-pull-you investigation’ (Ibid.). Such absorbing work, 
which transports one from what is to what might be, is somewhat akin to the 
concept of the epistemic action. This physical move or adjustment, rather than 
only having a direct, ‘pragmatic’ purpose, assists us in gaining or organising 
information – that is, it helps us to learn (Clark, 2011, pp.70-9). This is reframed by 
Lambros Malafouris in terms of the difference between ‘representational’ work 
done by the brain, and ‘performative’ work in which the puzzle is solved materially, 
‘without any need for mental representation’ (2013, p.219; see also pp.237-9). Andy 
Clark uses the computer game TETRIS to exemplify the epistemic action; I propose 
as an alternative the challenge of slotting packets of food into the freezer. While it 
might be possible to judge by eye the most efficient arrangement of fish fingers, 
ice-cream tub and bag of peas, an epistemic action would be to physically fit the 
objects into the space, perhaps rotating them or reordering them. I don’t deny that 
this epistemic action in particular happens to overlap with the pragmatic work that 
needs to be done (that is, putting the food in the freezer). Nevertheless, it can be 
seen that the physical experiment of trying out the available gaps replaces a mental 
procedure in which I would otherwise be obliged to picture the fish fingers fitting 
(or not) beside the potato waffles.  
                                                     
11 See discussion of Connor’s use of the term ‘magical’ in relation to materiality in the 





Malafouris proposes a subtler example of the epistemic action in his observation 
of the potter, whose: 
hands are skilfully sensing and grasping the wet clay so that the potter can decide 
precisely how much forward or downward pressure is needed to center the lump 
of clay on the wheel. What is it that guides the dextrous positioning of the potter’s 
body? How do the potter’s fingers come to know and control the precise force and 
position of the appropriate grip for the shaping of the vessel (2013, p.208). 
As Malafouris says, the ‘constituents of creativity are in the throwing, in the shaping’ 
(Ibid., p.213; emphasis reproduced). Thought is a diffuse set of processes that are 
located in the hands, in the clay, and in the brain. The action of the hand is 
similarly indispensable in the speculative interactions described in both Connor 
(2011) and Resnick (2007). However, the material and manual interventions that 
they describe tell the human interlocutor something, not only about the particular 
object(s) they are handling, but about how things work in general. In other words, 
they describe a specifically philosophical puzzle made concrete and worked – 
which is to say, thought – manually. Salter asks how, ‘in the act of making 
something’, ‘humans and materials [are] coproduced’ (Ibid., p.240). The artist, 
physicist, potter, or baby, discover something about the material that they 
manipulate. Further, though, their actions illuminate something about the way the 
world hangs together. Landy’s disassembly of his CD radio cassette player, his 
twisting, wrestling, unscrewing and scraping makes a different kind of sense when 
considered as a variety of distributed thought. We might feel we already ‘know’ 
that an electronic object like this must include a drastic and intricate tangle of 
materials. However, Landy, in his hours of manual puzzling, is bound to encounter 
the nature of the entanglement in a different and more profound way. 
The hand – the hand that is experienced by its owner as it works – reappears in 
P.D.F. (Product, Disposal Facility) (1998; Figure 18) via the lines that have been 
made by Landy. In his drawing, the artist describes the straight, hard lines of the 
conveyor belts and (equally distinctly) the objects that travel upon them. Landy 
brings to his portrayal of the objects themselves a heightened attention: the 
surfaces, contours and textures of household goods and souvenirs are rendered 
with care and the unevenness of their texture and contours offer a marked contrast 
with the straight lines and surfaces of the conveyor belts. This applies in particular 
to the sheepskin coat belonging to Landy’s father. In a moment that augurs the 





the centre of the frame, and three years before Break Down, it is already in the 
process of being taken apart. The seams of the jacket and its stiff bearing possess 
real vitality and immediacy in this illustration, which shows the garment, with 
arms outstretched, under attack by no fewer than three Stanley knives and a pair 
of scissors. Landy is known for making exceptionally fine drawings that summon 
almost hallucinatory amounts of detail,12 but in P.D.F. (Product, Disposal Facility), 
the line itself seems almost to take precedence over its subject. Indeed, at some 
points the line of the conveyor belt runs directly through the objects on it, 
suggesting that the belt was drawn first and the details elaborated afterwards.13  
The specificity, delicacy and precision of Landy’s emaciated line brings a 
vulnerability to the piece. This resounds in the only truly whimsical detail; the 
spindly legs that support the conveyor belts. These legs are distinctly dubious in 
terms of their possible stability. They look, to say the least, likely to collapse under 
the weight of a mattress or a refrigerator. In addressing the practical consideration 
of how Landy’s conveyor belts are to be planted onto the ground – but doing so in 
such an inadequate manner - these frail little conveyor belt legs more than 
anything else situate the work midway between spaces of conjecture, procedure, 
diagram, and concrete, manual work. 
 
                                                     
12 See for example his series Nourishment, made in 2002 (and an example, Creeping Buttercup 
[Landy, 2002a] in Figure 29). These works are hyper-detailed, taking in each line, blemish and 
contour, to the extent that their subjects are made to appear uncanny. 
13 In this, Landy’s representation of Break Down is reminiscent of strategies employed by the 
artist Paul Klee in his line exploring works. One thinks particularly of the overlapping lines in 
Perspective With Inhabitants (1921) which, in a play on perspective, lies the people standing in a 
cuboid space down across the floor. The art historian James Smith Pierce (1976) identifies this 
and other similar configurations in Klee’s work with his enduring admiration of childhood uses of 
the line, which he considers a stratagem in its own right.   
5 Line / List / Inventory 
In this chapter, Break Down is reimagined as an operationalisation of the list. This 
occurs on two fronts: first, the physical form of the conveyor belt used by Landy, 
and second, his literal use of the strategy of listing in the Break Down Inventory 
(2001b), the text in which the collection of belongings granulated by Landy is listed 
in its entirety. The linearity of the inventory and its force for particularisation is, it 
will be suggested, reified through the physical conveyor belt form of Landy’s 
‘destruction line’, not least in the sense that the list-like form of the conveyor belt 
recruits it as a kind of text in itself – a concrete version of an inventory (Davies and 
Parrinder, 2003). Conversely, the linear form of the inventory makes of Break Down 
Inventory a kind of textual conveyor belt. Landy’s use of the Inventory – the fact of 
its writing and its existence during and since Break Down – has previously been 
constituted as a foundational element of the work by Harriet Hawkins (2010; 2014). 
Further, the theorists of design Colin Davies and Monika Parrinder identify that 
the work itself operates in a list like way: 
When entering the ‘Break Down’ exhibition, after the initial impact of the physical 
apparatus of the show, including 160 meters of conveyor belt, you are aware of the 
paraphernalia of list-making; inventories, sub-headings, sponsors and other to-do 
lists that literally acted as an aide memoir of Landy’s life at that moment. At the 
end of the 14 days, over 5000 personal items had been granulated, crushed, 
shredded and carefully logged. This infantry eventually materialised as a book to 
document the event and separately, a limited edition bound copy of the list of 
items destroyed – his life reduced to a graphic artefact (Davies and Parrinder, 
2003). 
The coming discussion continues to work via new media theory approaches, as 
introduced in the previous chapter (Section 4.1). Here, media objects are seen to 
arise from specific formations termed ‘discourse networks’ by Kittler (1985/1990) 
and defined, by Wellbery, as the ‘linkages of power, technologies, signifying marks, 
and bodies’ (1990, p.xiii) that form social life. Chapter 4 lays out an account of the 
significance of an ostensibly bureaucratic or pragmatic document such as the 
protocols written to guide Landy’s operatives in their work, and considers the 
formation of the instruction manual deployed in Break Down. This provides a 
starting point for a consideration, in the current chapter, of the ways in which 
discourses and practices associated with the form of the list are deployed by Landy 
in his Inventory. This chapter begins by eliciting connections between the 





and line as employed to explicate media practices of listing, inventorying and 
procedure. In a section on the conveyor belt, these conceptualisations of linearity 
and accrual are expanded in relation to Break Down. Next, examples of the textual 
form of the list are surveyed. Here, the list emerges as a generative form that is 
often performed parodically where it appears in literature and art. With these 
insights in mind, the discussion returns to Landy’s Inventory with a detailed 
consideration of the implications of its textual and material composition. The 
computer spreadsheet programme used to draft the Inventory is investigated 
alongside its form as a printed book. 
5.1 Series and line 
Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of axons and dendrites (elements of the 
structure of the neuron that, respectively, pass on and receive neurotransmitters) 
is a useful starting point for thinking through concepts of series and line.1 In A 
Thousand Plateaus, the physical form of these long connectors that carry impulses 
from one part of the brain to another enables Deleuze and Guattari (1987/2013, 
pp.15-16) to employ them as both an example of and an analogy for their account 
of continuous shifts in formation in the multiplicity. These elements of neuron 
cells, linear in form, have ends that meet but do not join, demonstrating that the 
brain, rather than being the stable and durable object we might imagine, is a 
dynamic entity; ‘a whole uncertain, probabilistic system’ (Ibid.). In the context of 
the current discussion, this metaphor borrowed from neuroscience is helpful in 
plotting points between the multiplicity and line or list. In the fluctuations of the 
multiplicity, lines can be drawn, or joins made and unmade. In a first example, the 
line, an entire thing, splits off into versions of itself that operate at a variety of levels 
of signification. Here, one might revisit the image of Freud’s young grandson as he 
plays fort/da (Freud, 1955/2001, p.15), throwing a cotton reel into his cot and then 
                                                     
1 Although his work is not central to the analysis presented here, I also look to the work of Tim 
Ingold in understanding the nature, function and practices related to line. For Ingold, line stands 
in for qualities of connectivity, as seen in the following quotation, taken from the very end of his 
text on lines: ‘drawn threads invariably leave trailing ends that will, in their turn, be drawn into 
other knots with other threads. Lines are open-ended’ (2007, pp.169-70). While Ingold hardly 
cites Deleuze and Guattari (and their work is in many senses fundamentally different) the open-
ended line that appears in his work nevertheless seems to me to be closely related to their 
dendritic connection in an account that prioritises connections and processes of connecting 





retrieving it.2 In so doing, one might consider not the cotton reel that reliably 
continues to exist even when it is out of the baby’s sight, but the thread. Think of 
the line that connects the boy to the cotton reel. Consider the affordances (Gibson, 
1979/1986) of that thread; the way that it invites holding by one end, while the 
other end can be thrown away, right out of sight and yet be connected to the 
thrower. Consider, too, that this physical thread evinces another entirely more 
complex line – a line constructed by the infant that connects him with his mother, 
despite her absence. This line is therefore not singular, but a multiple entity, 
possessing as it does (for the baby, or at least, for his grandfather) an existence that 
is aside from – although, as I argue, rooted in - its physical form.  
Observation: Picture of Spatial Growths – Picture with Two Small Dogs (Schwitters, 
1920 and 1939), Tate Modern, London (November 2016). Framed in black, a deep box 
with a glass front gives a cabinet-like impression that is increased by the depths of the 
object itself. Adding to the dolls-house sense of the piece, approximately ¼ of the way 
from the top a rectangular grotto holds at the back a newspaper cutting, like wallpaper 
for the pair of tiny, ceramic dogs that stand within. A thin curve of plywood protrudes 
like a fin, supported by a wooden block and adorned with white plastic. Various other 
lips and flanges interrupt the flatness of the work. A plywood disc. A wooden half-circle. 
A wisp of wool teasings. There is what looks like a wooden door knob with a chunk cut 
from one side; a strip of paper forming a bridge. These disruptions of the smooth surface 
of the backing board seem to underpin a sense of accretion that is also suggested by 
Schwitters’ layerings of materials and papers. The work is a kind of journal. Sections of 
newspaper text, sweet wrappers decorated with a picture of an orange on dark green, 
an orange Rizla packet, a theatre ticket, handwritten notes, an envelope posted from 
Oslo in 1937. Along the bottom, a small section of lace, off-white like a petticoat-edge – 
a square of black, woollen stuff, a circle of black lace. At the centre, an envelope-sized 
rectangle of blotting paper holds layers of ink-leavings. A scrap of muslin and tissue-
paper punched with glue is like a skin through which previous accretions show. Shifting 
                                                     
2 See also discussion in Chapter 3 (page 69) and Chapter 6 (page 195, footnote 13). Since Freud 
deploys the fort/da tableau to illustrate his account of repetitive urges as rooted in the death 





and swilling over and across one another, they look as though they are at sea; or perhaps 
as though they are the sea. 
A second instance of multiplicity can be found in proximity. In strictly material 
terms, this might be seen in terms of the mobility given by the bobbin to the 
thread; the ability to be retrievable that is received by the bobbin from the thread. 
In addition, the assemblage of thread / bobbin gain their particular significance – 
are able to ‘matter’ in a specific way – when the baby who plays with them joins 
the constellation: baby / thread / bobbin. This chapter also discusses the inventory 
or list as textual forms that bring into propinquity discrete elements that agitate 
modes of expression into life. As discussed in Fuller (2007, pp.1-2) a similar 
phenomenon arises in the collagings of the artist Kurt Schwitters. In Picture of 
Spatial Growths (1920 and 1939), quotidian scraps attached to the backing board – 
the bus tickets, envelopes, tearings of fabric and sweet wrappers – form an 
inventory of a specific period of Schwitters’ life. As Fuller observes, these artefacts 
awake in one another an odd, proximal and reciprocal potentiality: through 
closeness alone they elicit something lively and eloquent from one another.  
This chapter investigates moments in which line and series are enacted in Break 
Down, especially in the textual and material form of the Break Down Inventory and 
in Landy’s conveyor belt. First, I establish a basis on which these terms, ‘line’ and 
‘series’, can be employed. This begins with a conception of numbering as 
constructed via – and constructive of - a range of social and meaning-making 
practices. In the following quotation from the introduction to a survey paper on 
‘everyday numeracy as it is practiced with and without numbers’ the 
anthropologist Sophie Day and sociologists Celia Lury and Nina Wakeford propose 
that:  
rather than looking at the ‘essential’ characteristics of numbers (if any such exist), 
our aim is to understand numbering in terms of the apparently endless ways of 
being and having relations, making relations between the one and the many, the 
part and the whole’ (2014, pp.128-9).  
Following the approach taken by Day et al, in the coming discussion numbering is 
considered as a variety of social practice that is, as such, relational rather than 
absolute, and that possesses the capacity to produce and enact meaning. I employ 
the terms line and series in this discussion to describe the kind of numerical 





a line is drawn on the pavement. One might envisage this via the image of a person 
uttering a series of words, since one cannot speak more than one word at the same 
time. All of these must appear before or after; above or below other parts of or 
participants in the same line or series. Series and line are, therefore, defined here 
as sequences of things, items or events that occur consecutively. In some instances 
objects might appear in a specified order or according to a specified logic - for 
example, in the progression, 1, 2, 3, 4, where each consecutive number is larger by 
one than the number that appeared immediately before it. This non-random 
sequentiality is not, however, a requirement of series or line. If I muddle up a 
sentence, one might nevertheless sensibly call the result, free though it is of much 
sense, a series of words: of / sensibly / muddle / might / one / is / it / similarly / 
words / a / sentence / free / up / call / if / I / sense / a / of / as / the / result / series/ 
much / line / or. Similarly, if numbers appear in a random order – say, 3, 2, 4, 1 – or 
are repeated – 1, 1, 1, 1 - what appears might nevertheless be described as a series of 
numbers. Other possible examples of series include the blip-blip-blee of Morse 
code, or the pulses of light from a lighthouse.  
Linear organisation should not be considered a necessary condition of a series. 
Indeed, while in an attempt to demonstrate series of things that do not occur in a 
spatial line I have continued to group together the same kinds of things, this is not, 
in fact, formally necessary. The potential for series to be constituted on a purely 
logical basis can be seen in the example of numbering, which can work entirely via 
a logic of equivalence, at an entirely referential level (see Chilver, 2014; Day et al, 
2014; Guyer et al, 2010). It is, for example, possible to perform the thought, ‘three’, 
without having in front of me three things. One might further imagine things that 
happen one after the other in time as I write with the window open on a summer 
day. A bell chimes, someone walking by outside says ‘pardon?’, there is a flash of 
light as an opening window reflects the sun and the noise of a car as it passes, a fly 
lands on my arm. These, taken together, constitute a series of happenings 
connected only by the fact that they are perceived to have happened, one after the 
other. However, this example harbours at least two further complications. The first 
is that things do not tend to happen purely consecutively. The light, the forward 
movement of the car and the manoeuvrings of the fly would, I imagine, all continue 
concurrently, even if one only perceived them one at a time. Secondly and 
connectedly, each element in a series might continue to relate to other structures 





of things happening above, where I have deliberately tried to make an assemblage 
of different kinds of things, but it applies, I think, to each of the other instances of 
series that I relate here. Grains of chalk that make up a chalk line on the pavement 
continue to have a connection (a common history) with the stub of chalk that I put 
back in my pocket, and will eventually disperse, being worn or washed away in a 
variety of directions. Each word deployed as part of a series of words has a range of 
correspondences and associations quite apart from this deployment in particular. 
The apparent flash of light from a lighthouse issues from a revolving lamp that in 
fact continues to be visible from other positions even if it can’t be seen 
continuously from a single position. The example of knots in a piece of string seems 
less likely to contain elements of association that relate differently to the individual 
knots. That said, if the knots are meant for counting, the recording of histories or 
the casting of a spell (see also Day et al, 2014, pp.140-2), even they will have their 
own connections in which the rest of the knots in the series may not be implicated. 
One might observe, finally, that my example of a series of different kinds of 
occurrences on a sunny day fails, in fact, to make a series of different kinds of 
things. The five elements in this series – bell noise, ‘pardon?’, flash, car noise, fly – 
are part of a series that is united specifically in terms of the surface upon which the 
series emerges – that is, the sensory environment of the author.3 Series, it can be 
seen, relates to objects that through some parameter or another are the same kind 
of thing, or more specifically, emerge in relation to the same substrate. This applies 
to each of the examples of series presented in this exploratory discussion. It is 
easiest to think this in terms of the chalk line, which relates directly to a physical 
surface upon which particles of chalk are deposited. However, it does relate to 
numbering too, even if in this case the ‘surface’ under discussion is logical rather 
than physical. On this basis, series is inherently relational, but depends not on 
                                                     
3 Here in particular it can be seen that there is some similarity between my conception of series 
(and, discussed later in this chapter, list) and Guattari’s seriality, in which the members of a group 
all orient themselves toward the same ‘exterior object […] without really being aware of one 
another’ (Genosko, 2000, p.63). Evidently my discussion does not apply the same contextual 
specificities as Guattari’s. However, in relation to conceptions of psychic processes (as discussed 
in Chapter 6: see especially page 188) it might be noted that this is an instance in which Guattari 
draws upon Winnicott’s account of transitional formations in order to discuss psychic 
entanglements as they appear in the constellations – or more properly, assemblages – of patients 







which element appears before or after which, but on the context in which the series 
occurs. This insight underlines the relevance of the coming discussions on series, 
line and list to Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of assemblage, in which, as 
discussed in the introduction (Section 1.3), the capacities, strength and temporality 
of any entity – that is, its affect - is defined only in relation to the assemblage in 
which it is implicated. 
The series, thus constituted, is present in line can be seen in the writings of Sybil 
Moholy-Nagy on the work of the artist Paul Klee. Here, she identifies the line 
precisely as a modality of accrual. As she remarks, for Klee, the line is ‘successive 
dot progression [that] walks, circumscribes, creates passive-blank and active-filled 
planes. Line rhythm is measured like a musical score or an arithmetical problem’ 
(1968, p.9). In the Pedagogical Sketchbook, a publication that is above all else a 
meditation on line, Klee himself uses a row of lines to indicate a series of divisions 
or units, which are expressed through the annotation ‘1+1+1’ (1968, p.22). The logic 
of this intervention is that a numerical accretion also works through the drawing 
of the single line as it progresses along the page. Further to this, the art historian 
James Pierce examines the facility of the line to communicate the dynamism that 
inheres in the world. In reviewing works of Klee’s that have been inspired by the 
strategies of children’s art, Pierce suggests that a preoccupation with movement – 
not of the subject of the mark, but of the mark-making implement - connects ‘the 
sequential nature of line’ to writing (1976, p.87-8). In a similar moment, the 
anthropologist Tim Ingold (2007, p.34) draws connections between trace and 
thread, weaving and writing. In these reflections on text and textile we see that 
much as the line can work through a productive tangle or matting, it may also 
move in a single direction as it progresses through the formation of letters in a 
written sentence. This conception of the line as a mode of accrual provides a 
foundation for the coming discussions of the dual action of the list. As I will show, 
this arises in Break Down both as a stratified configuration and as a textual mode 








Figure 19: Photographs of conveyor belts and containers at waste reclamation facility from 
Landy's research preceding Break Down. Taken from Michael Landy / Break Down (2001a, p.91 






5.2 Conveyor belt 
Landy’s conveyor belt dominates accounts of the material form of Break Down. 
This object provides an opportunity to explore further the modalities of both line 
and list. The technicity of this large structure is captured in Michael Landy’s 
description of its form and function in conversation with James Lingwood (Co-
director, Artangel) several years after the event: 
There was a hundred metres of conveyor belt looping around the space. And an 
area in the middle was raised up, so that the sorting could happen there. There 
were four bays, deconstruction bays where everything was allotted a number – a 
car bay where my Saab 900 was taken apart, an electrical bay, a shredding and 
granulating bay (because we were essentially breaking everything down into its 
material parts then shredding and granulating it). A furniture and artwork bay 
also. There was an organised team of eleven operatives who did the deconstructing 
and recycling with me (Landy, 2008a, p.106). 
A bewildering array of personal belongings is displayed by Landy in Break Down, a 
work that has been described as ‘a list in action’ (Davies and Parrinder, 2003; see 
also Hawkins, 2010). The list is a good metaphor, too, for the action of a conveyor 
belt – and vice versa - as both work by moving things along in sequence. In this 
section the physical structure of Landy’s conveyor belt itself is considered, and 
Landy’s mappings of the large, mechanical structure that forms the main physical 
framework of Break Down are brought into play.  
First, though, it is worthwhile to investigate how the conveyor belt might work as 
a conceptual component of the current discussion. Line and series inhere in the 
form of both the list and the conveyor belt. In order to think the conveyor belt in 
relation to the present discussion, I turn to the typology proposed by Ingold of the 
line as either trace, fold or thread. Here, a trace is a mark left on a surface (like a 
line drawn in pencil, or a snail’s trail), a fold, crease or cut forms a line that remains 
in the contours of the surface, and a thread exists in three dimensions and ‘has’ a 
surface rather than ‘being on’ a surface. As a concrete, linear form, the conveyor 
belt corresponds with the third variety of line defined by Ingold; the ‘thread’, which 
is defined as:  
a filament of some kind, which may be entangled with other threads or suspended 
between points in three-dimensional space. At a relatively microscopic level 
threads have surfaces; however, they are not drawn on surfaces. Here are some 
common examples: a ball of wool, a skein of yarn, a necklace, a cat's cradle, a 
hammock, a fishing net, a ship's rigging, a washing line, a plumb line, an electrical 
circuit, telephone lines, violin strings, the barbed-wire fence, the tightrope, the 





Only the sections of Landy’s conveyor belt that ascend to the sorting trays make 
use of rubber belts, which would give the kind of continuous surface imagined by 
Ingold. The level sections use a series of metal rollers that lie horizontally across it 
like railway sleepers (see for example Artangel, 2015). Nevertheless, the long, 
twisting form of the thing in its entirety forms an overall line that references the 
concept of series as laid out earlier in this chapter. For example, Harriet Hawkins 
describes Landy’s ‘un-manufacturing’ of objects through which they:  
are simultaneously fast-forwarded to the landfill […] as they are ‘‘tracked 
backward’’ through their production process. With each turn the objects take 
around the conveyor belt system they are moved closer towards both of the 
normally ‘‘excluded’’ others of the commodity form; their manufactured nature 
and their potential fate as rubbish. In this tracking backwards Break Down enacts 
the assembly processes, it recalls the machines and methods used, the labour 
employed and the raw materials which once constituted the objects (2010, p.23). 
The focus here is not on the state or number of Landy’s possessions, but an 
accumulation or layering of processes (listing; dismantling, sorting, granulating) 
that act recursively upon the objects processed via the progressive gathering 
motion of Landy’s conveyor belts. Similarly, Day et al (2014) in their account of 
numbering as method (that is, of numbering as incorporating a set of practices that 
are constitutive and relational; bound up in the making of meaning rather than 
dealing in absolute terms) draw directly upon the image of Landy’s conveyor belt 
as it ‘move[s] yellow boxes full of Landy’s possessions towards completion, adding 
a bit at each pause or stage, in the way of a sum, 1+1+1’ (Ibid., p.144). Here, Break 
Down is reimagined as an exercise in ‘accretion’. 
James Lingwood first suggested the use of a conveyor belt in Break Down when he 
visited the show Michael Landy at Home in 1999. As Landy says, before that he had 
not fully considered how the project should work: ‘I envisaged things on a table 
that would end up in this big waste disposal bin. What should happen in between 
was less clear, what kind of form it might take’ (Landy, 2008a, p.104; see also 
Berning, 2012; Landy, 2008b). The ‘research’ section of Michael Landy / Break Down 
includes photographs that document Landy’s visit to a reclamation facility that 
uses roller conveyors in a blue metal frame the same shade as that eventually used 
in the show (Landy, 2001a, pp.90-1; see Figure 19). The connection with these 
industrial units in which rubbish are sorted is made explicit in Landy’s 





The work is based on material reclamation facilities, in which materials that have 
value are reclaimed from the waste chain. Conveyor belts carry the materials and 
people sort them. […] Break Down is a bit like a Scalextric version of a material 
reclamation facility with all my possessions circulating on a roller conveyor until 
they are taken apart’ (Ibid., p.107). 
This apparatus displays Landy’s belongings as they ride the circuit: ‘The conveyor 
belt is like a plinth in a way, it – er – conveys what’s going on’ (Ibid, p.107). Harvie 
describes it as ‘a sort of mobile catwalk on which to parade in intimate detail his 
possessions’ (2006, p.66).  
Landy’s reference to the conveyor belt in Break Down as a ‘Scalextric version’ of the 
real thing is echoed in the schematic notion of the plan of the conveyor belt 
published in Michael Landy / Break Down (2001a, p.33; see Figure 20). The concept 
of the Scalextric – toy racing cars on a track, powered by hand held controllers – 
signals miniaturisation, which again implies an alteration of the relationship of 
viewer and object, and an intensification of vision (Stewart, 1993, p.53). While 
Landy’s rendering of the apparatus of the reclamation facility is in fact 
accomplished through the use of a full-sized industrial conveyor belt, this version 
nevertheless appears as a play thing (perhaps because it is so clean and bright). 
This sense of Landy’s conveyor belt as a toy or a carnival ride – or at least, 
something that is either miniature or outsized - inflects other accounts of the work. 
As Harvie comments, the conveyor belt itself can be seen as ‘a giant fetish object’ 
(Ibid.) and this is echoed in a newspaper review in which the toy character of the 
conveyor belt is emphasised:  
He has built a conveyor belt and designed it to look like a gigantic toy train set or 
futuristic factory. It is painted turquoise blue, laden with bright yellow plastic 
crates containing his things, and is operated by men and women wearing matching 
blue boiler suits (Wood, 2001).  
One might pause, here, to meditate upon the question of what ‘a gigantic toy train’ 
might resemble, other than a full-sized train. Landy’s conveyor belt is pristine and 
bright, but despite its shiny presentation, is in fact precisely the same as those used 
in reclamation facilities. It is therefore the same size. That said, a theme of 
miniaturisation emerges through the presentation of this conveyor belt as a 
novelty or toy object, due in part to the fact that Landy’s line does not go anywhere, 





The scalextric and the train set are toys that use a line of rail or track and that map 
or deploy spaces in that they describe a specific line or space on a table or the floor 
– again, usually a circuit. As the literary critic Susan Stewart (1993) suggests, 
schematic representation of this type at once distances and sharpens one’s vision 
of the object(s) under depiction. This logic is replicated in the diagram that appears 
at the beginning of the ‘manual’ section of Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 
2001a; Figure 20). Here, Break Down appears as a system of channels through which 
Landy’s belongings are poured; lines through which they must travel. As such, the 
conveyor belt is emphasised as a technology that orders and serialises both the 
items that are to be processed and, in the ‘work bays’, the endeavour of dismantling 
and granulating them. The inflated rationality of this vision is conveyed in the 
architectural character of its design and layout on the page and the blue and yellow 
‘Ikea’ colouring of the page on which it appears, which cites the appearance of the 
conveyor belt itself (Harvie, 2006, p.68; Wood, 2001). The regularity of the lines - 
the striated bends, arrows, and steps to each end of the sorting platform – suggests 
that these may have been taken from a library of possible architectural components 
in a computer design programme. This drawing is diagrammatic in that it is 
understood that its purpose is not to reflect the dimensions of the conveyor belt – 
and does not need to do so in order to perform its function of representing the 
various tasks involved.  
The plan, then, is not designed to describe the conveyor belt as such but to situate 
the processes that Break Down comprises. The journey of Landy’s yellow, plastic 
trays, containing entire objects, components and fragments, are dictated by the 
originary journey of the conveyor belt; its constitution in space determines their 
trajectory. As Stewart demonstrates, in the miniature there emerges a hyperactive 
precision; a psychotic clarity and exactitude that brings with it an unlikely sense of 
being able to gain an omniscient perspective. In a moment that works between 
discussions on listing in the following sections, and topographical diagramming 
here, Stewart draws upon Borges’ reflections upon a (fictional) attempt to describe 
the entire world in verse to observe that ‘attempts to describe the miniature 







Figure 20: Plan (Landy, 2001a, p.33) 
This is a vision that works between the above schematic plan and the iteration of 
Landy’s conveyor belt imagined in his pen and ink work, P.D.F (Product, Disposal 
Facility) (1998; see Figure 18) as discussed in the previous chapter (pages 120-2 and 
127-8). This drawing, I suggest, opens up ways of thinking about completion, 
universality and specificity, and the impossibility of finishing lists. If as the critic 
Umberto Eco suggests in a survey of artworks that display profusion, ‘there is a 
swing between a poetics of “everything included” and a poetics of the “etcetera”’ 
(2009, p.7), this sketch both conveys and contains profusion. A body of objects and 
structures entirely fills - and seems to continue beyond the edge of - the picture 
space. This gives an impression of an extended continuity. It seems at first glance 
that Landy’s projected endeavour of dismantlement might extend in all directions 
and forever. However, on closer inspection objects only occasionally disappear 





an overall containment to the piece. The conveyor belt zigzags from top to bottom, 
punctuated by arrows that indicate the direction in which they travel. By keeping 
his depictions of the work within the frame throughout, Landy depicts a process 
that is continuous, since it is joined from beginning to end, but not infinite. In Eco’s 
terms, this signifies that in the modality employed by Landy ‘everything [is] 
included’ (2009, p.7); the subject of the work is both inclusive and finite. 
In P.D.F. (Product, Disposal Facility), then, Landy’s imaginary conveyor belt works 
between profusion and specificity as it transports everything he owns to 
granulation. Its significance depends upon precisely the conversation between 
everythingness and thisness that is called up by Deleuze’s use of the term 
‘haecceity’.4 The picture space, while encompassing much, is shallow, and the 
perspective bends somewhat, since the viewer is evidently looking from one side 
of the scene and yet the surface of some conveyor belts are angled slightly toward 
us. This foreshortening emphasises the diagrammatic or map like nature of the 
work. Landy’s conveyor belts are tables for holding and displaying the world’s 
strangeness. As such, Landy’s dad’s coat, his fridge, his mattress, become mythic 
objects. P.D.F. (Product, Disposal Facility), like the bigger work, Break Down, that 
follows it, is art as list, communicating to the viewer a pressing abundance of 
things. Crowding bodies, hands and unmanned tools unrelentingly poke, slice and 
unscrew electronics, slippers and books which helplessly submit to these savage 
attentions. Hectic levels of particularisation feature evenly across the entire work: 
wherever the eye falls, there is detail. In the teeming specificity meticulously 
caught within the wide frame of P.D.F (Product, Disposal Facility) Landy raises up 
a feeling of expansive profusion. 
                                                     
4 See also Chapter 3 (page 71, footnote 9). One might, here, consider the account of univocity 
developed by Deleuze in response to the work of the scholastic philosopher John Duns Scotus. 
Here the universe - Creator and creature, Life and living - sings with one voice; a voice that is 
difference and which therefore depends on infinite variety – that is, on specificity, thisness or 
haecceity. As Eugene Thacker (2010; see also Deleuze, 1968/2004; Widder, 2009) comments, 
Scotus’ univocity comprises firstly, the separateness and specificity of things, secondly, the 
‘common nature’ that is a field through which it becomes possible for things that are different to 
nevertheless be compared, and thirdly, the ‘common nature’ that is ‘the univocity of all common 
natures’ (Thacker, 2010, p.123). That is to say, univocity is the relationship between the 
relationships between things – ‘the nature of all common natures’ (Ibid.). In both Duns Scotus 
and Deleuze, relationship can only take place if each creature has its own specific characteristics 
and limits. For this reason, it is haecceity, the specific essence of ‘this in particular’, which creates 





5.3 List  
In this section, I present an account of the list as a riffing form that is inherently 
concerned with repetition and the endeavour of categorisation of collections of 
parts. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, line is distinguished from the 
series in general in that the line occurs specifically in space – which is to say that 
it is both a serial and a spatial formation. Where the conveyor belt is a variety of 
line, the list appears in this context as a form that is both serial and linear since it 
(a) presents a series of entries, one after the other and (b) is presented in a line, 
across, and often down, the page. Here I look to the line-thinking of Klee (1968), 
Moholy-Nagy (1968) and Pierce (1976) on Klee, and Ingold (2007), all of whom 
provide accounts that pertain directly to the current consideration of list – and 
indeed, line itself - as a form that is concerned with both series and text.  
Just as some of the conditions defined earlier in relation to series also appear in the 
line, so it is for list. For example, list entries are ordered one after the other. As in 
the series, while a list may be organised in a particular order, this is not an essential 
condition but a contingency of the form. That said, some important distinctions 
can be made between series and list. While, as I have shown, there are almost no 
limits to the medium or means through which a series might work the list occurs 
in language alone. Like the series, parts of which are always united by their 
substrate, the list is distinguished by its categorical nature. In addition, the list is 
always a list of something (Eco, 2009, pp.113-6). Imagining again the person who 
utters a series of words – let’s say, ‘one; thought; baby; grass; eleven’ – this series 
can be defined as a list of words, even if they have little else in common. As such, 
the inclusion of entries in a list is an act of categorisation.  
In the list, each entry is construed as having a single and flat relation with the pre-
existing title or category to which it is appended. This view of the list is typified 
when the theorist of language Jack Goody discusses the list as a strategy that can 
‘take category items out of the sentence structure and group them by similarities’ 
(1987, p.275). The list is constituted, then, via a ready-made logic that is applied 
from above rather than arising from the specific characteristics of its individual 
items or members. This kind of stratified modality repels argumentation, story, or 
the progressive development of an idea, referring instead to just one argument: the 
inclusion or exclusion of a particular item on the list or the applicability of the 





qualities of ‘the authoritative and totalising’ (Tankard, 2006, p.341) by giving an 
impression of closure, inclusiveness and an assumed self-sufficiency.5  
The most nostalgic (not to say regressive) surfaces of this argument can be 
observed in accounts of the list by literary critics Robert Belknap (2004) and Paul 
Tankard (2006). Tankard identifies the internet as a producer of lists of ‘nuggets’ 
of information – as Belknap says, ‘the apotheosis of lists’ (Belknap, 2004, p.xii) - 
where once there might have been theses and arguments. Similarly, in Belknap’s 
preface the quality of the ‘virtual’ is set up in opposition to that of the ‘literary’ 
without much in the way of elucidation regarding how either category might be 
constituted, how they might operate or what they might signify. It can be seen that 
Umberto Eco (2009), citing Belknap (2004), also exercises a separation between 
literary lists and those that have a practical purpose.  
However, such taxonomic discussions of ‘virtual’ versus ‘literary’ or indeed ‘literary’ 
versus ‘pragmatic’ lists seem misguided. The ‘pragmatic’ seems rather a capacious 
category, including without much in the way of differentiation or specification 
categories such as the itinerary, contents page, receipt, catalogue and guest list, as 
well as the inventory. Rather than indicating any ethical or aesthetic qualities in 
particular, all that use of the term ‘literary’ seems to signify for Belknap is that such 
lists are ‘made up’, as opposed to being written for direct practical purposes.6 As 
such, he argues, the ‘pragmatic’ list is infinitely extendable, where made up lists 
are subject to a fundamental foreclosure. As Eco comments, this argument ‘can 
easily be turned on its head: insofar as practical lists designate a series of things 
that, when the list is drawn up, are what they are and no more, then such lists are 
finite’ (2009, p.116). Meanwhile, there is no reason that an invented list of the type 
that appears in a poem, play or novel should not continue indefinitely.  
                                                     
5 In the list-studies of Paul Tankard (2006) and Robert Belknap (2004), examples of ‘low-brow’ 
lists are employed to illustrate this point. In Belknap for instance the mode of the ‘ranking’ – the 
pop culture convention of the top ten, for example – is identified as a variety of list that can be 
superimposed over almost any area of social or cultural life ‘as though the aim of everything – 
every experience, every work of art, every personality, every event – were to find its place in a 
single hierarchical plan’ (2004, p.x). 
6 A useful repositioning of the quality of the literary is provided in Kittler (1985/1990) and also in 
Welberry’s introduction to this text, in which he observes that ‘if literature is medially constituted 
– that is, if it is a means for the processing, storage, and transmission of data – then its character 






Welcome complication is provided by the art theorist Andrea Phillips (2012), who 
offers a focus on the constitutive nature of lists. She argues that any list might 
potentially continue indefinitely, since any change in the world they seem to 
enumerate and contain must be reflected in the list itself: along similar lines, one 
might call upon Susan Stewart’s remark in her discussion on practices of collection 
that ‘to play with series is to play with the fire of infinity’ (1993, p.159). The list plays 
the quality of containment against the possibility of unending variation. This 
infinite potential for proliferation gives rise to the kinds of lists that inhabit our 
lives (or my life, in any case): scraps of paper, creased into softness, torn, starred, 
crossed out, with additional entries in increasingly smaller script which climb the 
margin or eventually peter out at the bottom right-hand corner of the page. A list 
that has been handwritten on paper, a finished and unmarked specimen might 
here be reclassified as an abandoned list. The ruination of folding, scribbling, 
circling, adding, tearing, drawing of arrows and crossing out of entries is, simply, 
the work that has to be done to maintain it in step with the world and work to 
which it refers. Therefore, while appearing to offer ‘rationalisation’, the list plays 
between finite and infinite and ‘performs across registers’ (Phillips, 2012, p.99). In 
this sense, the list takes as its basic underlying condition a state of fragmentation. 
By this I mean not only to suggest that the list acts as a compilation of entries, but 
further to this (and simultaneously) that it functions to break things down.  
The title of Break Down might therefore be taken to refer not only to the 
transformation of Landy’s belongings which are themselves broken down into 
shards, fragments and dust, nor even to Landy’s state of mind as he enacts a mid-
life crisis by getting rid of everything, imagining this work as a means ‘to really fuck 
it up for myself’ (Landy, 2008a, p.104; see also 2008b). Rather, the title of the work 
might be seen to refer quite simply to the Break Down Inventory, which provides a 
fully itemised ‘break down’ – a complete list - of everything that Landy owned 
before the show took place. As Phillips comments in her exploration of the ubiquity 
of lists and listing:  
speaking at once of the technicity of my/your life and the endlessness of our 
labour, my/your list both absorbs and refracts the stressful intensities of our 
openings and closings, gaps and double bookings, opportunities and frustrations 
(2012, p.96).  
It is the moment of breaking down, or fragmentation in the form of refraction that 





manageable – to bring into scope - a variety of tasks that might otherwise escape 
us (me). This notion might be applied and explored via a comparison between the 
broad, overall aim; ‘go to the Co-op’, as compared with the refracted version that 





The first would at least get me as far as the shop; the second, in which the various 
tasks involved are broken down, split up, named individually, arrayed, gives me a 
fighting chance of being in a position both to give my son his tea and have working 
lights on my bike. 
We’re listing slightly; back in line. It is my contention that there is a space of 
continuity between list, line and number that is captured to some extent in each 
of the accounts of listing encountered in this chapter. That is to say, there is some 
consistency; to some extent, they line up. The constitutive role of the list appears 
in Chilver’s comment, as part of his development of a relational approach to 
number in art, that ‘number is usefully thought as the set whose members are 
identified by the inventory’ (2014, p.240). Similarly in her exploration of list as 
method Phillips provides as an initial remark the ‘visual predicate’ that defines the 
list: that of the column (2012, p.96; see also Goody, 1987, p.274). While it is 
undeniably a convention of list-writing, the column form is less than axiomatic. 
For example, even lists that appear in Phillips’ own prose tend not to be organised 
in this way but instead, are generally demarcated with commas as seen in the 
following enumeration of types of device employed in contemporary art: ‘a list, an 
experiment, an archive, a joke, a party, an instruction, a walk, etc.’ (Ibid., p.107). 
This last is not presented in a vertical column, but can still very easily be defined 
as a list (and it still maintains a horizontal, linear form on the page). An important 
quality of the form is nevertheless conveyed in Phillips’ discussion of the columnar 
list. As she remarks, in logical terms the relationship of each entry to each other 
entry is vertical, or paradigmatic, like the warp on a loom in relation to the weft of 
the grammatical relationship between words in a sentence (see also Tankard, 
2006). Therefore, while entries in a list may themselves have an internal 





sentences - they are rendered non-grammatical by the form. In effect, each entry 
in the list functions nominally, referring to one item (a material object, a concept, 
a memory, a task, a category, an experience) in particular.  
5.4 Listing and multiplicity 
This vertical relationship between list entries has been represented in a number of 
ways: for example, Belknap employs the analogy of electricity passing through 
circuits in series rather than in parallel (2004, p.21). I also want to draw into this 
discussion the helpful account in Ingold (2007, p.156) of the guideline, which ‘is 
intrinsic to the plane’ – for instance, the lines of a stave in musical notation or those 
that demarcate the parameters of a graph, and the plotline – the musical notes or 
the data indicated on that graph - which, if excised, ‘would leave the plane intact’. 
Ingold summons the material form of the printing press here, in his deployment of 
the image of the galley and the type that can be inserted into it. To push this further 
(and to depart to some extent from the graphic and material examples provided by 
Ingold), in a psychoanalytic exploration of grief, Darien Leader comments that in 
order to move on from a loss, one must first understand (in some way) the 
difference between structure and specificity. One must distinguish the object one 
mourns from ‘the place they have occupied for us’ in order, eventually, to be able 
‘to put others into that same empty space’ (2009, pp.131-2). If syntax can be seen as 
a kind of guideline or framing device, the plotline summons the paradigmatic 
relationship between the various entries on a single list. The complex potentiality 
that arises through these vertical relations is vividly summoned in Fuller: 
There is an interplay between the one and the multiplicities it contains, that it 
might be, that it might have been, that it weaves in and out of as relations of 
dimensionality. Elements in a paratactic list always open up into a matrix of 
immanent universes. Each of the elements in a list is hypotactically stacked in 
relation to the immanence of what it is next to, what it abuts to and differs from. 
Such hypotaxis is virtual, that is, for its actualisation it demands power from the 
imagination (2012, p.14). 
In the list, a form emerges that affords the freedom and transformative capacities 
of the multiplicity, and which therefore cannot be entirely delimited or expressed 
(Ibid., p.155). It therefore becomes possible to posit an account of the list as a 
fundamentally liberatory form, in the sense that it accommodates jumps in and 
out of the linear order defined through its form. Indeed, it does so far more readily 





The list affords escape from its own written order, providing a space for 
interruption and provisionality. As such, it subverts the authority of prose, which 
demands to be read from beginning to end (and otherwise refuses to make sense).  
The modality of the list is at least in part concerned with the recursivity of ‘1+1+1’ 
(Klee, 1968, p.22; see also Day et al, 2014, p.144), causing the author to hit the 
comma or return key again and again in order to arrive at the beginning of a new 
line. This repeating structure summons the Freudian conception of repetition as 
produced by a ‘death drive’ (Freud, 1955/2001; see also Buchanan, 2015, pp.32-4). 
Citing this motif, the psychoanalyst Darian Leader shows in his account of 
melancholia that the modality of the list is closely related with processes of 
mourning (or attempts to mourn). In this account the work of mourning is about 
enumeration: ‘like looking at a diamond not just from one angle but from all 
possible angles, so that each of its facets can be viewed’ (2009, p.28). Here, Leader 
refers briefly to Break Down ‘in which all of [Landy’s] personal possessions were 
ground into dust by a machine he had installed to literally break down his life’ 
(Ibid., p.33). The work is deployed by Leader as an illustrative example in his 
discussion of the listing quality of grief, in which the bereaved replay on a loop 
their memories of the deceased. He comments, with regard to ‘the list published 
by Landy of the thousands of objects he destroyed’ that this ‘serial, list-like quality 
[…] frustrates our desire to create stories’ (Ibid.). There is some resonance between 
this account from Leader and the comparison, by Tankard (2006), of the trapping 
nature of ‘spooling’ prose with the potentialities for new kinds of connections and 
associations as presented by the list. In Leader, Break Down Inventory (Landy, 
2001b) appears as an apparatus for mourning and in particular for resisting an 
artificially truncated mourning: to insert too readily a real loss into the realm of 
story, he claims, risks short-changing the mourner by placing their loss within the 
clichés of narrative structure. That said, ‘on its own, the work of listing and 
reshuffling may indicate precisely a block to the mourning process’ (Leader, 2009, 
p.34) – which is to say that listing might signal a jamming of the works: a failed or 
stuck mourning. Here, the mourner finds herself in difficulties. What is required 
in order to un-jam the process is some sense of narrative – but it is the foreclosures 
that inhere in narrative convention that cannot be allowed, and that the list 
enables us to avoid. Yet for Leader, if list is not enough, neither is narrative: an 





Tankard gets us further toward imagining the nature of this ‘something’, 
identifying as he does the liberatory potential of the list as a text that does not 
require its readers to follow the progress of a particular argument or narrative in 
order to gain from the reading. His response to the line of the list relates directly 
to the form of the poem, which, he claims, is also vertically structured (in contrast 
to interminable horizontality of prose). This notion of list and poem as vertical, 
skippable, refracted forms summons Ingold’s reflections on the broken line: 
fragmentation can be read positively in so far as it opens up passages […] that might 
have been closed off, allowing inhabitants to find their own ‘ways through’, and 
thereby to make places for themselves, amidst the ruptures of dislocation (2007, 
p.167-9). 
The fragmented nature of the list, then, and its reliance on the vertical relation 
between each of its entries, opens the way to the list as a 'poetic' form. This vision 
of line breaks that are productive, making space for new meanings or narratives, 
echoes directly a fascinating comment in Belknap, that in the rhythmic unfolding 
of the list, ‘sometimes all hell breaks loose, and in some psychedelic jam of 
language an ecstasy overwhelms us’ (2004, p.xiv). Here – perhaps due to the 
mention of jam - I am moved to consider the famous list from the penultimate 
section of Joyce’s Ulysses, of the objects on Bloom’s dresser. Other lists go haywire 
in other ways, but this example provides an apt demonstration of my contention 
that it is the recursive movement of the form that gives it the excessive quality that 
might be called, in Darien Leader’s terms, ‘something more’: 
On the lower shelf five vertical breakfast plates, six horizontal breakfast saucers on 
which rested inverted breakfast cups, a moustachecup, uninverted, and saucer of 
Crown Derby, four white goldrimmed eggcups, and open shammy purse displaying 
coins, mostly copper, and a phial of aromatic violet comfits. On the middle shelf a 
chipped eggcup containing pepper, a drum of table salt, four conglomerated black 
olives in oleaginous paper, an empty pot of Plumtree's potted meat, an oval wicker 
basket bedded with fibre and containing one Jersey pear, a halfempty bottle of 
William Gilbey and Co's white invalid port, half disrobed of its swathe of coralpink 
tissue paper, a packet of Epps's soluble cocoa, five ounces of Anne Lynch's choice 
tea at 2/- per lb. in a crinkled leadpaper bag, a cylindrical canister containing the 
best crystallised lump sugar, two onions, one the larger, Spanish, entire, the other, 
smaller, Irish, bisected with augmented surface and more redolent, a jar of Irish 
Model Dairy's cream, a jug of brown crockery containing a noggin and a quarter of 
soured adulterated milk, converted by heat into water, acidulous serum and 
semisolidified curds, which added to the quantity subtracted for Mr Bloom's and 
Mrs Fleming's breakfasts made one imperial pint, the total quantity originally 
delivered, two cloves, a halfpenny and a small dish containing a slice of fresh 
ribsteak. On the upper shelf a battery of jamjars of various sizes and proveniences 





In its entirety, this scene, in which Stephen Dedalus and Leopold Bloom return late 
to Bloom’s house, has the structure of a kind of catechism, in which each element 
of the humdrum actions performed is relayed to the reader in a form that extends 
well beyond the credible comprehension of the actors in the moment of their 
acting. Detail is piled upon detail in a precarious ecstasy, as though Joyce means to 
experiment with how much detail can be loaded on before the entire edifice 
collapses under its own weight. His listing of the items in the dresser appears, 
therefore, as an unstable, semi-inflated thing that lists in the sense of listing to one 
side. This askew sensibility is further underpinned by the appearance of Joyce’s 
characteristic portmanteaus: moustachecup; goldrimmed; halfempty; coralpink; 
leadpaper; jamjars. These jammed-together words feel both jaunty and rickety. In 
addition, it might be observed they work in a way that is closely analogous to the 
nominal character of all list entries. In just the same way, in Joyce’s joined words, 
the insertion of a descriptor into the body of the noun conveys an underlying 
essentialism which pushes these objects forward in their very specificity and 
peculiarity. Partly because of their uncompromising distinctness and partly 
because through their joining they physically overwrite a space that would usually 
exist on the page, the portmanteaus raise up in the text a sense of claustrophobia. 
There is decomposition here, and disarray. While each individual entry feels 
entirely reasonable and proportionate, it is Joyce’s shuttling strategy of laying 
object over object over many pages that gives this penultimate chapter of Ulysses 
a credulous hilarity. This relentless seeing suggests in the end either godlike 
transcendence or the compensatory clear-sightedness of the irredeemably 
hammered. 
In short, this excerpt from Joyce reveals the list as a generative form. Indeed, it is 
this native fecundity and liveliness that prevents it from becoming the psychic 
dead-end feared by Leader (2009). Belknap’s ecstatic ‘jam’ (2004, p.xiv), evokes, 
therefore, the image of a mass of influences and fragments boiled together in the 
cranium to make a new, sticky cohesion. Similarly, albeit through use of an imagery 
that is, mercifully, altogether less repulsive, Fuller animates an account of meaning 
as relationally constituted when he remarks that:  
the accretion of minute elements of signification into crowds, arrays, and clusters 
allows a reverberation of these cultural particles between them and together, the 





I read in Belknap’s arresting phrase, ‘some psychedelic jam of language’ (2004, 
p.xiv), a sense that the list - its very form – potentialises reading, but also repeating, 
mainly the same but somewhat different, to operate variations on a theme, to play 
around – that is, to riff. 
5.5 Listing with one eyebrow raised 
As Phillips contends, in contemporary art the list tends to be employed with one 
eyebrow raised, working as it does as a play on the modalities of the artistic and 
the practical. She suggests that the list is ‘a system of relations between elements, 
these elements being both the contents of any list […] and the structures to which 
they are linked’ (2012, p.99). Context is important, and in the main, deployments 
of the list in art and in literary texts are performed aslant. This tendency is 
epitomised in a purposely overblown episode in Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey 
in which an intriguing ‘manuscript’ that promises to reveal grim secrets is 
uncovered in a sinister cabinet on a stormy night. The candle belonging to the 
protagonist, Catherine, is suddenly blown out before she can read it, leaving her in 
a state of high agitation - but in the morning, the first sheet she reads turns out to 
be nothing more than an ‘inventory of linen’; that is, a ‘washing bill’: 
She seized another sheet, and saw the same articles with little variation; a third, a 
fourth and a fifth presented nothing new. Shirts, stockings, cravats and waistcoats 
faced her in each. Two others, penned by the same hand, marked an expenditure 
scarcely more interesting, in letters, hair-powder, shoe-string and breeches-ball. 
And the larger sheet, which had inclosed the rest, seemed by its first cramp line, 
“To poultice chestnut mare,” – a farrier’s bill! (1818/2003, pp.163-4). 
Austen lists the lists, using their utter mundanity to explode the melodramatic 
imaginings of the night before. The extravagant sufferings of Catherine – ‘her 
feelings at that moment were indescribable. Her heart fluttered, her knees 
trembled, and her cheeks grew pale’ (Ibid., p.161) – are brought into contact with 
the tedious recurrence of the need, week after week, for the washing to be done, 
and new shoe-string purchased.  
This tableau directly exemplifies the argument, in Tankard (2006), that the list is 
often deployed against the grain. This may, as in Austen, satirise the ‘literary’. 
Alternatively, an implied irony falls back upon the list itself. Due to its incongruous 
inclusion in a literary work (and, similarly, looking to Phillips, we might add, an 





The natural functions of lists are perceived to be scholarly, scientific, 
administrative – all functions of literate culture. […] Thus the uses of lists in non-
scholarly, nonadministrative discourse – the impractical discourses of literature – 
are usually humorous and parodic’ (2006, p.347).    
I am not convinced by this ‘humour’. Certainly, none of the examples I review here 
– apart from Joyce’s - make me laugh. Where such sources refer to ‘joke’ and 
‘humour’ I want to refer to something quieter: a twist of the mouth; a kind of 
mordancy. The joke, or perhaps I should say the rub, is that the previously 
discussed conception of the ‘pragmatic list’ as a stable referent that in some sense 
performs a direct mimesis of its subject(s) are in themselves rather troubled. The 
credulous straightness of the bureaucratic list is harnessed and undercut by 
enactments of the form in art and literature. As the artist and writer John Chilver 
suggests, such endeavours are ‘about rhetoricising the list’ (2014, p.245), which is 
to say that they expose the ways in which listing is constructive, rather than simply 
reflective, of its contents. In the examples that follow, as in the Break Down 
Inventory (Landy, 2001b), what is exposed is the ultimate impossibility of 
objectivity and completion. For example, to return for a moment to the excerpt 
from Joyce (on page 149 of this thesis) it can be seen that what he mocks is the 
notion of completion itself. The shuttling action of the list works as a contrivance 
for the capture of the entirety of life in its multiplicity; that this venture is – 
naturally – hopeless, brings to the work a sort of skewiff, teasing quality. The scope 
of Joyce’s listing is an important constituent in the status of this work as an epic, 
as can be seen in the omniscience of its knowledge and attention and the way in 
which the most profound subject matter is awarded the same quality of attention 
as the contents of the kitchen dresser. Simultaneously, and for the same reasons, 
it is necessary to imagine this listing as parodic. Joyce, in performing this doomed 
attempt to convey the universe entire and complete, mocks the very notion that 
such a thing might be possible.  
A further example of this aslant listing can be seen in J.G.Ballard’s short story, The 
Index, which takes the form of the back pages of a fictional biography of the main 
character, Henry Rhodes Hamilton (HRH). As shown in the below selection from 
entries listed under ‘H’ the piece reproduces the conventions of paratext while 
simultaneously allowing it to tell a story: 
Hamilton, Henry Rhodes, accident-proneness, 118; age, sensitiveness about, 476; 
belief in telepathy, 399; childhood memories, 501; common man, identification 





resemblance to, 322; hobbies, dislike of, 87; illnesses: concussion, 196; 
hypertension, 346; prostate inflammation, 522; venereal disease, 77; integrity, 89; 
languages, mastery of, 176; Orient, love of, 188; patriotism, renunciation of, 276; 
public speaking, aptitude for, 345; self-analysis, 234–67; underdog, compassion for, 
176; will-power, 87 
Hamilton, Indira, meets HRH in Calcutta, 239; translates at Gandhi interviews, 253; 
imprisoned with HRH by British, 276; marries HRH, 287; on abortive Everest 
expedition, 299; divorces HRH, 301 
Hamilton, Marcelline (formerly Marcelline Renault), abandons industrialist 
husband, 177; accompanies HRH to Angkor, 189; marries HRH, 191; amuses Ho Chi 
Minh, 195; divorces HRH, 201 
Hamilton, Ursula (later Mrs Mickey Rooney), 302–7; divorces HRH, 308 
(Ballard, 1977/1991) 
To ‘read’ the life story of HRH requires direct and quite detailed participation on 
the part of the reader. One might at several points need to mark a spot with a finger 
and turn the pages back and forth.7 The details are opaque, and the tone entirely 
determined by the protocols of index-writing. The entire weight of the narrative is 
shifted onto the content of each entry, that is, the items in the list. Most of these 
are preposterous and grandiose; some are pooterish – ‘hobbies, dislike of’; some, 
exposing – ‘illnesses: concussion, 196; hypertension, 346; prostate inflammation, 
522; venereal disease, 77’. The reader is left to conjecture, for example, by what 
means Ghandi’s denunciation might connect with his outing to Harry’s Bar and 
introduction to James Joyce by Ernest Hemingway, all of which occur on page 256 
of this fictional text.  
Ballard’s piece aptly exemplifies the previously cited accounts of parodic listing in 
Tankard (2006) and Phillips (2012), since its effectivity has to do with a disjuncture 
between the contents of the list and its mode of delivery. A similar disjuncture can 
be seen in a section from Georges Perec’s project to record in exhaustive detail 
every feature of a certain square in Paris: 
Fleeting slogans: “De l’autobus, je regarde Paris [From the bus, I look at Paris]” 
Ground: packed gravel and sand. 
Stone: the curbs, a fountain, a church, buildings… 
Asphalt 
Trees (leafy, many yellowing) 
                                                     
7 Further, reading an online transcription of the text meant typing page numbers into a ‘search’ 
box to see what patterns emerged as I clicked on the ‘up’ and ‘down’ arrows to move from one 





A rather big chunk of sky (maybe one-sixth of my field of vision) 
A cloud of pigeons that suddenly swoops down on the central plaza, between the 
church and fountain 
Vehicles (their inventory remains to be made) 
Human beings 
Some sort of basset hound 
Bread (baguette) 
Lettuce (curly endive?) partially emerging from a shopping bag  
(Perec, 1975/2010, pp.5-6). 
This list reproduces a concern with procedure, since Perec is following a self-
imposed system of his own devising in his project of looking and writing. There is 
an earnestness to his listing: his tone here is not at all arch, but rather self-
conscious. Throughout the text and especially in these first pages, Perec plays 
between the assumed formality and objectivity of his adopted style, and his 
location as the subjective observer. This can be seen in a certain unevenness of 
attention. ‘Human beings’ receive a single, shared entry, where the endive 
‘emerging from a shopping bag’ has an entry of its own. The entry for ‘stone’ 
becomes overwhelming and ends with an ellipsis. There is a kind of sheepish 
humour in ‘some sort of basset hound’, while the sudden ‘swoop’ of pigeons 
provides a rare moment of animation in a notably static scene.  
Finally, a list from Italo Calvino’s novel If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller 
(1979/1998) makes nonsense from the way in which the list, as discussed earlier, 
not only describes, but constructs its components through categorisation. As in 
Perec’s list, a certain licentiousness can be identified in the following scene, set in 
a library for the classification and conservation of ‘confiscated books’, where 
oppressive regimes with punitive policies regarding books are categorised as 
follows: 
the countries where all books are systematically confiscated; 
the countries where only books published or approved by the State may circulate; 
the countries where existing censorship is crude, approximate, and unpredictable; 
the countries where the censorship is subtle, informed, sensitive to implications 
and allusions, managed by meticulous and sly intellectuals; 
the countries where there are two networks of dissemination: one legal and one 
clandestine; 
the countries where there is no censorship because there are no books, but there 





the countries where there are no books and nobody complains about their absence; 
the countries, finally, in which every day books are produced for all tastes and all 
ideas, amid general indifference 
(Calvino, 1979/1998, p.235). 
This final list is somewhat analogous to discussion in Foucault (1966/2002) of a list 
of ‘animals’ taken from Borges, which includes a promiscuous assortment of classes 
of beast. As Foucault comments, it is funny and yet tests our tolerance, due not to 
the nature of any one entry in particular, but the troubling fact that they are unified 
within the same list. He draws a comparison, here, with the case of ‘certain 
aphasiacs’ who, if given an assortment of balls and ends of wool, are unable to 
arrange them according to any consistent schema, taking up, rather, classifications 
including a variety of discontinuous factors; colour, length, texture and so on. In 
so doing, they ‘create a multiplicity of tiny, fragmented regions in which nameless 
resemblances agglutinate things into unconnected islets’ (Foucault, 1966/2002, 
p.xx).  
A similarly parodic vein can be seen in various features of the Break Down 
Inventory. Here, we must begin with its very existence. There is no sense that a full 
list of Landy’s possessions was needed in any practical way in order for the work to 
take place. Further, while some of the works of art destroyed might be deemed 
worth recording and preserving via the recording function of the list, the majority 
– and perhaps all - of the rest of Landy’s possessions are unlikely to be missed by 
anyone save the artist himself. A refrain can be caught here, between Landy’s 
listings and the undifferentiated focus given by Joyce to each of the objects in 
Bloom’s kitchen dresser. In Break Down Inventory, it is precisely the futility of the 
action of recording the existence (and subsequent destruction) of such banal 
flotsam as a small rubber spatula (K1631), a pair of purple woollen socks (C490) and 
a 500g packet of Tesco’s red split lentils (P2876), for example, that gives this list its 
excessive quality. This looming redundancy is drilled home through the use of 
series numbers which – also - completely lacks a direct purpose. These numbers, 
which consist of a letter (‘A’ for art; ‘R’ for reading matter) and a number, have no 
practical relationship to the work of taking apart and shredding as it took place. 
There is evidence that the dismantled pieces of some of Landy’s possessions 
retained their number after being deconstructed (Artangel, 2015). However, this 





remains at large were awarded any continuous connection with their previous 
existence though Landy’s systems of recording and sorting.  
The text of the Inventory has an easily decipherable logic, however, in that objects 
are organised into groups. The below selection shows entries from the ‘Clothing’ 
category: 
C493 Hometown Boys country-and-western style hat with feather and ribbon 
C494 Red beret with brown leather rim and tastles, present from Janine Ferris 
C495 Worn straw Ska hat with brown ribbon with hole in it 
C496 White woollen cossack hat padded lining and metal adjustable buckle 
C497 Medium size white cotton short sleeve top 
C498 Brown and white check nylon shirt, size 16" neck 
C499 One red and one brown polyester skull cap hat 
C500 Green tweed flat cap with popper fastener on peak and green silk lining, 
purchased in Loughborough, 1982 
C501 Camouflaged army hat with wide brim and adjustable string, purchased 
on trip to White Water with Richard Flood 
C502 White T-shirt from Scrapheap Services with faded black Jelly Tots sweet 
wrapper screenprint on front 
C503 Medium size black cotton underpants 
C504 Calvin Klein medium size black cotton underpants 
C505 Alexandra red polyester baseball cap with adjustable red plastic fastener, 
as worn in Scrapheap Services 
C506 Blue and white lined swimming trunks with drawstring once owned by 
Angus Fairhurst 
C507 Plain blue baseball cap with adjustable plastic fastener, purchased while 
on holiday in Dalyan, Turkey 
C508 Plain medium size white cotton T-shirt 
C509 White cotton floppy cricket hat with zip-up pocket 
C510 Medium size grey cotton underpants 
C511 Blue swimming trunks with elasticated waist and drawstring, purchased 
at the Blue Lagoon, Iceland 
C512 Paul Smith pair of worn checked cotton socks with holes in them, once 
owned by Ian Davenport  
(Landy, 2001b). 
Despite the apparently even distribution across Landy’s belongings of his 
systematic work of disassembly (in the sense that everything that Landy owned is 
listed; everything is to be shredded) this listing works differently on the different 
kinds of entries. Art works are treated formally, given the name of the artist and 





format used to label works by galleries and in academic writing. Pop music 
compact discs are given their code numbers and record company names. Clothing 
and kitchenware are not always dated or given a name – although designer and 
branded objects often are. These ordinary things are very often given a story that 
relates to Landy’s family or situates him within the art world: see for example the 
hat bought in the company of Richard Flood (presumably the curator) or the 
swimming trunks of Angus Fairhurst.8 That said, the very proximity of items with 
highly evocative stories or (in)famous associations to the most basic needments - 
medium sized pairs of cotton pants and tee shirts - ironises these more resonant 
entries and roots them in the territory of utility. Similarly, Landy’s family memories 
rub against evidence of his connections with well known figures from the art world 
and young British artists to produce a vivid impression of narrative: of the living of 
a life. Just like Ballard’s index, this list of Landy’s things enables the reader to flick 
back and forth, reconnecting items and constructing some version of his life story. 
It is instructive, here, to consider the impact of the format of the Inventory. Landy’s 
written descriptions are organised into a single column so that naming and 
describing are effectively treated as a single function. This decision on Landy’s part 
returns us to the notion that the list – even the list that is made of full sentences – 
escapes grammar. Every list entry is in essence a nominal entity: a noun, or a noun-
like thing. As discussed earlier in relation to Joyce’s portmanteau words, this 
joining results in a funny essentialism in which the story of the thing seems to 
become an intrinsic part of the thing itself, as seen in the below entry: 
L2027 Small metal crucifix, once owned by Ethel Landy  
The superimposition here of Landy’s narrative – ‘crucifix once owned by Ethel 
Landy’ - and the part of the text that offers the most direct description of the object 
– ‘small metal crucifix’ - reveals firstly the material specificity of the object itself – 
its status as a thing that has a particular quiddity. What is implied by Landy’s use 
here of ‘metal’, rather than any more specific identification (which might have 
occurred if the object were made of silver or gold)? This might suggest that the 
‘metal’ in question was inexpensive. I imagine an object that is perhaps rather dull, 
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that would sit lightly in the palm of the hand. Alongside this I begin to conjecture 
the possible significance (personally, socially, among one’s family) of destroying a 
religious symbol, and one once owned by one’s mother at that. The curious use of 
the passive – not ‘given by’ or ‘stolen from’ but ‘once owned by’ – seems suggestive 
of the porous atmosphere in which in parenthood one’s personal possessions 
somehow end up owned by one’s child (and here I find myself identifying with 
Ethel). This is all present in item L2027, wrapped into a single entry that works as 
a single and encapsulating signifier. This thought experiment, which effects a 
notional separation between object and narrative, opens up the possibility of a 
critical engagement with list entries beyond the flatness of the most immediate 
message of the Break Down Inventory. This thing – and this – and this – were here, 
and they were owned by Landy.  
5.6 The material form of Break Down Inventory 
This section audits the contents of the Break Down Inventory (Landy, 2001b) and 
their relationship with its material form. The list is one possible refinement of the 
broader definition of the series; the inventory is a more specified category again. 
Like the list, the inventory presents a series of entries that fit a particular category 
and that may or may not be presented in a particular order – but the inventory is 
a written form since its purpose is record keeping, in general for the listing of 
material objects. Since the Inventory was written using a spreadsheet programme, 
I investigate the character of this medium in particular. 
Number and containment are the key principles that structure the text of the 
Inventory, which in the print version, published by Ridinghouse9 in 2001, is 
prefaced by a note that provides the complete number of entries in the list (7227) 
as well as the combined weight of these objects (5.75 tonnes). This unembellished 
presentation of the twin facts of the number of objects destroyed and the physical 
weight of these objects, draws upon the convention of the list as impermeable by 
analysis or discourse (Tankard, 2006). Landy’s Inventory appears to be self-
sufficient, to possess an entirely and directly mimetic relationship to its subject. As 
such, it works to elevate the authority of Break Down itself (by which I mean the 
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appearance of moral veracity and significance that has accrued to Landy’s work). 
In referring to the weight of Landy’s shredded belongings, I am drawn to consider 
the physical form, and in particular the bulk of the book itself. My copy of Break 
Down Inventory weighs 720g. The weight of the book performs a dual role in the 
construction of its own meaning and significance. Its size speaks of the genuinely 
colossal nature of Landy’s endeavour. Simultaneously, as argued in the previous 
section, the form of the text and its contexts, Landy’s adoption of a bureaucratic 
modality, and relatedly the excessive completionism of his approach, which has 
produced this heavy inventory, are performed in a parodic manner.  
This turn toward the material form of the print copy of Break Down Inventory is 
enriched through reference to media histories, including historic emergences of 
practices of writing and organising text and the development of the electronic 
spreadsheet programme. In discussing media histories of ancient Roman and 
medieval contexts respectively, both the cultural historian Cornelia Vismann 
(2008, pp.41-3) and the theorist of new media Katherine Hayles (2002, p.99) note 
the transformative power of the introduction of the codex (the book with pages, 
preceded as it was by the scroll) due to its affordance of non-sequential reading. 
Pages enable the reader to flick backwards and forwards; the facility for re-reading 
and cross-referencing of passages re-connects texts with themselves in new ways. 
This material detail relates very directly with discussion, above, of the vertical 
(paratactic) relation of one list entry with the next, in which the shuttling motion 
of the list appears as an alternative to the modality of prose, which unspools like 
ribbon from a bobbin. Indeed, along similar lines, Tankard speculates over how 
conventional expectations of texts might have developed ‘if rather than having 
invented the codex to replace the scroll, something like a text cassette had evolved, 
that presented text like tickertape’ (2006, p.353).  
The original form of Break Down Inventory as an electronic spreadsheet (a media 
form that affords scrolling in perpetuity) is directly reproduced through use of a 
grid in the print copy. Indeed, despite its publication in the form of as a codex (a 





















Figure 22: Front cover of Break Down Inventory (Landy, 2001b). Photographed by the author, 
June 2015. 
 
Figure 23: Folded page edges of Break Down Inventory (Landy, 2001b). Photographed by the 





scroll-like continuity described by Tankard. It is not designed to be unfurled - on 
close examination it is clear that one would have to destroy the book to prise it free 
of the binding. However, its pages are folded double, with a fold at the outside 
edge, and printed only on a single side of each continuous sheet so that the text 
appears on one side of what appears to be a long zig-zag of paper (Figure 23). 
Presented in ‘landscape’ orientation, the text runs from the beginning to the end 
of the inventory in order of serial number, giving the impression that the entire 
runs down a single, continuous sheet of paper, much as if it were printed for a 
scroll, rather than a book with pages.10 In addition to doubling the weight of the 
physical text, this folding works to emphasise the theme of series: the vertical 
relationship of each entry to each of the others. Belknap defines the list as ‘a 
formally organised block of information that is composed of a set of members’ that 
‘joins and separates at the same time’, figuring at the same time ‘the sum of its 
parts and the individual parts themselves’ (2004, p.15). In precisely the same way, 
the formation of the print copy of Break Down Inventory speaks of the equivalence 
of every entry with every other entry, securing at the same time the unique position 
and place of each. 
5.7 Spreadsheet 
This section investigates the implications of Landy’s use of the spreadsheet in the 
initial gathering of the information contained in the Break Down Inventory. The 
importance in the current discussion of material form as directly constitutive of 
and entangled with the content of a text has already been discussed. Here, I map 
the constitutive capacities of the spreadsheet and make connections between these 
general points and the particular features of the spreadsheet used in the writing of 
the Break Down Inventory. I follow the media theorist Lev Manovich in imagining 
that the electronic database offers a distinctive ‘way to structure our experience of 
                                                     
10 This feature of the Inventory differs specifically from the practice, in early book-binding, of 
leaving the edges of the pages ‘uncut’ – here, razoring the folds on the outside edges of pages 
was left to the reader. The folds of the Inventory, on the other hand, do not impede our reading 
of the contents since text is purposely not printed on the inside of the folds. The protagonist of 
Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller describes reading a book that is constructed in 
precisely a similar way, although this appears to have been an error. Cutting the pages open with 
a paper knife, he unexpectedly encounters an unprinted page: ‘an intact blank really reigns on 
the two sides that confront each other. You turn another page and find the next two are printed 





ourselves and the world’ (1999, p.81).11 In this account, Manovich sets the list (or 
database) in opposition to the narrative (or algorithm). It is his proposal that the 
potential for new items to be added at any point ‘without in any way modifying the 
logic of the database’ (Ibid., p.83) forecloses the development of a narrative that 
makes sense as narrative. In digital media, he argues, this relationship is turned 
upon its head since the range of possible options (clips, pictures, data) are ‘stored 
in a database’ while the narrative – which is to say, the links made between these 
options – is more fleeting. This seems to me a troublesome position, since these 
links – algorithms - are in themselves ‘stored’ either as part of the program of a 
game or in the eventual form or ordering of the thing if we are imagining a film, 
for example. Actually, what this account of vertical and horizontal relations shows 
is that a database modality is present in language even at the level of the spoken 
sentence, in which paradigmatic relations work in the imagination rather than the 
digitised store of the database. If anything, I wish to suggest that database and the 
story are more closely aligned than might first be imagined. 
In considering how the material form of the spreadsheet in particular is 
constitutive of its contents, one might begin with the spreadsheet as a tool of 
accountancy. The electronic spreadsheet, which as will be seen was only developed 
in the late 1980s, nevertheless succeeds from the earliest emergences of writing, 
which according to Vismann arose in order to enable practices of accounting. Here 
lists function not to reflect but to eventuate exchanges - they ‘do not communicate, 
they control transfer operations’ (Vismann, 2008, p.6). Accordingly, 
Mesopotamian clay tablets (emerging from the Babylonian Empire in the third 
millenium BCE) use pictograms to convey such matters as ‘the per-capita 
consumption of female workers, lists containing inventories of wheat and beer, 
lists with names of trees, shrubs, and administrative offices, lists for those training 
to become compilers of lists’ (Ibid.; see also Belknapp, 2004, p.9).12  
                                                     
11 I include the spreadsheet in the definition by Manovich of the database as a ‘collection of items 
on which the user can perform various operations: view, navigate, search’. 
12 In his expansive work on the relationship between oral and written language, Jack Goody 
opines that there is too little evidence to award to the Mesopotamian tablets the status of being 
the site of the emergence of writing (1987, p.18). That said, in this account as in those discussed 






The information recorded in Mesopotamian plaques is organised spatially, and its 
positioning in itself ‘encodes the values of an entry’ (Vismann, 2008, p.6). That this 
convention is extant can be observed in the conventional use of ‘in’ and ‘out’ 
columns in both ancient and contemporary accountancy, or at the back of this text, 
in the form of the bibliography. Here, through a formalised set of conventions and 
processes the fields of author surname, title, place of publication and publisher are 
distinguishable from one another partly because it is accepted that they should 
always appear in the same, prescribed order. This strategy of communicating 
meaning partly via the placing of an entry on the page or in relation to other types 
of information is formalised in what tends to be seen as the first spreadsheet 
programme, VisiCalc. This is described by its author, Dan Bricklin, as follows: 
The screen has a command area at the top where the cursor location was displayed, 
as well as the formatting setting for the cell and its formula. The main area has 
rows and columns labelled A, B, C across the top and 1, 2, 3 down the side. The 
cursor highlights a cell which displays the calculated results. There are commands, 
including those to blank a cell, clear the sheet, delete, insert, and move 
rows/columns, edit the contents of a cell, format a cell for text or numbers as 
left/right justified, currency, etc., global settings for all cells for formatting, etc., 
printing, copying of cells with the copies modifying the references to be absolute 
or relative, save and load, locked titles synchronized with the scrolling, and 
multiple windows into the same data (Bricklin, 1999/2017). 
As Bricklin says (supported by Power, 2007), this first spreadsheet programme is 
notably similar in its functions and underlying logic to those commonly used 
today. The electronic spreadsheet differs from a paper form or a table in that it is 
infinitely expandable on either axis and able to receive any kind of data (as long as 
the receiving cell is correctly instructed as to what kind of information it should be 
displaying). As in a word processing document, content can be moved or copied, 
but the spreadsheet has the additional capacity to make and repeat calculations, 
and can sort information, for example by size or into alphabetical order. That said, 
the spreadsheet continues to structure entries through the ancient form of the grid. 
As the media historian Lisa Gitelman demonstrates in her exhumation of the 
history of the blank in printed forms and books – the cheque-book or accounts 
book for example, ‘documents establishing the parameters or the rules for entries 
to be made individually in pencil or ink’ (2014, p.23) – such electronic documents 
strongly echo these printed blanks. Just as the form delimits the text that can be 
added, ‘metadata necessarily direct and delimit (that is, encode) the appearance of 





While Gitelman does not suggest that the blank inevitably demands to be filled, 
Goody posits that:  
so powerful are these elementary forms of what the creators of computer software 
call “spread sheets” that anyone composing a matrix is almost forced to fill all the 
gaps, to leave no “empty box”. The table abhors a vacuum (1987, pp.275-6).  
I wonder whether Goody has taken on board the affordances of a spreadsheet, and 
in particular the ability of the spreadsheet to extend indefinitely.13 Nevertheless, 
the emphasis on boxes and blanks here and in Gitelman in particular is analogous 
to the moment when, in beginning to play with perspective, Klee lays out a grid of 
horizontal and vertical lines. Here, his annotation, ‘1+1+1’ (1968, p.22) indicates that 
for Klee the grid is precisely about the accrual of single units that appear one after 
the other. Accordingly, what is striking about the form of the spreadsheet is the 
laminations that are afforded by this form between each entry and the next, as each 
‘1’ that is, each single entry, stands in its own cell. In the Break Down Inventory, 
other strategies that separate each entry from the others include the capital letter 
at the start of each entry, and the serial number. Indeed, in her investigation of 
deployments of the database as a predictor of specific behaviours labelled risky or 
even insurgent the geographer Louise Armoore (2009) draws briefly upon Landy’s 
Inventory as an enactment of what she calls the ‘pixelation’ of human identity into 
a number of sortable, searchable predictive characteristics. The nature of this 
sorting, specifying feature of the spreadsheet is its reification of sameness and 
difference – the simultaneity with which it pulls together, while holding separate, 
the elements that are entered into its cells. It is this sense that Break Down – and 
the Break Down Inventory – reproduce and parody the use of algorithmic 
predictions of behaviour for marketing purposes. For example, when Stallabrass 
mentions ‘data-mining,’ Landy says that the existence of the Inventory, in 
combination with his lack of belongings, will make him ‘the perfect person to sell 
to’ (Landy, 2001a, p.108). As Armoore comments:  
Because codified data can be used to visualize a person, no matter how absurd or 
tenuous, the artists who experiment with alternative ways to visualize a person do 
                                                     
13 Although in the first prototypes, there was only ‘a matrix of five columns and 20 rows’ (Power, 
2007). In any case, Landy was in no danger of continuing to fill his electronic ‘spread sheet’ ad 





so against the grain, offering new modes of attention that attend also to the 
calculation that is made (2009, p.27).  
In other words, Armoore understands Break Down to be working against the grain 
of this pervading surveillance by working what she calls ‘pixelation’ through via 
active decision making rather than the deferred responsibility commonly enacted 
through the use of algorithms in surveillance. I have discussed the way in which 
entries on the list bring with them the residue of previous contexts, and further to 
this, gain new significance in relation to their neighbours. This relational mediality 
exposes a space in which the imaginative work of the observer is called into play. 
Armoore demonstrates that such generative work between confluences of different 
items on a list of characteristics or factors occurs, too, through the operation of 
predictive algorithms.  
This opening up of conversations between previously unrelated objects, which 
Fuller calls ‘unknown combinatorial potentials’ (2007, p.14), is therefore an 
important strategic capability of the Break Down Inventory. That the entire 
collection of Landy’s belongings might provoke such conjectural sparks of 
significance can be seen too in an account of Break Down in which Tim Cumming 
lists a succession of random objects that he sees while visiting the show: ‘A pair of 
boots, computer parts, electrical wiring, mattress stuffing, drawings, prints, 
photographs, exhibition catalogues, a bread basket, a red, wooden wagon wheel’ 
(2001). Cumming’s listing is in some ways akin to Joyce on the contents of Bloom’s 
dresser in that it works to emphasise the grand scale of Landy’s project, a sort of 
sprouting profusion as object succeeds object to form a chaotic melee. As a side-
effect, the computer parts and electrical wiring inherit some earthiness from the 
pair of boots and the bread basket, whose wholesome solidity is itself softened by 
the close proximity of the mattress stuffing. The informational qualities of 
‘drawings, prints, photographs, exhibition catalogues’ are dampened: the fact that 
they are made of stuff raised up, by their inclusion alongside the boots and the ‘red, 
wooden wagon wheel’.  
While a range of strategies employed in the writing of the Break Down Inventory 
perform the lamination of each entry from the others, therefore, this list also affects 
an accretion. Like the refracting list in Phillips (2012) Landy’s spreadsheet performs 
the modality of ‘1+1+1’ (Klee, 1968, p.22; Day et al, 2014, p.144); a space of 





storage for ideas that reanimate only when purposely and directly interpolated into 












Figure 24: John Landy's sheepskin coat in the process of disassembly by an operative (Landy, 
2008a, p.194). 
6 John Landy’s sheepskin coat 
The central provocation of this chapter is the story of John Landy’s coat. If objects 
in the world act as part of a refracted (which is to say, a fragmented) version of self, 
it is interesting to imagine what Landy does when he transforms everything he 
owns (the miscellany – the tin-openers, souvenirs, junk-mail and official 
correspondence - alongside the more personal mementos) to shreds, granules, 
pellets and dust. In accounts of the work, Michael Landy’s father’s sheepskin coat, 
shredded during Break Down with the rest of Landy’s possessions, becomes the 
receptacle for some heavy, woolly narratives of family, inheritance and loss. In 
telling the story of the coat as frequently as he does, Landy makes it clear that he 
is executing the destruction of a deeply significant personal possession. The story 
unfolds over many tellings (see for example Berning, 2012; Burn, 2004; Cork, 2000; 
Cumming, 2002; Harvie, 2006; Landy, 2002b; Perry, 2013; Stallabrass, 2000; Steiner, 
2008; The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002; Walford, 2001; Wood, 2001): John 
Landy's immigration from Ireland as a teenage boy; his life as a manual worker, a 
digger of tunnels who enjoys his work; his industrial accident at age 37; the life of 
ill-health that follows and the appalling inadequacy of the financial compensation 
that he receives from his employers. His son, Michael Landy, is witness to all of 
this: recipient of the story and at some later point, recipient of the coat.  
This chapter gathers around the story of the sheepskin coat three threads of 
theoretical discourse in a plaiting motion, handling first one concept and then the 
next to bring together a fat thread of discussion. The three sections of this 
discursive plait are firstly assemblage theory as it appears in the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari (1972/2013; 1987/2013), secondly, extended mind theory from Andy 
Clark (2011) and Lambros Malafouris (2013)1 and thirdly, psychoanalytic object 
relations theory; particularly the work of Donald Winnicott (1964; 1971/2005). I 
                                                     
1 Extended mind theory is a theorisation of the extension of cognitive function via material 
objects. As will be discussed, any account of these two theorists must incorporate a number of 
important distinctions, not least in disciplinary terms, since Clark is a philosopher who writes 
about cognition, while Malafouris, while himself drawing upon a number of theoretical bases, 
including psychology and philosophy, is an archaeologist. Although Malafouris uses the term 
‘material engagement theory’, for convenience – and to accentuate relevant connections 
between the two theories and the current discussion – I refer to this entire body of work as 





work these three perspectives one around the other, gathering them into my 
discussion while minding the ways in which they diverge, to enable consideration 
of the relationships between thingly personhood; subjective thinghood: 
subjectivity and materiality as revealed through Break Down. The first section of 
this chapter develops a discussion of the contours of this entwined entity of 
thing/person as it is revealed in accounts of Break Down. In the second section I 
discuss the utility of object relations theory (particularly the work of Donald 
Winnicott) as a supplement to extended mind theory that offers ways to think 
through the possibility of an extended emotional2 life. I also work this through in 
the opposite direction, considering how the insights of extended mind theory 
might assist in elaborating further Winnicott’s concept of the transitional object. 
In the third section, I consider John Landy’s sheepskin coat and its destruction, via 
close reading both of accounts of the coat itself, and an examination of the literary 
trope of the abandoned coat that carries upon it some element of its previous 
wearer. I move, then, to consider ways in which Deleuze and Guattari’s conception 
of multiplicity works into the realm of extended meaning-making and personhood. 
While Winnicott centralises the material qualities of physical things but 
nevertheless positions material objects as recipients or containers of psychic 
projections, Deleuze and Guattari turn this vision inside-out, offering instead a 
dispersed unconscious: a flow that is fully enjoined with the rest of the world. In 
the fifth and final section I enact a re-evaluation of the questions posed in this 
chapter. If human thought and feeling are scattered through or projected into the 
                                                     
2 A note on terminology: in this thesis as a whole I deploy the term ‘affect’ in the Deleuzo-
Guattarian sense – meaning the capacities of an entity to have an effect and to be affected by 
entities beyond itself. To distinguish from the more encompassing Deleuzo-Guattarian 
interpretation of the term, in this chapter I make use of other terms, such as ‘emotion’ and 
‘feeling’, and occasionally to the ‘psyche’. Here I should acknowledge the more common usage 
in which ‘affect’ refers to territory that might in everyday parlance be discussed in terms of 
‘emotion’. Where the term ‘affect’ used in this sense appears in quotations, it has been allowed 
to stand – however, for the sake of disambiguation, I have decided not to use the same term. It 
should be acknowledged that this is an imperfect solution, since ‘affect,’ as used in relation to 
psychic processes, takes into account a subtler and more complex realm of attachments, 
fixations, affiliations, debts, and pleasures than can readily be summoned through other terms. 
Further, since affect (in the sense of psychic process) is concerned with intersecting flows of a 
range of qualities, strengths and speeds, it should itself be seen, in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense, 
an assemblage (and is certainly contained within Deleuze and Guattari’s broader concept of 
affect, as demonstrated for example in Kathleen Stewart’s text Ordinary Affects [2007]). The 
alternatives are, for a variety of reasons, more specific and limited terms; emotion, for example, 
might be seen through this lens as a sensory output that arises from the complex assemblage at 





material world, what thingly values might we need to incorporate into our concept 
of what it is to be a human being?  
6.1 The biographical thing 
What is the life of things, in relation to human thought and emotion? In staging 
this conversation I am stimulated by a broader and more encompassing narrative 
on the material object as a container for psychic processes; personhood; biography, 
in which the material world is perceived as existing beyond the surface of one's 
eyes and epidermis and simultaneously, our stuff - Landy’s stuff - is taken as a 
direct and externally readable representation of elements of his personal history. 
For example, Jen Harvie (2006) suggests that Break Down provides a 'metonymic' 
victory over capital when, despite rigorous processing via the inventory and 
destruction-line, Landy's things overspill the bounds of this self-imposed 
bureaucracy to reveal aspects of his identity. As detailed in the introduction 
(Section 1.2), biographical narratives of Landy and his stuff draw upon a body of 
social scientific discussion regarding human agency and consumer capitalism. As 
represented in the account by Kevin Hetherington of ‘the skilled and creative 
person making a social life for themselves through consumer practices’ (2004, 
p.157), via practices of consumption, people are seen to continue to organise their 
lives in ways that are as ingenious, provisional and productively chaotic. This 
narrative is supported through reference to individuals' endlessly demonstrated 
capacity to find meaning in the materiality of the world that surrounds them and 
particularly in the commodity. Consumers appear as bricoleurs, organising and 
reorganising a quotidian collage of material belongings and practices (see for 
example Miller, 2008; Jenkins, 2007; Julier, 2009).  
Such concepts arise frequently in the existing literature on Break Down, partly 
because Landy himself assimilates sociological accounts of consumption, citing in 
his work – often through inclusion in the collages made in the preparation phases 
of Break Down - texts such as Consumption: As a way of life (Miles, 1998).3 This 
discourse which one might call ‘identity through consumption’ is exemplified for 
example in the interview question in which Landy is asked whether ‘the evidence, 
and the inventory, add up to a true picture of who he is’ (Wood, 2001). Similarly, 
                                                     





writers on design Colin Davies and Monika Parrinder state that while Landy’s Break 
Down Inventory is a list, it is also, and nevertheless, ‘a resonant representation of 
identity’ (Davies and Parrinder, 2003). Even a visitor to the show who clearly does 
not ‘buy’ this discourse nevertheless seems to feel a need to look for Landy in his 
stuff: 
Seeing all his possessions travelling around in front of us seemed to say virtually 
nothing about him, except that he had the same sort of stuff that other people had. 
Some of his things obviously meant more to him than others, and there was a 
suggestion that he was a little peeved by the thoroughness with which operatives 
despatched his family photographs - scribbling on the faces before tearing them 
up. But his possessions did not provide any sort of window into telling me what 
sort of a person Michael Landy is (Walford, 2001). 
In such accounts of Break Down, Landy’s individual material practices can be 
precisely detailed (see Section 1.2.1). However, they provide little discussion of the 
psychic mechanisms through which such work takes place. In contrast, in 
imagining a procedure through which life, feeling, or power might be breathed into 
a fetish object, Malafouris (2013, p.133)4 opens the way to considering what it might 
be not only to think or feel ‘via’ material objects, but to recognise the extent to 
which thought and feeling might occur within the object. His material 
engagement, then, is not meant as analogy, but as the statement of an actual state 
of affairs that cuts fundamentally across narratives of personhood or subjectivity 
as entities or qualities that are singular, or self sufficient, or that originate within 
the innate constitution of the individual.  
That said, the stories that are told by Malafouris reveal the warmth and depth of 
the narratives constructed by human beings via their stuff. Michael Landy seems 
to exemplify such instincts in relation to his father’s sheepskin coat, which he uses 
to tell a story that positions his family in social and class terms, and him in relation 
to his dad. Indeed, the narrative of John Landy’s accident – and the motif of 
material objects as extensions of the person of his dad - run through Michael 
                                                     
4 The term ‘fetish’ is used in Malafouris in the anthropological, rather than the Marxian sense. 
Malafouris makes a comparison between the unknown agency of material objects and the 
mechanisms or practices through which fetishisation occurs – which is to say, through which 
objects gain a human, or person-like status. The implications of such transactions are explored 
more fully later in chapter 6. Through his deployment of this concept Malafouris hopes to gain a 
methodological approach that enables 'a return to the things themselves as socially alive and 
active in a primary sense' (Malafouris, 2013, p.133). In short, it is more 'productive', in Malafouris' 






Landy’s work. After Break Down, this narrative theme emerges in two shows, Semi-  
detached (2004) and Welcome to my world (built with you in mind) (2004).5 
As the art historian Gill Perry suggests, ‘the narrative of the sheepskin coat’ merges 
into that of Semi-detached, which ‘presents the history of a traumatized family 
whose social patterns have been distorted’ (2013, pp.48-50) by the after effects of 
John Landy’s accident. If Scrapheap Services is a satirical mocking of callous 
responses to – and deployments of - redundancy and unemployment by the 
Thatcher government,6 Semi-detached and Welcome to my world are, while 
maintaining that rage, more vulnerable, emotional shows depicting from a son’s 
perspective the native significance and worth of a human being – John Landy – 
who does not earn money.  
 
Figure 25: Image from Shelf Life (Landy, 2004). 
Semi-detached is a comprehensive survey of John Landy’s life and situation (Landy, 
2008a; Landy, 2008b): hence the famous recreation in the Tate Britain’s Duveen 
Gallery of the front and back of 62 Kingswood Road, Landy’s parents’ pebble-
dashed, semi-detached house. This minutely accurate, full-scale model takes in the 
configurations of airbricks, drainpipes, trailing wires, corrosion on the letterbox 
                                                     
5 The two are connected in that Welcome to my world comprises detailed sketches based on the 
photographic images from Landy’s parents’ home, previously used as projections in Semi-
detached. 





and patchings of mortar. It is a portrayal of the house to which John Landy has 
been increasingly confined over the years since his accident.  
As Perry suggests: ‘deprived of the “external” spaces of his working life,’ for John 
Landy, ‘DIY was no longer simply a hobby, but a means of negotiating both his 
masculinity and his domestic confinement’ (2013, p.48). The house is cut in half to 
reveal a smooth, blank intersection, upon which visitors view three projection 
works: Four Walls incorporates images from John Landy’s collection of DIY 
manuals (Landy, 2008, pp.290-5; Steiner, 2008, p.312), hailing the loving work of 
making and maintaining a home, while also putting into question the idealised 
simplicity of the ethic of home improvement, via a series of static, mannered, 
instructional images. The other two series survey objects in situ at 62 Kingswood 
Road. No.62 (2004) shows a grittier, mackled-together reality that incorporates 
images of dust, cobwebs, desiccated insects on windowsills, medication annotated 
for dosage in spidery biro. But Shelf-Life (2004) has a particular kinship to the 
sheepskin coat destroyed in Break Down. As suggested by the title, Semi-detached, 
the ‘detachment’ of Landy’s project to provide a disinterested, systematic audit of 
his dad’s life (Ibid.) is betrayed by works which convey, through the acutely 
attentive treatment of the subject by Landy, a tender attachment to this house, and 
to his dad’s things. The clutter, dust and accumulation detailed here and in 
sketches in the show Welcome to my world might from some overly-hygienic 
perspectives seem prurient and rather attacking of Landy’s dad. However, what 
these images convey is the living detail of the fragility and vulnerability of a person 
and his domestic surroundings.  
Observation: Stills from Shelf Life (2004, in Landy, 2008a, p.304). It is here that Landy 
records his dad’s arrangements of objects – magazine clippings, tools, photographs, 
washers, batteries, cable clips, plugs, pen-knives and tippex, some of which, still in their 
blister packs, hang on the wall on nails. In one poignant still, a detailed close-up of a 
black plastic comb, still holding deposits of grease, flakes, and a fan of trailing white 
hairs. These gatherings of things, by now so infrequently used, are arrayed around the 
shelf. They form a pleasing composition that seems to express John Landy’s careful work 
of making and remaking himself through his surroundings. This assembly of possessions 
and their arrangement in relation to one another seem very clearly to act as an 
organising structure for the man himself, as well as being marked by his presence in other 





medication, even a moth that died and spent years drying undisturbed in the dust: all 
bring an imminent sense of the person, his habits, and the transience of his presence. 
 
Figure 26: Illustration from Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 2001a, p.41) 
If belongings can act 'as companions to our emotional lives or as provocations to 
thought' (Turkle, 2007, p.5), this suggests that ownership is not a straightforward 
matter of the owner's entitlement to dispose of the owned object as she wishes. 
Instead, the connection between person and thing begins to acquire the more 
complex lines and furrows of a relationship. Landy forges a narrative of self and of 
the mundane facets of his relationship with his own things through annotated line 
drawings of soon to be granulated objects in Michael Landy / Break Down. A 
drawing of a cassette tape is accompanied by the comment, ‘the song Old Tige 
would make me cry as a child’; a tube of eye cream: ‘clinique eye saver silver comes 
of ends up that you have glitter eye lids’; a sports holdall: ‘lucky purple bag’; a belt 
buckle: ‘old belt buckle that I’ve been wearing for years Abigail thought it was very 
me’ (Landy 2001a, pp.41-50).7 Likewise, as discussed in Chapter 5 (pages 156-7), 
biographical snippets emerge in the cataloguing work of the Inventory: exemplary 
                                                     
7 Original spellings and punctuation have been preserved. Landy played the cassette of Old Tige 





are items A90 – Gary Hume, Clown, gloss paint on wood, swapped work with the 
artist, 54 x 28cm, 1997; E1064 – Habitat adjustable aluminium bedside lamp with 
40 watt bulb, stolen from Karsten Schubert’s cottage, Snettisham, Norfolk; R4368 
– Teddy bear Christmas card from John and Ethel Landy (Landy, 2001b), all of 
which combine as components of Landy’s life story.  
Cumulatively, then, a gathered and discrete biography does seem to appear 
through the bricolage of Landy's life as it appears in Break Down. This collection of 
objects is more than a randomly aggregated bunch of stuff (Cumming, 2001; see 
also Hawkins, 2014); indeed, in the months before Break Down Landy discusses this 
corpus of material as a self-portrait of sorts (Cork, 2000). It is the fruits of a lifetime 
of consumption; a unified whole that stands in some way as an authentic account 
of the man. It is indicative of the compelling nature of this aspect of the work that 
despite pronounced differences in approach between two of the main published 
academic discussions of Break Down, both Jen Harvie (2006) and Harriet Hawkins 
(2010; 2014) attend closely to the question of objects as biography. As Harvie says, 
'Multiple bottles of HP sauce suggested Landy’s love of the stuff. And a long list of 
single socks perhaps indicated his perennial ill-fortune at the launderette but his 
commitment to making do in the circumstances' (2006, pp.70-71). In her account 
of the work, Hawkins observes that objects 'are given social lives, biographies, by 
human storytellers' (2010, p.30), conjuring not objects with agency, not objects 
entirely separate from human agency, but something else, formed 'unevenly' 
partway between the two. Certainly, it is clear that for many what animates Break 
Down is the sad poetry of abandoned belongings that, we imagine, must form part 
of Landy’s identity, his personhood.  
6.2 John Landy’s sheepskin coat 
Mirroring the notion of an object that is biographical – or that somehow possesses 
human qualities - Harriet Hawkins makes the following intriguing remark on the 
sheepskin coat belonging to Michael Landy’s father, John Landy:  
The biographical moment of the object is a shared one; it exists, it is recounted 
because of the family history that the coat narrates. […] The boundary between 
object and person is increasingly fluid and, on the surface at least, increasingly 







Figure 27: Sketch of John Landy's coat and handwritten retelling of its story (Landy, 2001, p.110). 
This section explores the ways the coat has been made to signify Michael Landy’s 
family life, and to stand in for John Landy himself, in accounts of Break Down. In 
order to discuss further the idea of a coat that is inhabited by its former owner, I 
review appearances of second-hand and abandoned winter coats in three literary 
sources, before returning to an evaluation of the notion of the sheepskin coat as a 
transitional object in the sense proposed by Winnicott.  
It is relevant to begin with a close analysis of a quotation in which Landy recounts 
the story of his father’s coat: 
I think the sheepskin coat was there on the conveyor belt from the first day and it 
just kept travelling round and round.  A few of the things I had more attachment 
to I destroyed last. I also had my record collection playing throughout the two 
weeks and this jollied the whole occasion along. It made us more destructive in a 
productive sense. The last song we played every night was Joy Division’s Love Will 
Tear Us Apart.  
The sheepskin coat was something that my Mum had bought for my dad, but then 
he had a mining accident and couldn't wear it any more, so it was stored away in a 
cupboard. Over those two weeks the coat became my Dad in a way. My Dad is still 
alive, but somehow it became him. It was the last object we destroyed from all the 





for the first time it was quiet, though there were thousands of people in the store 
that last day. All that was left was my Dad's sheepskin coat ... One of the operatives, 
Barry, shredded it and then there was nothing left (2008, p.108; ellipses 
reproduced). 
It is the quiet that surrounds this telling that is compelling, and the plainness of 
the delivery, which seems to convey real loss. This episode forms a focal point; 
indeed, it seems almost the dramatic core of Break Down. The artist resists 
bombast or emotional spectacle in his characteristic unvarnished, direct language 
and (ostensibly) light tone. Notwithstanding, the implications of what Landy is 
saying – that the coat ‘became’ his dad, and was then destroyed – are deeply 
serious. The qualifiers sprinkled throughout (‘I think’; ‘in a way’; ‘somehow’), the 
ironic timbre of the specification of brand in ‘BMW speakers’ and the rote word 
play of ‘destructive in a productive sense’ all work to give an impression of 
detachment, helping Landy to resist a slip into confessional mode. However, the 
appearance of the song title, Love Will Tear Us Apart, cannot but provoke 
questions. Is love tearing Landy apart? Is Landy tearing love apart? In the final two 
sentences of the excerpt cited above Landy’s tone is more direct and grave: the 
rhythmic penultimate sentence and the string of equally-stressed syllables in the 
final phrase ‘and then there was nothing left’ communicate a stark finality.  
Observation: From video of Break Down (Artangel, 2015). There is something 
expressive about the material form of the coat itself: its softness; the way its thickness 
and slight inflexibility allows it to appear still to be inhabited by its wearer; the wrinkles, 
like the skin of an elephant; the way the warmth is trapped in by keeping the wool on 
the inside; those patch-pockets and seams that are not hidden but poke out, showing its 
construction. The form of the thing summons a sense of the weight of a sheepskin coat 
on the shoulders and the way its thickness restricts arm movement. The coat has been 
folded down into a flat, yellow container that rests on the metal rollers of the conveyor 
belt. It lies on its back with its arms folded flat to its sides like a man in a coffin. A 
procession of pallets shoulder their way along from right to left, transposing from the 
horizontal onto a diagonal belt with a regular shuffle. Landy’s dad’s coat moves up the 
diagonal and pockets first, lapels last, disappears into the top left corner of the screen. I 
listen for the noise of the bottom corner of each plastic tray against the black rubber of 
the conveyor but the soft, regular thud that I imagine is obscured by the ambient hum of 
voices and a high whine that might be an alarm or a small revolving motor. Off-camera, 





trundles onto the diagonal it is a pleasure to hear the bright rasp of the broken shards as 
they fall across themselves into the bottom corner, and then out of sight. 
Over the course of Break Down, the sheepskin coat is subjected relentlessly to 
description and depiction in interviews, sketches and photographs. It lies meekly 
in its yellow plastic tray and travels around and around on the conveyor belt. The 
artist gives 'an average of six interviews a day' during Break Down (Landy, 2002b), 
producing in the process a remarkable volume of iterations of the story of the coat, 
most of which cover similar ground. There is, perhaps, a hint of impatience with 
this unrelenting recycling of this narrative, which in the end becomes rather 
sentimentalised, in Landy’s terse account of the coat in a more recent journalistic 
rendering of the story: ‘The last thing to go was my dad's sheepskin coat. People 
clapped, and then it was over’ (Berning, 2012). The story of John Landy’s injury 
appears in most accounts of Break Down, though emphasised differently in 
different accounts: the politicising injustice of the accident and its effect on Landy 
is only fully recognised in an interview published in The Times a few months before 
Break Down (Cork, 2000) – although here, about four months before the show, 
while the story of John Landy's accident is present the coat is not. In The Guardian 
a year after the event the following account appears:  
[John Landy] received compensation, but it was a pitiful recompense for what's 
become a lifetime of chronic ill-health, and there is a clear and powerful 
undercurrent of anger in Landy and his work that is borne of his father's experience 
(Cumming 2002). 
Most sources simply comment that due to its sentimental value the coat was – or 
will be – the last object to be destroyed. Even in the more detailed academic 
analyses of Break Down (Hawkins, 2010; 2014; Harvie, 2006; Perry, 2013) the action 
and implications of shredding the coat in particular are not unpacked in detail. 
However, the more serious connotations of Landy’s reappear at odd moments: 
Landy says explicitly that shredding the coat ‘will feel a bit like disposing of my 
dad’ (Landy, 2008a, p.111) or comments that ‘'I'm going to kill the operative who 
destroys my dad's coat,' (Wood, 2002). Finally, in an account that includes a 
sustained focus on the processes of destruction in Break Down, a visitor to the show 
records the destruction of the coat. In a compelling moment of excess that 
graphically reveals the final, fragmented form of the coat while continuing to 





fluff’ escapes the shredder (Walford, 2001).8 Here, at the end of the show, the coat 
has not only become Landy’s dad, but has in some way performed his demise. 
Indeed, in the BBC4 documentary The Man Who Destroyed Everything (2002), 
Michael Landy reveals that his father suffered a heart attack three months before 
Break Down, and John Landy himself makes, grinningly, the following half-
suppressed comment regarding the destruction of his coat: ‘That put the nail in 
the - that really-’. 
The theorist of fashion Elizabeth Wilson (2003, pp.1-4) meditates on the disquiet 
that surrounds the clothes of the deceased, examining the way that a coat in a 
museum or thrift shop is in some sense occupied by its previous wearer.9 For 
Wilson this shifty feeling is connected with the function of clothes as an extension 
of the body. If clothes are human and corporeal, then so might the clothes of the 
dead be cadaverous. The figure of the garment and specifically the coat that stands 
in for the body of its previous owner or is inhabited by their spirit encompasses the 
benign (a longed-for trace of the lost one) as well as an uncanny dread. Charles 
Dickens (1903) draws on this theme in journalistic writings on his perambulations 
around Monmouth Street. The following excerpt is striking not only for the 
garment’s summoning of its previous owner, but also for the crepuscular vision in 
which it is the coat itself that is ‘deceased’: 
We love to walk among these extensive groves of the illustrious dead, and to 
indulge in the speculations to which they give rise; now fitting a deceased coat, 
then a dead pair of trousers, and anon the mortal remains of a gaudy waistcoat, 
upon some being of our own conjuring up, and endeavouring, from the shape and 
fashion of the garment itself, to bring its former owner before our mind’s eye 
(Ibid.). 
                                                     
8 This account offers an unusual perspective on Break Down in that it provides a reflexive 
discussion of the author’s thoughts and reactions as a member of the audience. Walford also 
records noticing a strong current of offence among viewers, and feeling a strong urge to take or 
replace things from the conveyor belt – even to remove scraps of granulated matter to take as a 
memento.  The resentment of many viewers as recorded in this piece perhaps lends credence to 
Landy's remark that when he descended from the high platform where he stood for much of the 
day to supervise the work of Break Down, he 'felt vulnerable. [Shredding possessions] is not 
something one should be doing in the consumerist mecca of Oxford Street' (Landy, 2002b). 
9 The trope of the haunted garment is also rehearsed in popular fashion writing by Justine 
Picardie (2005, pp.60-5) and in a comic piece by Simon Doonan (2000) in which he employs a 






In a lurid example of this trope, a ghost story entitled The Coat, the narrator is 
stalked by a haunted overcoat in a derelict house while sheltering from the rain:  
And now It was coming into the room – with an indescribable bobbing sort of 
motion, the empty sleeves jerking grotesquely at its sides, the skirts flopping and 
trailing in the dust, was coming slowly towards me; and step by step, with my 
bulging eyes riveted in awful fascination on the Thing, I was recoiling before it […] 
with deadly malevolent purpose, the Thing crept towards me. The empty sleeves 
were rising and shakily reaching out towards my throat. In another moment they 
would touch me and then I knew with the most dreadful certainty that my reason 
would snap (Smith, 1973, p.71) 
The compelling details here are the semi-formed mass and incoherent movement 
– bobbing, jerking, flopping - the emptiness, alongside its unshakeable intent. The 
author calls up that propensity of overcoats to hold a shape and therefore to seem 
somehow-inhabited – a tendency which, one might observe, certainly affects John 
Landy’s sheepskin coat. The coat that holds an imprint of its owner arises, too, in 
an episode in Daphne Du Maurier’s novel Rebecca (1938/2003) in which the 
narrator, newly arrived at her husband’s great house, unwittingly wears the 
raincoat that had belonged to her predecessor, his deceased, first wife, and finds 
her lipstick-marked handkerchief in the pocket: 
I must have been the first person to put on that mackintosh since the handkerchief 
was used. She who had worn the coat then was tall, slim, broader than me about 
the shoulders, for I had found it big and overlong, and the sleeves had come below 
my wrist. Some of the buttons were missing. She had not bothered then to do it 
up. She had thrown it over her shoulders like a cape, or worn it loose, hanging 
open, her hands deep in the pockets (Ibid., pp.132-3). 
Here, one might read a more pragmatic though no less compelling story of 
habitude sunk into the things we handle or wear every day. Rebecca’s mackintosh 
has been marked by her wearing and in particular the detail of the missing buttons 
‘[record] the body that had inhabited the garment’ (Stallybrass, 1998, p.196). In the 
insouciant detail of a coat thrown on like a cape, the ease of hands deep in pockets, 
the ‘pink mark’ of lipstick on a handkerchief, the coat summons for the narrator a 
vivid impression of the dead woman’s physical presence.  
A coat affords a boundary that allows one to walk in the cold or wet without 
becoming cold or wet oneself. It is worn on the back like a shell. A rain coat forms 
a cold, slick outer layer against which raindrops can fall and slide (Belmonte, 2007); 
a heavy winter overcoat, meanwhile, is somewhat permeable, soft and fibrous. It is 





to hold the shape and posture of its wearer makes John Landy’s sheepskin coat in 
Break Down a material memorial to the man (no matter that he is still alive at the 
time of the show). There is history in the bulges and creases, and this is called up 
beautifully by the fact that the marks of previous wear and especially worn-in folds 
in the arms were known by clothes menders of the nineteenth century as 
‘memories’ (Stallybrass, 1998, p.196). In its emptiness, the second-hand coat 
functions as a marker of negative space that refers to the absent body of its original 
owner. It is through this quality that something of the vitality of previous owners 
can be found in their clothes.  
Observation: From video material showing John Landy’s coat being taken apart (The 
Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002). Landy looks down from the sorting platform. 
He wears plastic safety goggles. He holds on to the rail. John Landy’s coat lies in a yellow, 
plastic tray. With no clear space in the work bay, the tray containing the coat is placed 
slantwise on top of a couple of other trays. It looks surprisingly light. With two hands, 
the operative picks up the coat, and you can see him getting a sense of its consistency 
and weight by passing it across with a brisk little movement from hand to hand. Still 
some life there; it lolls like a child being lifted into bed. He begins to feel for the buttons. 
Cut away: two cameras – one, a big television camera. Cut back: the coat is open now, 
and the operative is already at its woolly insides, nipping its seams with a stanley knife. 
Cut away – another camera and a line of spectators. A man in a green cagoule stands 
side-on to the work bay. He keeps glancing at his companion. Cut back: the operative is 
putting pieces of the coat into the shredder. Perhaps fortunately, it’s too high for him to 
place them with any kind of ceremonious purpose; he has to half throw them to get them 
in there at all. Cut to Landy: he’s still standing on the platform. He grasps the rail with 
his hands, and gazes through his safety goggles. The camera is prurient. It loses and then 
regains focus. Hovers. A close up. The corners of his mouth pinch. He searches with his 
eyes. A camera flashes. He turns, head then body. He walks out of shot. 
If ever there was an example to recommend a psychoanalytic account of Break 
Down (symbolically destroys father: check) wouldn’t Landy’s shredding of his dad’s 
sheepskin coat be it? As discussed earlier, the significance of his father and his 
father’s things runs through Landy’s work. That said, the work of Break Down, its 
imposition of bureaucratised and industrialised processes on Landy’s work of 





belts under fluorescent light) works to hold the coat – the event – at a remove from 
Landy himself. In addition, as seen in discussion on dust and the fragment in 
Chapter 3 (Section 3.3), to shred John Landy’s coat is not to destroy it as such but 
merely to transform it into fists of fluff and fibre. What Landy exposes in Break 
Down is that material objects are not inert but dynamic. He reveals the process 
inherent in each object; its life cycle both in cultural and physical terms. We see 
this in his research before the event on the notion of ergonomic ‘life cycle 
assessment’ of commodities, compulsory obsolescence and recycling (Landy, 
2008a, pp.102-3; 109-10). In Break Down he turns objects into narratives – stories of 
their own composition.  
This in turn inflects Landy’s actions when he destroys the sheepskin coat. I propose 
the following narrative. The coat becomes a cipher for – that is, in some way it 
stands in the place of - Landy’s dad. It is a soft, warm, human-shaped thing that is 
metonymic of all the numerous unquantifiably precious things – the kinds of 
belongings that in some way constitute a debt or exact a price from their owner - 
the love letters, photographs and art works that are also shredded during Break 
Down. The coat – and all of Landy’s other belongings – are inventoried. They 
revolve on the conveyor belts, are dismantled and shredded by Landy's operatives 
and finally, sent to landfill. Through Break Down, Michael Landy’s dad’s sheepskin 
coat ceases only to be a coat and becomes a story that twists, opens and resolves. 
The coat becomes a story. In particular, it becomes a way to tell the story of a 
human being who was treated as though he were garbage: who cannot work, who 
is loved by his son. In raising up the story of the sheepskin coat Landy devotes the 
entire work to his dad, stripping back his possessions over the fortnight of the show 
until his dad’s coat is the one thing to remain.  
They buy it on hire purchase. John Landy has an accident that damages his spine, 
and then it is too heavy for him to wear. His son receives the coat - what a burden, 
what a debt - too heavy for him to wear either, and through Break Down, he pulls 






6.3 Object relations and the multiplicity 
In order to extend this analysis more fully into discussion of the structures, 
strategies, flows – in other words, the assemblage that might be referred to as 
emotion or attachment - I read extended mind theory alongside object relations 
theory and especially Donald Winnicott’s contributions on the transitional object. 
Winnicott supplements extended mind theory – and the work of Malafouris in 
particular - in that he explicitly positions material objects in their very materiality 
as the recipients or containers of particular psychic (not only cognitive) objects, 
values or processes. That said Winnicott does not offer an account of the nature of 
matter qua matter. In object relations theory the external achieves significance 
only as an accessory to internal processes; therefore, the physical object is treated 
as a surface for the reception of psychic projections. It is nevertheless useful to 
bring object relations into conversation with Landy’s Break Down because it 
enables discussion of the ways in which material objects and substances work in 
relation to psychic processes. I begin by providing a brief introduction to object 
relations theory. In the context of this chapter, it is also important to position 
object relations theory in relation to the Deleuzian concept of the multiplicity, 
sometimes discussed using the term ‘schizoanalysis’: the two perspectives share a 
defining acceptance of the notion of an unconscious, despite the fundamental 
differences regarding its formation and nature that will be discussed in the final 
section of this chapter.  
The emphasis on distributed qualities of the human psyche as expressed in my 
summary of object relations theory below might seem at first to suggest a direct 
affinity between this and Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage-thinking. In fact, as 
will be seen, Deleuze and Guattari project an extension of psychic process between 
the person and the object as part of a total connection with the currents of life that 
move through, and beyond, the individual, merging person and universe. In 
contrast, in object relations theory we see in operation a notion of the unitary or 
molar human figure that begins and ends with itself. That said, in the concrete 
specificity particularly of Winnicott’s accounts of interactions with objects in play, 
I find object relations theory to be a useful conceptual tool to articulate the nature 






Object relations theory begins with Melanie Klein’s elaboration of psychoanalytic 
theory and in particular her description of the first months of an infant’s life 
(1946/2000). At the very beginning, she suggests, the infant does not perceive any 
boundary between itself and the rest of the world. As the baby begins to learn the 
cause-and-effect in which crying brings sustenance and comfort, she attributes the 
force that causes these necessary things to be delivered directly to her own will. 
Over the first months of life the baby is obliged to recognise her own (at first 
unbearable) separateness and vulnerability. As Winnicott (1964) suggests, it is the 
task of the primary carer (generally described in these texts as the mother) to 
uphold this miscomprehension, gradually managing the infant’s disillusionment 
from her first phantasies of omnipotence as she recognises her mother’s, and her 
own, separate, independent nature and begins to form a new conception of herself 
as a discrete entity that is both physically and psychically bounded. Given the 
immediacy, urgency and wholly engrossing nature for the infant of the most basic 
corporeal experiences and processes of taking-in and pushing-out, in object 
relations the infant psyche is located in the physical body as well as the mind. The 
Kleinian conceptualisation of the part object is an attempt to account for the baby’s 
earliest comprehension of the independent existence of her primary carer, in which 
the body is fragmented – or understood and experienced in terms of discrete parts 
- in order to keep the positive experiences from the negative. This ‘split’ is achieved 
by consuming the good (whole, safe, satiating and comforting) object, for example, 
the breast from which nourishment comes. Meanwhile, the terrifying rage that 
occurs when sustenance is not available or the nurturing parent does not come 
quickly is pushed out, creating a bad (fragmented, unreliable, thwarting, 
dangerous) object. As Klein says: ‘the bad object is not only kept apart from the 
good one but its very existence is denied, as is the whole situation of frustration 
and the bad feelings (pain) to which the frustration gives rise’ (1946/2000, p.134). 
In the Kleinian account, an infant, well supported, can in time move from the 
fragmentation of this early stage, known as the paranoid-schizoid position, toward 
a self that is experienced as integrated and self-contained.  
The account provided in object relations theory is of a psyche that makes use of 
and actively incorporates its psychic and material surroundings. This theory can 
be reframed in terms of a reconceptualisation of the human psyche that, while a 
single or molar entity, is nevertheless multitudinous in its reach or capacities. 





of the material object that fits it for use as an exploratory tool - or to think this 
more precisely in the terms employed in extended mind theory, an extension of the 
psyche. This is not clear-cut, however, since it is also true that in object relations 
theory, material objects and substances do not work for or by themselves but are 
animated through their reception and containment of psychic projections. For 
both Klein and Winnicott, clinical practice incorporates play, including children’s 
arrangement of and talk about things (a map, some string, a spatula, a soft piece of 
blanket). As such, their work incorporates physical, external objects and prioritises 
the material characteristics and capacities of these objects. However, in Klein 
particularly, while external objects are important in infants’ processes of coming-
to-terms with their own position in ontological terms, the internal is not a simple, 
mimetic repeat of what is going on in the world around the child.  
Winnicott goes much further towards suggesting that the material surroundings 
of the baby directly shape her inner life. The ‘transitional’ space described by 
Winnicott is the space of the always-unfinished move between subjective and 
objective; the (ideally) sheltered materiality of apparently omnipotent infancy 
towards separation and the ability to tolerate the concept of an external world that 
exists independently. This move is always partial and unfinished and the notion of 
transition; the importance of what Winnicott calls 'the intermediate area' 
continues – and continues to employ physical things external to the body to stand 
in for values somewhere in between interior and exterior - into adulthood. His well 
known essay Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena (1971/2005, pp.1-34) 
marks the beginning of a split between Winnicott and Klein, who omitted the piece 
from an edited collection specifically because it provides a more diffuse account of 
influences on the psyche (Glover, n.d., Ch.6). Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2013) 
stage a very similar argument with Klein when they assert that while children’s first 
experiences may occur around their families, the ‘amazing’ encounters they have 
do not pertain exclusively to familial relationships. Instead they posit a psyche that 
is not singular in focus, but instead is distributed, enabling the child to relate to 
his surroundings and play ‘let’s pretend’ without these activities always having to 
relate back to the mother and father. The following excerpt from Deleuze and 
Guattari is strikingly reminiscent of Winnicott, in the attention it pays to the 
importance of the material qualities of a child’s immediate environs: 
Let us consider a child at play or a child crawling about exploring the various rooms 





about like a machine, he uses one of his legs as though it were an oar, he goes into 
the kitchen, into the study, he runs toy cars back and forth. It is obvious that his 
parents are present all this time, and that the child would have nothing if it were 
not for them. But that is not the matter at issue. The matter at issue is to find out 
whether everything he touches is experienced as a representative of his parents 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/2013, pp.61-2).   
In considering the differences between the two, it is helpful to contextualise the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian conception of multiplicity in terms of their work against 
psychoanalysis. Here, the work of Klein is deployed as an example of the imposition 
of narratives of family. The clinical practice of psychoanalysis emerges as a set of 
procedures that rely on the domination of the analysand, whose experiences, 
concerns, dreams and fixations are rewritten on and in the analysand him/herself 
(1972/2013, pp.60-1). In contrast, what we are shown in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
‘schizophrenic’ phantasies of wolves, birds or fields of tiny cavities, is that the 
mechanisms of hegemonic power permeate our inner narrative at all levels, not 
least the unconscious. This is where we take in, and/or are taken into the energy 
of the pack; ‘an unconscious that is social, historical, and natural all at once’ (Smith 
and Protevi, 2013). There is no boundary point through which the libido cannot 
progress – instead, it ‘suffuses everything’ (Ibid., p.40). As Brian Holmes (2013) has 
it: ‘[b]y recognizing the schiz of the self, you can start to hear a collective 
assemblage of enunciation, even when the speaking subject is ostensibly an 
individual’. Freud’s failure (and therefore Klein’s) is, Deleuze and Guattari argue, 
the failure to comprehend this fecund multiplicity, substituting a molar account of 
‘the father, the penis, the vagina’ (1987/2013, p.31). Nevertheless, it is conceded, in 
her ‘marvellous discovery of part-objects, that world of explosions, rotations, 
vibrations’ (1972/2013, p.61) Klein brings to the surface something of vital 
importance, even if the discovery does not lead her to effect a fundamental 
reshaping of her understanding of the psyche.  
In assemblage theory what is important is not the nature of the part-object; the 
truncated psychic entity imagined by Klein, but rather the way it works by 
connecting and disconnecting with other entities. For example, rather than 
considering the breast as a self-contained presence, Deleuze and Guattari write 
about the machine of mouth-and-breast, which facilitates the flow of milk. They 
imagine these sites of corporeal conjunctions or processes (schizzes) between or 
within bodies as slicing functions and flows; however, rather than merely severing 





in a sentence, schizzes define and remake the machines into which they cut. In this 
way Deleuze and Guattari establish a way of talking about a lively, heterogeneous 
and internally responsive multiplicity which is ‘rhizomatic’; that is, ‘libidinal, 
unconscious, molecular, intensive’. This stands in opposition to another kind of 
account which is, conversely, ‘arborescent’; that is, sequentially hierarchical; 
‘unifiable, totalizable, organizable’ (1987/2013, p.37).10 In contrast to the productive 
mess proposed in Deleuze and Guattari’s account of multiplicity, the 
psychoanalytic account appears as a defining example of the external imposition 
of an inflexible schema or theory (or tracing) as opposed to the lively, responsive 
dance of counter-description or mutual inscription described by Deleuze and 
Guattari as mapping (1987/2013, pp.11-13). In Chapter 3 (pages 68-71) I allude to the 
multiplicity as an inclusive concept that needs to be understood as working across 
the ambits of the physical, social, and psychic. In phantasies of a number of teeth 
in a mouth, beetles in a swarm; when preoccupied by fragments jostling and 
shifting in a tray, or transported by the sight of dust motes shimmering, swimming 
                                                     
10 The allowances made in the Deleuzo-Guattarian account for decomposition and reconstitution 
as a vital element of the production of desire can also be expressed analogously through an 
account of the ambiguity, conditionality and mess of the mouth-and-breast machine. Thanks to 
Klein, the breast appears frequently in discussions of the part object cited here. However, it is 
called up in the most markedly squeamish tones. There are two exceptions: in a typically warm, 
if idealised account, Winnicott shows the sensual, soft and, especially, time consuming trial and 
error of a baby and mother ‘getting the idea’ of infant feeding (1964, pp.45-9). Secondly, in the 
only rendition to come close to acknowledging mess, Brian Massumi enacts a satisfactorily messy 
replay – lumpy infant regurgitations remain invisibly on ‘the grown-up baby’s chin’ as it exhales 
‘a smell of rot’ (1992, pp.72-7) - which is nevertheless permeated with disgust.  
The detached good and bad breasts in Klein evoke a vision of these truncated entities floating 
ghoulishly in mid-air, or presented on a plate a la Saint Agatha. In Anti-Oedipus the cartoon sink-
plunger/milking machine noise of a vacuum forming is faintly discernible as the ‘organ-machine’ 
breast, ‘a machine that produces milk,’ ‘is plugged into an energy-source-machine’ infant mouth; 
‘a machine coupled to it’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/2013, p.11). The entire procedure appears 
to take place in a vacuum. One imagines the docking of a space-station. For Deleuze and Guattari 
the whole point is that desiring-machines may facilitate squelchy, drippy and above all, 
haphazard proceedings – all of which renders the ‘plugging’, the passive tense, and the indefinite 
article entirely inapt.  
In pursuit of the lively contingencies of the multiplicity, I want to evoke instead as an illustration 
of productive complications that run together: the particular timbre of infant cry that provokes 
a letting-down of milk (it’s not entirely an illusion of early infancy that infants make their own 
milk appear); the satisfying flow; the milk that appears too slowly, provoking frantic rage; the 
gushing flow that appears too quickly and which seems to scare; the functional ‘coupling’ or 
alternatively, the sleepy infant mouth that is never quite wide enough open (never quite hungry 
enough?) and over time makes a wound on the breast; the milk that is fatty; the milk that is 
thinner but more sugary; the milk that conveys chemical pollutants with which the mother has 
come into contact, years past, hitherto stored in the fatty tissue of her breasts, into the tiny body 
of the suckling infant. It’s the very profuse nature of causation – and the mess - that makes the 





and shifting in a shaft of sun, we are connected with the swarm, which is to say, 
with all of nature; with the unconscious. 
On the basis of his work on transitional phenomena it seems likely that Winnicott, 
as much as Deleuze and Guattari, might have said that Klein miscomprehends 
part-objects by imagining them as purely phantasmic and framing the dramas of 
the psyche purely in relation to the Oedipal triangle: ‘the famous Mummy-Daddy-
Me’ (Genosko, 2000, p.54). I have proposed that the Deleuzo-Guattarian account 
of the psyche as multiple and refracted is perhaps not so remote from object 
relations as written by Winnicott, given the account he provides of a distributed 
psyche that incorporates material, external objects. Indeed, in a later critique, 
Guattari describes psychoanalysis, as Genosko says, as a ‘politico-religious 
movement with a vested interest in the collective paranoia which it studies’ (Ibid., 
p.57). Here, Guattari draws upon and generalises from Winnicott’s account of 
transitional phenomena to posit a therapeutic triangulation that includes a critical 
account of the psychiatric institution within which analysis takes place.  
Fadi Abou-Rihan lays out some points of commonality in an introduction to 
schizoanalysis from a psychoanalytic perspective:11 
Much as the Winnicottian found object is hardly inert, the flow described by 
Deleuze and Guattari is far from being a mere traffic in static consumable objects. 
What is at stake here is the production of an entire schema of production, 
distribution and consumption, of needs and demands, of recordings, exchanges 
and circulations – a production of, in sum, a construction that not only crosses the 
boundary between the collective and the individual, the economic and the psychic 
– as ideology, culture, thought or belief – but also a construction that reconfigures 
the materials and components of experience itself, whether psychological or not. 
Here, Deleuze and Guattari’s view of production as the grounding of what it is to 
be human – their version of an arche – is no more abstract or overarching than, 
say, Winnicott’s promotion of playing as natural and universal […] (2015, p.24). 
I agree with the gist of Abou-Rihan’s argument here. Winnicott’s transitional 
phenomena does, like the flows imagined in Deleuze and Guattari’s work on the 
multiplicity, depend on a vision of the psyche as an entity that is simultaneously 
mutable in form, and dependent on the concrete, physical environment. However, 
                                                     
11 Hence, I think, the somewhat defensive tone. It might come as a jarring surprise to readers 
accustomed to the Deleuzo-Guattarian argument that psychoanalysis works through the external 
imposition of Oedipal narratives, to be reassured that the work of Deleuze and Guattari is not 





it is essential to acknowledge that the foundation of the two approaches differs 
entirely. Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of psychoanalysis turns Winnicott’s 
assumptions about the nature of the psyche inside-out. Where Winnicott 
emphasises the importance of material objects as extensions of the self, not quite 
part of, or separate from the subject, in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, a person 
might (perhaps) experience herself as a whole, self-contained individual, but in fact 
is always part of the far bigger ‘whole’; the world at large.  
6.4 Thing human / human thing 
Of the two writers on extended mind theory discussed here, Andy Clark (2011) 
offers an account of the nature of matter that does not extend much beyond 
reference to Gibson’s account of affordances (1979/1986). As this might suggest, he 
employs matter only in as much as the human body and mind itself might employ 
them. Lambros Malafouris goes further towards a consideration of the ontological 
status of matter, suggesting that the power of non-human entities to make changes 
in the world – one might call it a facility for causality - is a matter of process and 
connection, not a fixed attribute that can be located in one place or another (that 
is, to things or humans). As he says, ‘agency and intentionality […] are the 
properties of material engagement’ (2013, p.119). Both Clark and Malafouris offer 
an account of objects outside the human body as integral to human cognitive 
function (and Malafouris significantly extends this by offering an account in which 
matter might be vitally constitutive of human psychic processes and cultural lives). 
The meticulous explorations provided by both authors open up a set of parameters, 
questions, and concerns to guide the encounters that follow.  
The notion of biographical things or transitional objects that exist somewhere 
between the internal and external is an apt example of a material object acting as 
a physical extension of consciousness, not just cognition. To begin to think 
between Winnicottian object relations and my discussion of extended mind 
theory, it is important to consider that neither Clark (2009; 2011) nor Malafouris 
(2013) seek to demonstrate that an extension of emotion or attachment occurs 
between person and object. As I will discuss below, this is certainly not the kind of 
transaction that interests Clark. Where Malafouris’ worked examples come closer, 
even the most expressive, his account of the relationship between the work of the 
mind and hands in relation to the affordances of clay in his 'cognitive ecology of 





encompass the realm of the structures, parameters and relationalities that produce 
emotion. When discussing physical objects that have more longevity than 
pixelated screen images Clark does confront the possibility of losing the material 
accoutrements of one's extended mind – however, this eventuality is considered 
only in terms of the immediate cognitive and practical difficulties that might be 
caused.  
For instance, in a key example of extended mind – a thought experiment 
concerning a notebook used by Otto, a man with memory loss, to remind him of 
the location of the museum – Clark (2011, p.224) acknowledges that the notebook 
could be lost. However, he observes, one might equally lose a memory ‘kept’ in 
one's brain – or indeed, a part of one's brain, to disease or injury - as lose one's 
brain-extension, the notebook. In opposition to those who suggest that emotion 
may also be distributed across or contained by material objects (an approach he 
terms ‘extended conscious mind’), Clark rigorously defends his projection of an 
extended mind theory as applicable to cognition but not consciousness, and 
therefore not emotion. He works systematically through various attempts to assert 
or support a theory of extended conscious mind and concludes that most are not 
supported by the available evidence, and if they were, this evidence would upset 
the one theory that currently works as a logical argument. Therefore, in his 
estimation, 'joy' – indeed all emotion and the entire 'machinery of conscious 
experience is probably all in the head' (2009, p.987).  
Malafouris diverges from Clark in his account of emotion and its potential 
extension into the surrounding material world, remarking that it is only helpful to 
discuss the extension of human cognition via the material world if 'the sensual, 
affective and emotional aspects of human intelligent behaviour' (2013, p.85) are 
also taken into account. In exploring the kinds of psychic connections that might 
be made and held together with the assistance of physical objects Malafouris 
characterises cognition and emotion as absolutely entwined. As he seems to 
suggest in the below excerpt on memory, it is only necessary to consider the 
contours of this cognitive/emotional function to understand how difficult it could 
be truly to bisect the two categories: 
If we are to understand the idiosyncratic abilities of objects, past or present, to 
make us forget or remember, to guide our everyday interaction, to channel and 
signify social experience, and to sustain our embodied routines, we should resist 





allow a truly meaningful sense of how the material world constitutes our existence 
as human beings to emerge (2013, p.87). 
I imagine that Clark would contest this conception of the ‘truly meaningful’ since 
in his account ‘meaningful’ is a value that has to do with the statistical validity and 
significance of empirical evidence. In other words, the two arguments run on the 
basis of entirely different criteria. Where Clark argues on the basis of what can 
currently be demonstrated in cognitive terms and through the operation of logic, 
Malafouris discusses the potential utility of the proposed theoretical approach.  
However, what unites the perspectives of Clark (2009; 2011), Malafouris (2013) and 
Winnicott (1964; 1971/2005) is that it is the externality, and the specific form of 
material objects, that enables them to form part of the human assemblage. To take 
seriously Malafouris' suggestion that 'the material world constitutes our existence 
as human beings' (2013, p.87) it is necessary to imagine that it is the very 
unbiddable nature, the ontological opacity of things, that enables their affordances 
as extensions or receptacles for human thought and feeling. This can be considered 
via Clark’s discussion of the ‘epistemic action’ (2011, p.70; see also Salter, 2015, p.103) 
– the physical action designed to advance one’s knowledge (as opposed to a 
‘pragmatic action’ that achieves an immediate practical goal). Here, we see for 
example that a note written on paper not only holds one’s thoughts, but by making 
them other or apart from us, can enable the extension of further layers of 
complexity. In Malafouris (2013, pp.209), the figure of the potter who, with 
fingertips, senses and works with the subtle densities of a specific ball of clay that 
cannot be known a priori, to make a pot of a particular height or with sides of a 
particular thickness, is another example. This concept can be developed further 
into the territory of the psyche via Winnicott’s close description of a baby’s 
explorations of the affordances of a piece of fabric in the following excerpt from his 
work on transitional phenomena. While thumb-sucking: 
(i) with the other hand the baby takes an external object, say a part of a sheet 
or blanket, into the mouth along with the fingers; or 
(ii) somehow or other the bit of cloth is held and sucked, or not actually 
sucked; the objects used naturally include napkins and (later) 
handkerchiefs […]; or 
(iii) the baby starts from early months to pluck wool and to collect it and to 





(iv) mouthing occurs, accompanied by sounds of ‘mum-mum’, babbling, anal 
noises, the first musical notes, and so on (1971/2005, p.5). 12 
Here, Winnicott conveys a profound respect for the baby’s own discovered 
strategies of exploration and comfort. Since it is an exploratory, as well as a 
comforting action, these explorations most certainly constitute epistemic actions 
as defined by Clark. Processes of understanding, by feeling against the skin, 
qualities such as soft, woolly, inside and outside, damp and dry – are positioned as 
essential to the infant’s work of placing him or herself in the world. The treasured 
soft toy or other object used by some babies and young children during the process 
of psychic separation from their primary carer is called a ‘transitional’ object not 
(only) in reference to a temporal transition, but also to a transition that occurs in 
relational terms, not for some symbolic reason but because the object is made to 
exist between the child’s inner life and the outer life with which she must come to 
terms.  
It can also be seen that the specific affordances or properties of the object are 
therefore essential to its usefulness as a transitional object. In Winnicott, a ball of 
string that can be looped and hooked around the furniture is useful to the boy-
analysand specifically for its capacity to do this (Ibid., pp.22-7). Indeed, multiple 
uses array around each object, user and context so the string might also tie a 
sapling to a supporting post; a ball of string might also be rolled across the ground 
like a ball, or used to make a trail. More relevant in relation to Winnicott, the ball 
of string contracts - or gives rise to - multiple figurative potentialities. In his case 
study on ‘string boy’ we are presented, therefore, with a ball of string which can be 
held in the hands, and a ball of string that can wrap around chair legs in order to 
wrap and bind elements that might otherwise fall apart (1971/2005, pp.20-7).13 
                                                     
12 Here, in the immersive detail with which Winnicott describes the textures and valences of 
encounters with physical things, he demonstrates a special facility for taking on board the 
significance of the immediate physical surroundings of the individual. The psychoanalyst (and 
analysand of Winnicott’s) Margaret Little, recounts a tale in which, during a talk at the British 
Psycho-Analytical Society in wartime London there were ‘bombs dropping every few minutes and 
people ducking as each crash came. In the middle of the discussion someone I later came to know 
as D.W. [Winnicott] stood up and said, "I should like to point out that there is an air raid going 
on," and sat down. No notice was taken, and the meeting went on as before’ (Little, 1985, in 
Glover, n.d.). 
13 See Chapter 5 (pages 130-2) for a discussion of multiplicity in relation to the bobbin and string 





Observation: Sketch of Landy’s father’s coat (Landy, 2001a, p.110; see Figure 27). The 
sheepskin coat seems postured half toward the viewer, its vivacity clear in the arms, 
which seem to stand forward, and especially in the wooliness of its collar and seams. The 
dark of a buttonhole, a slightly gaping pocket, and the ends of the sleeves, shore up a 
sense of heavy warmth. Landy’s handwriting wavers below, itself a dense fabric. 
Something of the life of objects as suggested by Winnicott can be seen in Landy’s 
sketch of his dad’s coat. The power of the transitional object rests on its concrete 
capacities and properties: it ‘must seem to give warmth, or to move, or to have 
texture, or to do something that seems to show it has vitality or life of its own’ 
(Ibid., p.7). The quiddity (that is, the ‘this’-ness) of Landy’s dad’s coat is similar to 
that of the teddy or blanket with its particular smell. In Winnicott’s terms, Landy’s 
dad’s coat is a clearly applicable example of a transitional object: it is a thing that 
holds some important value for Landy, partway between himself and the outside 
world. Compellingly, this is not presented by Landy as an act of imagination. 
Rather, as he says, the coat ‘became’ his dad. This moment of magical thinking is 
reminiscent of Malafouris’ description of the ways in which fetish objects (in the 
anthropological sense: see page 172, footnote 4) are 'generated' through a cognitive 
process through which an intangible value appears to inhere in and animate a 
physical object, so that 'interaction between persons and fetishes resembles 
interaction between persons rather than interaction between persons and things' 
(2013, p.133). Here, it may seem that humans have power over things, and/or things 
have power over humans. Indeed, it is in precisely this sense that such an object 
can be said still to be inhabited by its former owner. It is this space – the same 
space in which a mourner might embrace and bury her face in the fibres of a now-
empty garment – to which Winnicott addresses himself.  
6.5 ‘and then there was nothing left’ 
In considering these articulations of thing and human Michael Landy's 
transformation of his belongings into fragments and dust is brought into 
conversation with the notion from extended mind theory that our cognitive 
functions are woven through, scattered, and refracted across, the material objects 
                                                     
see also Mavor (2007, pp.58-60). As she warns, this case of Winnicott’s, while informative about 





that surround us. The material destruction of Break Down is perhaps especially 
provocative when considered in the light of this account of the mind as an 
assemblage that includes material objects. Where in many accounts Break Down is 
treated as in some sense standing for other conditions, values or circumstances, in 
the context of extended mind theory it is important to reclaim and restate the 
actual state of affairs in which Landy really was reducing all of his belongings to 
granules and shreds.  
This chapter has pursued the narrative in which Landy somehow destroys his dad 
by shredding his coat in Break Down. This final section will explore the idea that 
in granulating all of his possessions the artist is in some sense destroying himself. 
In this moment, Break Down appears as an attempt to rend and test the fabric of 
connections and associations of which Landy himself is composed: to destruction-
test what he is made of. Looking to extended mind theory, what might it mean to 
destroy all of one’s belongings in a context in which objects are not only 
companions to thought and feeling, not only close accomplices but actually 
integral to the assemblage that forms the entirety of the person? What is it for a 
person to lose or break an object that has formed part of – and in actual fact, is part 
of - his cognitive and psychic apparatus and as such, is synonymous with his 
experiences and memories? In this final section of the chapter, conceptions of 
personhood as multiple are brought into conversation with Landy’s endeavours of 
destruction. 
A number of accounts of Break Down speculate on the work as an act of self-
destruction, or a calling-up of the imagery of death and bereavement. In a 
representative example, Burn (2004) interprets the work as ‘a ritual acting out of 
the disintegration that is the only end of every human life’. This appearance of 
material fragmentation as a metaphor for the fragmentation of subjectivity or self 
is echoed in some ways by Landy's comment – on a number of occasions – that the 
process of destroying his belongings was a death of kinds. This reading of the work 
recalls the episode in which Landy's mother attends Break Down, perhaps 
imagining that (as in some of Landy's previous works) the project will involve some 
element of allegory, make-believe or sham. She realises that Landy is indeed in the 
process of destroying his own possessions in their entirety and becomes distressed 
- so Landy asks her to leave. It is striking that Landy so immediately connects this 





I spotted my mum crying and it started to feel as if I was preparing for my own 
funeral. So I had to come down the ladder and throw her out. I wondered whether 
I was the first artist ever to throw his mum out of his own exhibition (Landy, 2002b; 
see also Cumming, 2002; The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002).  
Jen Harvie also picks up on this theme of death and bereavement in her remark 
that Break Down was: 
a sort of hyperbolic clearing away of a life – the kind of thing we do when close 
friends or relatives have died, or when people anticipate their own deaths. […] For 
me and others I spoke to, there was something intimately affecting about watching 
this rite of passage, this clearance of a life, this self-imposed watershed that Landy 
was performing (2006, pp.28-9). 
In a macabre moment, Landy comments that toward the end of the fortnight the 
viewing platform from which Landy supervised the work of destruction 'had 
transformed into my gallows' (Landy, 2002b), and on a number of occasions, that 
the event was like his funeral. In a representative instance he says: 
This is a celebration of a life, but I'm still alive. People come in who I haven't seen 
for years. It's really nice. I'm happy every day. It's like my own funeral, but I'm alive 
to watch it (Wood, 2001; see also Burn, 2004; Corner, 2010).  
There is in Break Down an elegiac strand in which the seemingly pragmatic labour 
of disposal appears as a memento mori – for Landy, for his father, or maybe for 
anybody who uses material objects as containers for all the various ways in which 
we produce and reproduce our internal lives (so all of us, perhaps). This surfaces 
not only in the act of destroying objects but also in the way that Landy’s things on 
the conveyor belt might, Landy hopes, remind visitors of their own things – they 
might 'see objects they recognise, maybe something they’ve just bought, that they 
have in their carrier bags' (Landy, 2001a, p.108; see also Stallabrass, 2000; Landy, 
2008, p.106). Cumming (2001) also equates things destroyed with human beings 
deceased, commenting that Break Down 'encourages the witness to [...] wonder 
how much of what it is to be human is in what we own' and characterising the 
catalogue of objects displayed on the wall as ' lists of war dead'. In a later text he 
compares the missing belongings of Landy's which escaped being destroyed to 
missing limbs (Cumming, 2002). 
This theme in which perishing stuff is metonymic of the perishing human body re-
emerges in relation to Landy’s later work Semi-detached (2004), in which, as 





and effects in ways that seem absolutely bound up with the older man’s mortality. 
As the artist himself has said: 
As Dad was slowly deteriorating so was [the house]. Because the only jobs he was 
kind of left with was jobs around the house. So as he was kind of deteriorating, his 
body was deteriorating and so was the house, so he kind of started to lose interest 
in the house and somehow the house, I kind of thought, became his body, in a way, 
kind of slowly falling apart (Landy, 2008b). 
This extraordinary utterance by Landy feels absolutely connected with the space 
in Break Down that is occupied by the shredding of his father’s sheepskin coat. In 
a similar way, it opens up an array of responses, including the tenderness and 
disgust that can arise from an awareness of the acuteness of another’s corporeal 
vulnerabilities. It is also striking that in recording the minutiae of his father’s 
belongings, Landy makes explicit the connection between body and belongings in 
a way that never quite occurs in his discussion of Break Down. Only one journalistic 
article on the work makes any such suggestion. Here, in an interview nine years 
after Break Down, Landy relates that he was ‘paranoid’ throughout, drinking 
heavily, taking Solpadeine and smoking ‘secret fags’ to relieve his anxiety. In a 
precise reversal14 of his account in Wood (2001) at the time, he says: 
People turned up who I hadn't seen for years. It felt like I was attending my own 
funeral and I became obsessed with the thought that I was witnessing my own 
death, or jinxing myself or my family (Corner, 2010). 
The effect of this ‘destructive and nihilistic’ act was so intense, he comments, that 
he came to a complete standstill, making no art for a full year afterwards. It may 
be, then, that Landy himself experienced the work as an act of negation that 
worked not only on his stuff, but on himself. To think through this conflation of 
the shredding of things and human death I return to the notion from Clark (2009; 
2011) and Malafouris (2013) that extended cognition absorbs things into the human 
machinery. In the above discussions of biographical and transitional objects I 
showed that things’ reception of these refracted human/thing, thing/human values 
imbues things with human qualities (like the things as missing limbs called up 
                                                     
14 Athough in relation to such inconsistencies between Landy’s various accounts of the work, it is 
imperative to return to the image of the prism given to us by Leader (2009), also discussed in the 
methodology (page 49). Accordingly, to discover two contrasting statements by Landy about the 






Cumming’s meditations on the piece) –which is why an abandoned coat might be 










Extended cognition, in its cognitive approach to psychology (especially in the work 
of Andy Clark for whom brain biology and observable outputs of cognitive 
processes are the sole subjects of research) and its demonstration of the ways 
human beings depend on external objects to be able to function cognitively, 
demands that human beings be considered as ‘thingly’ (that is to say, part of or 
arising from the ‘natural’).  
This presents a moment of possibility: a discursive cut into the imposed margins 
that hold in place the categories of human and thing. In declaring that ‘the 
unconscious is totally unaware of persons as such’, Deleuze and Guattari 
(1972/2013, p.61) imagine that the unconscious connects into the gigantic and 
monolithic emanation that they term hylè; the sum of material flows and energies 
that make up the category one might, loosely, describe as ‘all life’. This grand 
presencing is not meant as an occult force, but in its immanence, could be 
experienced as a place in which human identity in the singular surrenders to or is 
transcended by the multiplicity. Perhaps this goes some way toward imagining why 
Landy, hitherto so resistant to spiritual or idealised readings of the work, says a 
year after the show that during Break Down 'something else was going on' 
(Cumming, 2002). This ‘something else’ is also important to Hawkins (2010). She 
suggests that this transcendent quality is conveyed in the 'intimacy' of Landy's 
wobbly sketches of destroyed objects (see Figures 26 and 27), and the story of the 
sheepskin coat. Conversely, she suggests that it also arises in the dehumanisation 
of the operatives, made thingly as they are by Landy’s requirement that they wear 
identical boiler suits and follow Landy's instructions (Hawkins, 2010, pp.27-30). 
Landy’s destructive work, then, objectifies the human subject while effecting a 
subjectification of objects. The ‘sacrifice’ practiced in Break Down makes fluid the 
boundaries between people and things.  
Consider, from the documentary The Man Who Destroyed Everything (2002) the 
image of Landy on a February morning just after the end of Break Down (see Figure 
28). The beginning of the scene in which Landy leaves the flat to get new keys is 
conspicuously hokey. As Landy leaves, his partner, the artist Gillian Wearing, says 
goodbye and picks up the phone as if to make a call, but then fumbles her 
performance and laughs delightedly into the camera. Landy performs his walk 
down the stairs and along the road to the shop, smirking past the camera as if 





Cold, bony, and grinning; still in his boiler-suit and a jacket too thin for the 
weather, he looks frail and insubstantial. At a certain moment, it seems to me that 
the thingness of his things has been subsumed into the boiler-suited body of 
Michael Landy. In becoming thingly, Landy diminishes himself, but 
simultaneously, he inhabits the immanence of the material world. The inescapable 
and monumental nature of matter means that it can stand in for – or perhaps, that 
it is - the ‘something else’ that is beyond human comprehension or reach. 
Meanwhile, the absolute impunity of the physical matter that always outlasts 
subjectivity (the sacks of shards that still sit at 499 Oxford Street as Landy chooses 
new boxer shorts) mimes our perishability. Break Down is a work in which Landy's 
odd socks might carry a trace of their owner, but more significantly, shows us that 
materiality both constitutes and exceeds us.  
Break Down both transmits and intercepts the moment in which the solidity and 
continuity of physical objects stands in for the – putative – solidity of human 
narratives. For this reason, the suddenly quiet falling away that Landy describes, 
and the elegiac quality of those final moments in which Barry the operative feeds 
John Landy's sheepskin coat into the shredder, are, I would suggest, the very centre 
of the piece. The woolly weight of human relationships and the moment in which 
that weight is held in abeyance, firstly through its projection onto a collection of 
objects and then, in a further moment of interruption, through these repeated acts 
of destruction (or transformation – dismantling, sorting, shredding) are the life of 
the work. We are transported, once again, to the enticing shards of plastic, wood, 
wire and metal produced in Landy’s crushers, which are in many ways the true 
product of Break Down. These offerings, the ejected fragments of Landy’s material 













Figure 29: Creeping Buttercup (Landy, 2002a). 
 
7 Conclusion 
After Break Down, Landy does not make art for several months. Then, he produces 
a series of etchings, with the title Nourishment, that depict in hyper-detail the 
sparest of plants that Landy ‘picked from around the estate where I live’ (Cumming, 
2002). An example can be seen in Creeping Buttercup (Landy, 2002a; Figure 29) in 
which Landy catalogues the roots of the plant with the same magnificent delicacy 
and specificity as the wiry stalks, the leaves and the small, hardy, flowers. The 
discussions that follow in this conclusion return to this etching by Landy, and the 
range of pertinent associations that it produces. These associations enable me to 
open out the discussion to consider critique and analysis beyond Break Down. They 
relate to imagery deployed by Deleuze and Guattari (for example: 1987/2013, p.5; 
see also O’Sullivan, 2002, p.84) regarding the root and the rhizome as modalities 
that are distinct, but not isolated, from one another. These modalities will be 
discussed in relation to fluctuations and currents in the field of Cultural Studies 
that have contributed to the iteration of site writing developed in this thesis. 
In tandem with the compelling image of the plant in its entirety, the state of affairs 
identified by Deleuze and Guattari, in which things are ‘always in the middle’ 
(1987/2013, pp.306-7), contains an implication for the writing of this conclusion. 
The constantly mobile, connecting and reconnecting assemblage makes finishing 
tricky: it is difficult to find the ends because there are no ends. Indeed, the longer 
I work with Break Down, the more it seems to have something to do with 
everything. As the anthropologist Kathleen Stewart remarks in relation to her text 
Ordinary Affects, this inquiry:  
doesn’t mean to come to a finish. It wants to spread out into too many possible 
scenes with too many real links between them. It leaves me – my experiment – 
with a sense of force and texture and the sure knowledge that every scene I can spy 
has tendrils stretching into things that I can barely, or not quite, imagine (Stewart, 
2007, p.128). 
I identify this discovery of the perpetual expansions, contractions, and shiftings of 
knowledge with my deployment of the notion of an art work as ‘an assemblage […] 
and therefore unattributable’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/2013, p.2). Metaphors of 
inside and outside; before and after; (buried) roots and their (visible) sproutings - 
are logically superfluous in the context of the assemblage theory that frames this 





need for a text to finish), such concepts provide helpful vocabularies and points of 
departure for thinking beyond the immediate focus of this project into the broader 
communicabilities of its methodology and theoretical composition in the fields of 
Cultural Studies and art criticism. 
To make use some of these useful, if inapt, constructions, then: this concluding 
chapter incorporates, in Section 7.1, a look back into the preceding discussions in 
order to offer some final remarks on the entwined forces or energies of materiality 
and mediality, specifically in relation to Break Down. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 might be 
seen, in Stewart’s term, as ‘tendrils’ that project outwards to consider the broader 
implications of this project in relation to two areas: respectively, the strategy, or 
method, of site writing and its significance in the field of Cultural Studies, and the 
broader implications of the theoretical work of the previous chapters, in which the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari is developed in response to Break Down (and vice-
versa: in which my response to Break Down is thought and worked in relation to 
Deleuze and Guattari) in relation to art criticism more generally. The final part of 
this chapter takes the form of an afterword on what escapes. Here, I perform an 
exploration of some connections that ticker-tape through the back of my mind as 
I write, which do not form part of the main logic of my argument, and yet have 
been formative in the processes of engagement with Break Down described here. 
7.1 Matter as medial, and material text 
Beyond (though always arising from) Break Down, a single, defining, inquiry, into 
relationships between materiality and mediality, runs through this thesis. This 
section will review how this conversation has unfolded specifically in relation to 
Break Down. 
It is this that shapes Chapter 3: Fragment / Part / Whole, on fragmentation, 
multiplicity, and the mediality of fragments, which carry upon themselves the 
narrative of how they came to their present form. It also underpins analysis, in 
Chapters 4: Manual and 5: Line / List / Inventory, of the interplay between textuality 
and materiality in Break Down as it arises in the procedural guidelines written for 
Landy’s operatives (Landy, 2001a) and in his Break Down Inventory (Landy, 2001b). 
Finally, it is this that propels the investigation, in Chapter 6: John Landy’s Sheepskin 
Coat, of entwinements between personhood and thinghood. These elements of the 





material form of objects and their interplay with – indeed, their constitutive role 
in - human processes of thought.  
This study also puts forth an explication of the treatment of materiality in previous 
publications on Break Down. In Chapters 3: Fragment / Part / Whole and 6: John 
Landy’s Sheepskin Coat, accounts of Break Down in which the work is framed 
primarily via concepts of consumerism or (Landy’s) subjectivity are elaborated 
through critical complexifications of materiality, and cross-connectivities between 
categories of subjectivity and matter. In existing literatures on Break Down, the 
objects processed by Landy, whether complete, dismantled or granulated, appear 
to be discrete in themselves; possessing some kind of innate stability or 
completeness. This inquiry extends from these beginnings the proposal that 
Landy’s belongings at whatever stage in the process of dismantling and shredding 
(and like all material objects) are characterised by change, process, and 
transformation. As such, a conception of materiality is developed that builds upon 
and theoretically repopulates accounts of Break Down by engaging firstly questions 
regarding the materiality, composition and capacities (in material and 
philosophical terms) of the objects under discussion, and secondly, the 
mechanisms through which material objects become important for the formation 
of identity. I argue that a material object cannot be comprehended if it is not 
understood in terms of process; ergo, in order to think about fragments it is 
necessary to consider fragmentation. In Chapter 3: Fragment / Part / Whole, Break 
Down is revealed anew through the material form of the fragments produced, 
through an account of Landy’s work as processual and dynamic. The fragment 
itself, which bears the marks of its coming into its present form, must, I suggest, 
be seen as an epitomal expression of matter as inherently narrative. It is, then, the 
granules produced in Break Down that provoke the pivotal proposal that matter 
possesses the capacity for mediality. 
This discussion of Landy’s processes of dismantling and granulating objects opens 
up a further exploration regarding questions of material form and the concept of 
affect (in the Deleuzian sense: that is, the extent to which an entity can be altered, 
and effect change beyond itself). In Break Down Landy does not destroy, but rather 
transforms his belongings. Does Landy’s entire collection of belongings differ in 
any meaningful way from individual items extracted from that collection? In what 





unscrewed and lying together in a heap of components, wire and metal plates? 
Does a pile of Landy’s granulated stuff differ especially from his stuff before 
dismantling and shredding? As observed in Chapter 3 (page 75), molecules have no 
discernible preference for being part of one or the other (unless, I suppose, a 
physical force such as magnetism is involved – in which case ‘preference’ is 
expressed through their material properties). Moreover, the granules produced by 
Landy possess, as Jane Bennett (2010) would say, a ‘vibrant’ energy that emerges 
precisely from their thing-ness - and that prevails even as objects are taken apart 
and shredded. To get at form and how it matters, it is necessary to make enquiries 
regarding the nature of the assemblage in which this pile of fragments is part. The 
question at issue, I have said, is affect; therefore, the significance of form does not 
inhere in the object alone. Indeed, in the context of assemblage theory, to speak of 
the ‘object alone’ is nonsensical. Affect can work at the basest, most physical level 
- remember, for example, the tray of fragments (Figure 10) in which, when gently 
shaken, the largest particles rise to the top of the pile (see Chapter 3, page 72). It 
can also be seen in the affordance theory of James Gibson (1979/1986) in which the 
qualities of objects (at the basest level; their shape, bulk and density, for example) 
interact with the visual fields and physical capabilities of the animals that interact 
with them to produce possibilities for interaction or use. Examples might include 
a slot that affords posting, a blade that affords cutting, or a log at just knee-height 
that affords sitting.  
Things also possess affect in the realm of personhood, or identity. In the narrative 
that arises again and again in the existing literature on Break Down, Landy’s 
belongings are seen, in some unspecified way, to supplement or express his identity 
or biography. This thesis re-opens and complexifies that narrative in order to 
consider precisely the nature of this relationship. Chapter 6: John Landy’s 
Sheepskin Coat works between extended mind theory (Clark, 2009; 2011; 
Malafouris, 2013), Winnicottian object relations theory and a Deleuzo-Guattarian 
account of the multiplicity in order to achieve an account of personhood and its 
relationships with materiality that draws upon the implications of the notion of 
affect as discussed previously. Since affect does not inhere in an entity, but rather, 
arises from its relationality within an assemblage, I argue in Chapter 6 that neither 
individual identity, nor the material objects that might be said to have some kind 





the workings or doings of every entity under discussion must be considered in 
relation to the rest of the assemblage.  
Form and affect become significant in specific ways when considered in relation to 
the role of material objects in the constitution of subjectivity. In his account of the 
capacity of things to perform a role that is both ‘me’ and ‘not-me’, Donald 
Winnicott (1971/2005) specifies that the material form of the object concerned is 
of direct importance to the processes he describes. Here, human subjectivity 
resides not only in ‘the biomachinery contained within the ancient skinbag’ (Clark, 
2011, p.76). Rather, in a further appearance of the theme of fragmentation, it 
appears to be broken apart and refracted, scattered and seeded through the 
material objects that surround us. If in their account of the extended mind both 
Clark and Malafouris make a case for thought as a distributed entity, Winnicott 
supplements these in his work on material ‘transitional objects’ as the recipients of 
specifically psychic processes. Thought, emotion and identity depend upon and are 
indeed utterly wound up in material objects that are exterior to the person. In 
extended mind theory, by contrast, the quality of thingness is invited right inside 
– is, indeed, essential to - the experience of embodied personhood. Meanwhile, 
mind is scattered into and through matter. Drawing these accounts together has 
enabled me to confront anew the implications of Deleuze and Guattari’s account 
of the figure of the human being – including what we might experience as our most 
interior perceptions and experiences - as entirely continuous with the universe in 
its entirely (1972/2013, p.15). In contemplating Landy’s comment that Break Down 
felt like enacting his own funeral (see for example Burn, 2004; Corner, 2010; Wood, 
2001) I have suggested that the act of shredding material objects that have housed 
or embodied elements of his thought, identity and psyche has grave implications. 
In footage of Landy just after Break Down (The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 
2002) the artist seems to have taken upon himself the quality of the thingly; he 
wears prominently upon himself the fragility of being a person, living in a body.  
Turning now to the field of material text, Chapters 4: Manual, and 5: Inventory / 
List / Conveyor Belt evaluate Break Down as a work that operates between matter 
and text through an examination of two specific examples of deployments of text 
in relation to Break Down. These are firstly, the set of instructions devised for use 
by Landy’s assistants and later published in Michael Landy / Break Down (Landy, 





list of Landy’s belongings. This pair of chapter-long investigations consider the 
material form of both texts, and the relationship between the texts and the material 
objects and practices that are implicated in Break Down. 
In investigating Landy’s written protocols for Break Down, the instruction manual 
is anatomised as a textual form that provides a schema for a series of prescribed 
actions or procedures without being required to explain its logic to the reader. Its 
overwriting of the critical and sensory faculties, can, I have proposed, be seen as a 
performance of the abstraction of labour power, in broadly Marxian terms 
(1867/1976, p.270), and in light of Kittler’s account of writing as a specifically bodily 
discipline (1985/1990, p.33). In effect, I argue, the manual reads its reader, the 
instruction-follower, as an enormous pair of hands. Further, and with reference to 
the practice, in Fluxus, of using event scores, I suggest, the manual enables us to 
explore the limits of intentionality. It is the omissions and gaps in Landy’s 
instructions that via as Dezeuze says of Fluxus, ‘chance and choice’ (2002, p.82), 
open up some of the most fertile spaces of potentiality in Break Down. 
The inventory employed by Landy works, I argue, both to enumerate the objects 
destroyed during Break Down and to underpin the sheer scale of the endeavour. 
Here, the list - as a literary and textual form – is surveyed. The mediality of Landy’s 
Inventory is explored through analysis of both the material form of the published 
text, and the desktop spreadsheet programme that was used to collect the entries. 
The Inventory constitutes a line-like construction of items that appear in series. 
Similarly, the conveyor belt is a list-like thing, that, in presenting one item after 
another in succession, mirrors both the instruction manual and the inventory. As 
such, the motif of the conveyor belt, the form of which dominates the material 
configuration of Break Down in situ at 499 Oxford Street, is deployed as the 
starting point for an investigation of the operation of line and series as they appear 
in Landy’s plans and representations of the work. The logic of the inventory is 
therefore in some sense constitutive of the material form and processes of Break 
Down, since, as Day et al observe, the work relies upon the modality of a line or 
series of entries that call up the form of the conveyor belt. Here, one item follows 







7.2 Site writing and cultural studies 
This section evaluates the deployment and adaptation in this thesis of the art 
writing strategy originated by Jane Rendell (2005; 2010), site writing, and takes a 
sounding of the significance of this work beyond its direct relationship with Break 
Down as the work under consideration here. The distinctive adaptation of this 
strategy in this thesis both arises from, and represents a contribution to, the 
broader field of cultural studies. As Simon During explains in his introduction to 
the definitive collection The Cultural Studies Reader: ‘when it first appeared in 
Great Britain in the 1950s [cultural studies] studied culture in relation to individual 
lives’ (1993, p.1), including a concern for the ordinary details and practices from 
which ‘individual lives’ are constituted. The development of art writing that has 
emerged through this thesis certainly owes a debt to this first iteration of the 
discipline in the sense that it has centred upon the ‘textualizing and historicizing 
[of] everyday life’ (Ibid., p.25).1  
It is necessary to specify, however, that this thesis as a whole, and my extension of 
site writing in particular, contribute not so much to this first wave of cultural 
studies, described by O’Sullivan as ‘a fundamentally hermeneutic project’ (2002, 
p.83), but more specifically to a more recent, more broadly ‘heuristic’ cultural 
studies (Ibid.). In exploring the capacities of the newer project to which the current 
thesis contributes and pertains, O’Sullivan works with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of the rhizome, the mobile gathering and regathering of joining points 
or moments in which energies meet and combine or work upon one another; 
disconnect; reform (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/2013, pp.5-7). He deploys this 
concept from A Thousand Plateaus in order to explain the sense in which ‘as soon 
as cultural studies becomes fixed, (becomes a discipline) then the real work of 
cultural studies will be going on elsewhere’ (O’Sullivan, 2002, p.88). However, this 
is not a new insight; something not dissimilar is already in play almost a decade 
earlier when During defines in his opening remarks that ‘cultural studies is not an 
academic discipline quite like others,’ since ‘[i]t possesses neither a well-defined 
methodology nor clearly demarcated fields for investigation’ (1993, p.1). He opens, 
and leaves open, the question of whether cultural studies contributes ‘its own 
orientation’ in relation to existing fields of social ‘analysis’ (Ibid.). In effect, then, 
                                                     





During, like O’Sullivan, leaves open the question of its existence as a discipline at 
all. Cultural studies is a discipline, and a plurality. It is prompted to disaggregate 
by its own aggregation, to disestablish itself by its own establishment, so that the 
particularities of its boundaries and concerns never quite resolve into clear or 
singular focus.  
Observation: Plant (March 2018). First, I loosen the soil around it, exploring with my 
fingers, scraping, revealing. I try not to pull until the end, when I find that the tap-root 
has pushed itself intransigently into and through an especially dense clod of soil, which I 
can’t shift with my fingers (and a spade would break the root in any case). It tautens, 
then finally relents with a little snap. I bring it inside, wash my hands and find myself 
cleaning the mud from the root as well, careful not to damage it, with a movement of 
the fingers – a gentle rub – somewhere between washing hair and washing salad. I lay 
the root tenderly down on a sheet of white paper. It is difficult to see this plant as a 
single, entire, thing. Its up and its down communicate in such different ways. The leaves, 
the size of finger- and thumb nails, reach up to collect sunlight; stalks channel energy 
back down underground. The roots search and spread. I put aside an impulse to try to 
sum the thing up, compelled, instead, to catalogue it. The smell: peering closely at the 
plant, I smell the loamy sweetness of soil, and the brighter sweetness of the plant itself 
– a smell that I can only describe as ‘green’. The leaves: heart-shaped, with a scalloped 
edge. Their veins seal the edges of puffy subdivisions, like quilting, and observed against 
the light, glow an acerbic, lime-green. Rubbed gently between a finger and thumb, they 
feel so soft that I inspect the leaves closely, convinced that I will find minute hairs – but 
find none. The leaves of this plant bear five nibbled holes altogether, and some ragged 
edges too. The stalks: those that carry the leaves are like little unclosed tubes – like tiny, 
green, gutters. They join, with a slight bulge, into thicker, more fibrous stalks, purple, the 
colour of bruises. Stalks become blanched white where they enter the ground. They take 
on a translucent, succulent look. The roots: the centre of the plant is a knot (a corm?) 
that gives out the roots; the stalks. This is where the plant gathers itself together; where 
it begins (or ends). The palette here beneath the soil is quite different – a yellow-white-
brown. To me, an above-ground creature, the first metaphors that occur are deathly. 
Roots: the colour of milky eyes staring into soil; the colour of maggots. But as I observe I 
find myself transported by the liveliness and obduracy of roots. The profuse complexities 
of this beard that extends itself into the earth. Tendrils rest luxuriously under and across 





roots that push further and further out from the knotted centre of the plant. At this point, 
I have been observing the plant for an hour, bending in close to catch the finest detail. In 
the end, it is the audacity of sending these most delicate, vulnerable parts out to explore 
what the plant does not yet know that most astonishes me. 
These two differently constituted accounts, in During (1993) and O’Sullivan (2002) 
of the discipline of cultural studies as a mass that writhes itself apart while 
simultaneously returning to itself summons the chaos of the root structures 
recorded by Landy in his etching Creeping Buttercup (2002; Figure 29). As 
O’Sullivan suggests in his revisiting of Deleuze and Guattari’s working of the 
rhizome against the arboreal, or root structure, for Deleuze and Guattari, the root 
signifies not mobility but stratification. As they suggest, the arboreal structure 
might be exemplified by ‘grammatical trees’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/2013, p.4) 
that diagrammatically construct knowledge in a linear, hierarchical fashion in 
which relationships between the constituent entities described are fixed. What is 
required within the current analysis, however, is not an oppositional account of 
linear fixities of root structure versus mobile dynamisms of the rhizome. As 
O’Sullivan remarks, following Deleuze and Guattari’s lead, it is worthwhile to 
retain arboreal structures so as to be able to make strategic use of them. In any 
case: 
[I]t is the nature of the rhizome to be broken, it is the nature of the root to produce 
rhizomes. For in reality these two are entwined; the rhizome in the root and the 
root in the rhizome. Cultural studies, within the academy, may be ossified, may be 
frozen, but that does not mean that we have to go elsewhere. Rather, we switch 
registers (O’Sullivan, 2002, p.89). 
In a similar way, cultural studies retains (and in institutional terms, needs to 
retain) its disciplinarity while remaining, through its complexities and mobilities, 
a multiple entity. It ‘has an object of study,’ and, ‘in common with other disciplines, 
[it] operates to fix knowledges’ (Ibid., pp.81-2). Simultaneously, it provides a space 
of productive volatility. It is therefore more apt to speak of this protean, 
relationally defined, and dynamic cultural studies as a strategic or procedural force 
than to attempt to describe what it is per se, since its affects (in the form of its 
topics and methods of study, theoretical concerns and so forth) cannot operate, or 






Since I write here about a methodological approach, site writing, I use the current 
section of this conclusion chapter to consider strategy in the vulgar sense of ‘things 
that are done’ in the production of knowledge. Nevertheless, it should be 
acknowledged that within the heuristic of cultural studies this term, strategy, 
should be taken to apply equally to theory and methodology. In view of the 
relationality that produces specificities in the Deleuzian account (Thacker, 2010; 
see also Deleuze, 1968/2004; Widder, 2009), theory – or method - does not hover 
above and describe or act upon the subject unilaterally, but is fully implicated in 
it. My development of site writing explores the relationship of this thesis to Break 
Down, a work that has no continuing material existence (as a work – its remains 
do, of course, continue in the world, in some form). Concurrently, site writing here 
arises from and responds to the condition of writing in cultural studies more 
broadly - by mapping relationalities between the critical analysis undertaken in 
this thesis, and the subject of the thesis.  
The above specification of a cultural studies that is both rhizomatic and root-like 
is necessary to introduce the implications for cultural studies of the development 
of site writing in this thesis. Before moving on, though, it should be said that 
relational and (broadly) practice-oriented approaches to methodology are in no 
way specific to cultural studies. As the scholar and yoga practitioner Antonia Pont 
suggests, ‘practising can be understood as (constituting) a context in which ideas 
about intention, activity, action, desire and “discipline” are tested, unsettled and 
clarified’ (2017, p.16). Such work has arisen right ‘across and between disciplines in 
the social sciences, the humanities and the natural sciences’ (Lurie and Wakeford, 
2012, p.4). In this space, I will not chronicle the development and proliferation of 
such approaches more broadly, nor attempt to map their many instances in full, 
but provide select examples from texts already cited in this thesis. I look first to 
Harriet Hawkins, who, in the text For Creative Geographies, focuses on ‘the nature 
of geography-art relations […], and what could be identified as their core analytics’ 
(2014, p.2). It is not the themes that arise in works of art that are useful in this 
reframing, but the close examination of the fibre of encounters between geography 
and art. Sophie Day, Celia Lury and Nina Wakeford, writing about the 
methodological implications of ‘numbering practices’ in social and cultural 
research, discuss ‘the ways in which numbers both involve participation and 
themselves participate in the composition of forms of social life, that is, how 





accounts of specific practices or actions, Howard Potter (2006; see pages 92-3 of 
this thesis) frames his anthropological encounter with, and questions about, the 
mud that is omnipresent at the former concentration camp, Sachsenhausen, 
through the devising and making an object of memorialisation and/or 
objectification. He gathers mud from different parts of the site, dries it (in his oven 
at home) and places it in labelled vials, in a presentation box. The artist Chris Salter 
involves himself in a wide array of experimental and speculative activities in which 
art encounters natural science. These include his participation in the precarious 
and highly precise manual procedures involved in growing a tissue culture (2015, 
pp.141-50; see page 125 of this thesis) and elsewhere in the same text, his enquiry 
via the recording of the sonic atmosphere in and around the glacier at Jungfraujoch 
(Ibid., pp.74-80). As Lurie and Wakeford remark in their introduction to the edited 
collection Inventive Methods, such strategies are valuable in enabling a rethinking 
of ‘the empirical investigation of the here and now, the contemporary [because] 
they require their user to reflect critically upon the value, status and significance 
of knowledge today’ (2012, p.3).2 In particular, ‘inventive methods’ oblige their 
users to reflect upon, by participating in, the constitution (in direct rather than 
metaphoric terms) of their subject as it territorialises and deterritorialises; is 
configured; de-configured; reconfigured.  
In relation to the current project, an important element of Lurie and Wakeford’s 
intervention is their suggestion that it is fruitful to investigate the moments in 
which distinctions between the subject of one’s investigation, the method used, 
and the method-user, collapse in on one another. This rethinking of distinctions 
between object (the written), subject (the writer), and method (the writing) brings 
a new focus, on the workings and relationships between these positions and 
functions, which has framed and defined the development of site writing in this 
thesis. As in Rendell (2005; 2010), my site writing identifies and places the practice 
of writing itself in relation to the text/s under observation. Indeed, ‘site’ in 
Rendell’s site writing refers not only to the object of observation, but also to its 
writer, and writing. Like the note-writing that, as Andy Clark (2011) proposes, is 
not only a record, but a component of that thought, a key point of consistency 
between the passages of site writing that appear in this text is the way they reveal, 
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at irregular intervals, its authoring. More than that: site writing places me (and 
hopefully, imaginatively in my shoes, the reader) within encounters that have 
become part of this inquiry, firstly through the practice of having and writing the 
encounter, and then through their inclusion in the text. 
Further to this, site writing is a space of productive failure.3 Site writing was, at the 
start of this project, an attempt to bring myself as the watcher and writer as close 
as possible to the art work. As such, at the simplest level, this strategy graphically 
reveals and enacts a central ‘bind’ or dilemma of this inquiry, which is that ‘the art 
work’ no longer exists. I have therefore been obliged to look to materials and 
processes that arise from or are in some way provoked by the art work. This has 
both enriched the foregoing discussions, and I would suggest, bound it more 
closely with an impulse toward the pursuit of what Jane Bennett (2010) might call 
the ‘vibrant’ life of matter. As such, it also contains moments of slippage. First, I 
have expressed hesitation regarding Bennett’s construction, ‘vibrant matter,’ not 
wishing to imbue matter with a self-sufficient ‘life’. Instead, I suggest, any ‘life’ at 
all, whether human or otherwise, whether relating to an especially highly activated 
(human) perception of the potentialities that array themselves around a particular 
object, or the activation (independently of human intervention or not) of these 
potentialities, or in relation to such perceptions and activations in themselves - is 
produced relationally (see Chapter 3, page 52).  
In a second slippery moment, I became increasingly aware that to claim that site 
writing might, in any uncomplicated way, bring the materiality of the work into 
the text would be to discount the nature of observation and writing (even though 
it was specifically this that inspired me to begin to use site writing). Does a certain 
hermeneutic threaten to arise from my use of this methodology? This would 
certainly be true if site writings were written to ‘relay’ to the reader a ‘real’ 
experience that is taken to lie at their inception. And yet, to think of site writing in 
terms of is to reconsider. The passages of site writing presented here form part of 
the encounters that I experienced while writing them: part of the brain-flesh-lead-
paper apparatus that enabled me to have these encounters at all. Site writing is, 
therefore, not only a representation, but a direct record (both integral to and 
                                                     






formative of) those encounters – the intensities and affects that fall into and across 
me as I write, embodied in the site-written passages that have been reproduced in 
this thesis. 
Finally, and as I discovered in the writing, above, of a weed from my back yard, it 
is unlikely that the full complexity of the tangle of roots site written above could 
be adequately described in words, since to focus on a single root only obscures the 
importance of the others, and the in-ter-determinacy of the plant as a whole. The 
roots drawn by Landy – and those site-written in the passage above – possess their 
linearity and stratification. Indeed, they are intensely organised; each element of 
the root structure doing its thing; performing its function in relation to the plant 
as a whole. Simultaneously, roots present a delirious, jumbling profusion that is 
impossible to unpick with the eye, drawing the viewer in and in. Landy’s etching 
might, then, be seen as an experiment in the capturing of complexity; part of the 
miracle of the work being its completion, since, when writing, one feels one might 
never reach the end of the densities and intricacies of roots.  
In relation specifically to the development of site writing in this thesis, and its 
relationship to cultural studies, it is apposite to observe that this dilemma between 
the close observation of specificity, and the working of an assemblage, is present 
in some way in each of the site written passages in this thesis. Site writing holds 
the writer somewhere between an encompassing view of an entire working, and 
the particularity of what can be observed, and how closely. Any scene that can be 
site written might be anatomised, and in relation to an array of currents of 
attention or concern. This can be productive. Consider, for example, the analysis 
in Mol (2002), in which a single clinical diagnosis, artherosclerosis, is shown to fan 
out into a seemingly unending range of expressions (patients’ descriptions of the 
pain they experience; their relatives’ accounts of the same; medical professionals’ 
readings of scans; re-imaginings of the disease in relation to its possible 
treatments). Break Down is plural, and this plurality is embedded in the structure 
of the foregoing text. In each of the four main chapters of this thesis, I pick up a 
thread – an artefact, whether material or philosophical – that arises from Break 
Down and develop a discussion in relation to its associations. But it is essential to 
preserve a concept of the work (or the plant) as a ‘working’ (‘planting’) that cannot 
be accounted for through an understanding of its components alone. If, as Lury 





engagement with the constitution of knowledge, site writing in this thesis has 
enabled – required – me to negotiate this important moment of tension between 
the system and the specificities of its parts. 
As discussed in the Methodology (Section 2.4) Rendell’s site writing springs from 
art writing (see Bal, 2001) and is informed by psychoanalytic theory rather than the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian assemblage theory through which I animate it in this thesis. 
Rendell’s sense is that site writing operates in a similar way to free association in 
psychoanalytic practice, acting in relation to the deep, immediate responses of the 
analysand/art writer, so that writing becomes a way to contact one’s unconscious. 
Here, it is salient to return to Deleuze and Guattari and their centralisation of ‘the 
polyvocal connections of truly free free-association’ (Holland, 1999, p.45; see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3). In thinking the work of site writing through a Deleuzo-
Guattarian account of multiplicity, the ‘me’ persona that I perform through site 
writing resembles less an isolated, interior thing, and more a sea that extends 
beyond the beach on which I currently stand to other shores that I could hardly 
begin to imagine. As Guattari announces: ‘the ego is the whole wide world: I am all 
that! No more than to the cosmos do I recognise any limit to myself’ (1989/1996, 
p.168). As such, human identity (what we might experience as our individual 
consciousness) acts in a kind of auxiliary role, ‘authorised to speak in the first 
person’ (Ibid., p.160) while in fact, a joining point and ‘terminal’ for affects.4 
Psychoanalytic practices, including free association, can then be seen as strategies 
for relaying themes or refrains in new contexts in order to produce ‘new ways to 
speak and to see things’ (Ibid., p.168). 
In this light, languages often used in relation to psychic processes, of ‘outside’ and 
‘inside’ is not apt. Yet, in the foregoing discussion it has been useful to draw upon 
Winnicott’s account of the me-but-not-me ‘transitional object’ – the soft, grubby 
comforter that enables the child to separate from her parent by introducing an 
entity that exists part of the way between her ‘inner’ life and the ‘outside’. This is 
due specifically to the contribution made by Winnicott regarding the particular 
significance of an object’s affordances in relation to the psychic processes in which 
they figure, or rather, that they materialise and mediate. As is observed in Chapter 
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6, such ‘transitional’ practices are eminently transferable, and continue throughout 
adulthood - for example when absorbed in the plot of a novel (Winnicott, 
1971/2005, p.18). In reflecting now upon my own engagements with site writing, I 
conceive of this practice as, itself, a ‘transitional’ process; a transporting practice 
through which sensual experiences and encounters can be ‘externalised’ to enable 
one to observe them.   
I follow Rendell in employing an inclusive definition regarding what might 
constitute the ‘site’ in site writing. Like her, I take myself as the writer, and the 
writing I enact, as sites in themselves. Further to this, her main foci are works of 
art, architectural objects, and objects that imply some kind of treatment of space; 
however, Rendell writes a variety of sites, both physical and imaginary, and 
including reminiscences. In one example, she site writes an exhibition that is yet 
to take place: 
The artworks were not yet in existence. In their place I was sent a map and 
photographs of the small fishing village in which the artworks were to be installed 
as well as the artists’ written statements and visual proposals. I used my encounter 
with these representations to create a fiction, structured as a walk through the sites 
in which the artists intended to locate their projects. […] I invented a subject, a 
mermaid maybe, half-woman – half-fish, who arrives in a town she does not know 
and in passing through finds that it feels familiar yet at the same time strange – 
uncanny perhaps (2010, p.186).  
That said, the sites of this thesis differ somewhat from Rendell’s. Firstly, in terms 
of external foci alone the notion of a site is perhaps more broadly defined here. 
This I think is due not to any essential element of Rendell’s, or my, conception of 
site-writing: rather, it arises from a difference in focus. Where Rendell writes 
specifically about art and spatiality, my focus, beginning though it does with 
Landy’s Break Down, spirals out from the art work to incorporate an array of other 
objects; artefacts; moments. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, this 
broad focus connects with the development in British cultural studies (by which I 
mean cultural studies in the broader sense, taking into account its earliest 
iterations as discussed earlier in this section) of the study of everyday life; the 
turning of an anthropological lens upon quotidian practices with which its 
proponents were familiar (During, 1993). To be absolutely clear, it is because I work 
in cultural studies that I explore Break Down from a perspective that begins with a 
focus on the material outputs and processes of the work (and not its art historical 





of physical sites where Landy’s work used to stand, enabling me to consider the 
space and the light there, but also in some sense to ‘visit’ the work itself. Similarly, 
I have ‘visited’ aspects of Break Down when site writing works by artists other than 
Landy, a quivering pile of dust and an uprooted plant on sheets of white, A4 paper 
on my desk, online videos, and photographic images from Break Down. Other site 
writings have been narrative in shape, describing not images or tableaux but 
encounters or events that took place over a short period of time, such as my visit 
to 499 Oxford Street, or (below) a memory of my son’s explorations with found 
objects in the park. 
In this thesis, the example from A Thousand Plateaus of the ‘book machine’ has 
inspired me to ask, in relation to Break Down:  
what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not 
transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and 
metamorphosed (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/2013, p.2).  
To ask such questions is (in the terms used by O’Sullivan, 2002) to work 
heuristically rather than hermeneutically. It is to consider a cultural artefact (such 
as an art work, yes, but also, such as a pile of dust gathered on a sheet of paper) in 
terms not of layers of representation or ‘meaning’, but of relation, composition and 
function. As in the current thesis, the perspective offered by O’Sullivan (2006) is 
not confined to objects such as art works, or artistic practices such as Landy’s. He 
explores the significance of practices through which human beings can reach out 
from the constructed and isolating formation of their subjectivity in order to 
experience their membership of and absolute conjoinment with a universe that 
exceeds them. He lists as examples art, meditation, and sado-masochistic play; I 
would add a variety of generative and connecting activities that I have undertaken 
during and alongside this project: washing up, running, marking essays, breast 
feeding my infant son, reading theory, breaking stuff. Site writing.  
Such transformative – in Winnicottian terms, ‘transitional’ – activities have helped 
me to interrupt the flow of my own analysis of Break Down in order, as O’Sullivan 
suggests, to ‘switch registers’ (2002, p.89). In this sense, Rendell’s site writing, 
which includes close description, but also dream, fiction, and reminiscence, that 
‘works’ on a broader spectrum than mine. Any insight reached through the site 
writing developed in this thesis hinges upon an encounter with the concrete: the 





about the particle: about different varieties and sizes of particles and their 
significance in philosophical terms. Visiting the Duveen Gallery at Tate Britain, 
where Landy’s Semi-detached (2004) once stood, provides a more vital sense of its 
scale, and the politics of this work in which a scale model of Landy’s childhood 
home in its entirety fits easily within – is enveloped, or indeed, housed by – this 
canonical space. Playing-writing-replaying-writing online video of Landy’s 
operatives taking apart his stuff (Artangel, 2015) enables me to take into account 
the thousands of small movements and actions – twistings, scrapings, bendings, 
tearings – of which Break Down is composed. Finally, in this chapter, site writing a 
weed from the back of my house allows me to think through the life and power of 
Landy’s series, Nourishment, as I encounter the springy determination of roots, and 
more than that, the beauty of the plant as an entire structure – not the beauty of 
its appearance, but of its workings. In writing, I begin to question the metaphors 
that are often brought to bear in relation to the plant in which the roots serve the 
stalks; the stalks serve the leaves. I begin to be able to countenance – to hold in my 
head – a conception of the plant as an entire thing – not catalogued and segmented 
into components, but a working, a joining, a becoming.  
Similarly, in considering Break Down through the lens of cultural studies - as, in 
the words of Deleuze and Guattari, a ‘working of matters’ (1987/2013, p.2) - it 
becomes clear that the present text, and I as its author, join ourselves into this 
‘working’. Site writing seeds throughout this thesis an acknowledgement of this 
important moment of implication: it is impossible to write about an assemblage 
from the outside. Through the act of writing, the writer and text join this knot of 
currents and affect(s). From the moment I begin writing this thesis, and you begin 
reading – we become part of the assemblage that is Break Down. 
7.3 Assemblage(s) and art criticism 
This section presents a discussion of how the application of Deleuzo-Guattarian 
assemblage theory enacted in the previous chapters might speak to art criticism 
more broadly. This is framed by an exploration of the concept of assemblage in 
contemporary art, which is applicable at various points in this thesis. Rather than 
attempting an inclusive review of such broad fields this section focuses on the work 
of authors already cited in this thesis – for example, in relation to assemblage 





Simon O’Sullivan, with the addition of a small number of others including Stephen 
Zepke and Kathleen Stewart - in order to provide an indicative discussion. 
The foregoing chapters have prioritised material practices, products, or outputs 
that accrue around Break Down as a way of exploring the work without always and 
necessarily giving precedence to the fact that it is a work of art rather than another 
kind of thing. My decision to take this approach in the current thesis echoes 
Deleuze and Guattari’s approach, for example in relation to their work on Kafka 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1975/1986) or Bacon (Deleuze, 1981/2017) in that I treat 
mediality (that is, the capacity to mediate) is as a quality that is thoroughly 
immanent – which is to suggest that mediality is absolutely ingrained in and 
through every part of the universe. Before moving on to examine through this lens 
the importance of material output and process in Break Down, it is worthwhile to 
consider O’Sullivan’s analysis of specific ways in which art (and particularly 
contemporary art) acts, that makes it different from other kinds of thing. This is 
important, since in relation to my postulation that mediality is immanent in the 
universe, one might sensibly ask to what this mediality pertains. Although the 
foregoing chapters have not focused on this question, Break Down, as an art work, 
is generative of potentialities that would not be present if it were a house clearance 
or a recycling plant in operation. O’Sullivan (2009) relates these potentialities in 
terms of a kind of discursive hiccup: a stoppage in which freedom can arise, for 
something other than the dominant narrative to emerge. This might sound useful 
(if breaking apart dominant regimes of communication is a thing you want to do) 
but such caesuras cannot occupy a space of utility in any straightforward way, since 
they work specifically through a break in the stratifications through which 
communication becomes possible.  
Art can be imagined ‘as an event that interrupts knowledge – that breaks 
information. In fact, art is one of the very few things we have left that is able to 
creatively make this break’ (O’Sullivan, 2009, p.250). O’Sullivan’s account of the 
break that is produced specifically by art includes instances from contemporary art 
to which I will return later in this section. In relation to Break Down in particular, 
however, to think of that hiccup or stoppage in the usual progress of logic or sense 
is to recall the many aspects of the work that are in some sense excessive, including 
the outright scale of the material purge exercised by Landy, but also, the operation 





completism of the Inventory (Landy, 2001a; 2001b). In this sense, the work occupies 
– and inflates - a bureaucratic logic which, as Ben Kafka suggests, permeates 
everyday life, and embodies state power, in ‘the modern era’ (2012, p.9) so densely 
scaffolded is it by ‘paperwork’. It is no contradiction to observe that the operation 
of the principles set out in the manual for Break Down; the manic detail of the 
inventorying of the objects destroyed, is entirely superfluous to the process. 
Indeed, central to Harriet Hawkins’ analysis is the statement5 that in this work, 
‘excess, and its glorious expenditure in an act that is itself excessive, offers us a 
critique of the capitalist commodity’ (Hawkins, 2010, p.20). Break Down therefore:  
offers us the move from a rational, utility-based, knowing of the world in which 
there is nothing that cannot be made to make sense, to a worldview in which there 
is an excess of meaning and, moreover, an affirmation of that which exceeds 
meaning (Ibid.). 
The remainder of this section evaluates the significance of the deployment of 
assemblage theory over the previous chapters, while keeping in view this special 
capacity of art for wriggling free of knowledge – of the straightforward, or the linear 
– into a space that is less easily named and in which currents can meet and react 
in new ways. Manuel DeLanda suggests that the assemblage ‘must […] account for 
the synthesis of the properties of a whole not reducible to its parts’, even though 
‘the parts of an assemblage do not form a seamless whole’ (DeLanda, 2006, p.4; 
emphasis reproduced). As might be inferred from the intervention regarding site 
writing and cultural studies in Section 7.2, in responding to Break Down as an 
assemblage, the work is examined specifically in terms of its outputs and processes. 
Break Down is an art work that comprises (among other things) a set of procedures 
in which complete objects belonging to Landy are merely taken apart, sorted, and 
shredded; a negligible amount of waste (what’s another few tonnes?) sent to land-
fill.  
The attention given to the work as a set of material processes with physical 
outcomes that extend beyond the fortnight long period of Break Down and beyond 
the bounds of the art work’s account of itself, is therefore a fundamental element 
of the contribution made by this thesis and the originality of its commentary on 
Break Down. In particular, I argue, to focus on material flows in this way, is not to 
                                                     





minimise the importance of Break Down as art, but rather, enables the 
construction of a more deeply profound account of the life of this work. For the 
artist Andrea Eckersley, the material is a surface or locality – a specificity - that 
‘constitut[es] an assemblage of affects in an event’ (Eckersley, 2017, p.163). This 
applies as much to the accidental, inconsequential gubbins that lies around 
wherever we look – the bits of stuff that are so pervasive as to be invisible - as to 
the material that is made to speak via the scientific encounters deployed by Chris 
Salter, or the ‘physical aspects’ of an art work – which may include ‘clay, screen, 
canvas, board or wall, gesso, pencil, pigment, fluids or liquids’ (Ibid.) as much as 
the belongings, conveyor belts, yellow trays and so on that were mobilised by 
Landy. As Salter suggests, it is the unknowability of matter that produces the 
‘accidents, failures, misunderstood situations, resource limitations, and misused 
techniques [that] are essential elements of art in the making’ (2015, pp.14-15). 
Working with matter therefore forces open a chink, a schism in artistic 
intentionality which produces the potentialities that are specific to art – as 
O’Sullivan comments, in utilising the aleatory, ‘that which goes beyond conscious 
control’ (2009, p.255), it is possible to short circuit the well-worn paths by which 
we otherwise tend to produce ‘’just-more-of-the-same’ (Ibid.). The above examples 
from Salter (2015) and Eckersley (2017) also demonstrate that matter does not act 
alone. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Deleuzian concept of affect has been 
crucial to my argument that the properties of an object or body are not innate, but 
relational in nature. As Eckersley suggests, art works ‘generate encounters’ but also 
work through encounters between materials and ‘intensive elements such as the 
artist’s intentions and desires’ (Ibid., p.163) – not to mention the artist’s mediation 
of paint with surface; of clay with hand, of hand with pliers, hacksaw, lump 
hammer.  
To explore the importance of affect, I expand my use of the term assemblage here 
to encompass the use and significance of the term in relation to assemblage art. 
The assemblage in the sense of an arrangement, or gathering of things while not 
explicitly discussed, does nonetheless appear at various points through this thesis. 
As well as providing a new lens through which to view Break Down itself, 
assemblage, as it arises in contemporary art, provides an opportunity to situate this 
discussion in a broader context. Anna Dezeuze’s assertion of ‘the value of 
conceiving assemblage as a model of engagement with the world rather than as a 





assemblage presented itself as the privileged expression of a new consumer subject 
whose very identity was defined through an increasingly accelerated cycle of 
acquisition and disposal of objects. While the concrete nature of assemblage 
allowed it to underscore the new dominance of the commodity, it was its emphasis 
on process that suggested the ways in which subjects are formed through this 
changing set of relations. Through suggestions of transformation, loss, or 
reinvention, assemblage effected a temporalization of the object that articulated 
new forms of late-capitalist subjectivity (Ibid., p.32). 
Assemblage art emerges in the early years of the twentieth century, notably in the 
work of Picasso as well as Schwitters, whose Picture of Spatial Growths (1920 and 
1939) is site-written on pages 131-2 of this thesis (see also Fuller, 2007, pp.1-2) and 
came to prominence in the 1950s and ‘60s. The 1961 exhibition The Art of 
Assemblage, curated by William Seitz at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, 
is identified in some accounts as the point at which assemblage art became widely 
recognised (Seitz, 1961; see also Kelly, 2008) and, Dezeuze suggests, might ‘mark’ 
its ‘simultaneous culmination and demise’ (2008b, p.31). Seitz himself diagnoses 
assemblage art as ‘primarily assembled’ of ‘constituent elements [that] are 
preformed natural or manufactured materials […] not intended as art materials’ 
(1961, p.6; emphasis reproduced). Following Seitz, the art historian Julia Kelly 
defines that assemblage art produces: 
art galleries full of obsolete consumer goods, cobbled-together contraptions, 
ripped and squashed materials, configurations of rusty scrap, and awkward 
proppings of everyday things. All of these share an aversion to preciousness and to 
certain notions of artisanal skill and aesthetic effect. They also trouble the category 
of art, through materials, execution, and presentation (2008, p.24). 
In its emphasis on found and as Kelly (2008) says, ‘non-art’ objects, assemblage art 
pivots on questions of the production, elision, or nullification of context in similar 
ways to readymade art. Both forms are, as Stephen Zepke says in relation to the 
readymade, ‘constructed by the detachment of a material object from the seeming 
self-evidence of its form, function and meaning, allowing it to congeal a singular 
and immediate assemblage of sensory affects’ (2008, p.34).6 Keeping in mind 
Dezeuze’s vision of assemblage art as process rather than ‘formal category,’ it is the 
cobblings, the rippings, the squashings, and the proppings that matter here, since 
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what is produced by assemblage art is a range of encounters between previously 
unrelated ‘non-art’ materials.  
As Fuller suggests, such encounters produce new ‘combinatorial potentials’ (2007, 
p.14). Materials and objects, put together, accrue new energies and significances – 
are able to act in new ways - in relation to one another. In a similar vein (although 
via a theoretical construction that differs both from Fuller, and this thesis), Seitz 
refers to this productive practice of placing previously unrelated objects in 
proximity to one another in art, via the concept of aura from Walter Benjamin’s 
essay, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1955/1999).7 As 
Seitz remarks, ‘[p]hysical materials and their auras are transmuted into a new 
amalgam that both transcends and includes its parts (1961, p.83; see Kelly, 2008, 
p.27). The implication here is that a certain energy accrues to encounters between 
these truncated scraps of culture at a moment when they are entirely divorced from 
any ‘originary’ source and even cut off from their own previous ‘wholeness’. This 
moment affirms the multiplicity of artefacts, which are shown not only to have a 
variety of originary points or contexts, but also, in concert with the contexts in 
which they are newly conjoined, to produce new points of origination. As Guattari 
suggests (in relation to Duchamp’s readymades) such works play with and ‘trigger 
[…] a constellation of referential universes’ (1989/1996, p.164). Such 
multidimensional encounters and resonances can be observed in any number of 
examples discussed in the preceding chapters. In a ‘non-art’ example that 
nevertheless occupies similar territory, Jane Bennett memorably turns to a 
moment in which she was drawn into contemplation by an accumulation of 
miscellaneous objects, including a dead rat, ‘in the storm drain to the Chesapeake 
Bay in front of Sam’s Bagels on Cold Spring Lane in Baltimore’ (2010, p.4; see also 
page 35 of this thesis). As she says: 
When the materiality of the glove, the rat, the pollen, the bottle cap, and the stick 
started to shimmer and spark, it was in part because of the contingent tableau that 
they formed with one another, with the street, with the weather that morning, with 
me. For had the sun not glinted on the black glove, I might not have seen the rat; 
had the rat not been there, I might not have noted the bottle cap, and so on (Ibid., 
p.5). 
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In Homage to New York (1960, see discussion in pages 47-8), Jean Tinguely’s accrual 
of things from the dump – bike and pram wheels; a weather balloon; a piano; paper; 
a fire extinguisher – ‘works’ together in that their arrangement and relationality is 
– at least to some extent - mechanical. Further to this, as photographs of Homage 
to New York, Landy’s works for his show H2NY demonstrate, the same moment of 
conversation and transformation is present here. The enormous balloon bequeaths 
an aerial quality to the piano; the spokes of the bike wheels lend the mass of the 
entire thing a spindly precarity. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 5, pages 166-7, 
Break Down itself can be reframed as an assemblage work in which Landy’s stuff is 
removed from the context of his home and recombined in new ways, enabling his 
belongings to converse with or reveal one another in unanticipated ways. As 
discussed there, this works in relation to Landy’s Break Down Inventory (2001b), in 
which entries in a spreadsheet (and later, a book), spin a different significance off 
their new proximities.  
These assemblages show affect working. Specifically, they show affects that accrue 
to a particular object – a bicycle wheel, a dead rat, a sheepskin coat – changing as 
it is combined with or placed against new objects. In thinking this in terms of the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian assemblage, the example from Bennett (2010) is helpful since 
it captures the aleatory character of the assemblage; the manner in which 
agglomerations of objects can form and re-form in ways that receive human 
influence by chance, if at all. As O’Sullivan (2008, p.253) observes, ‘the object 
isolated from a given series works as a trigger point or a hatch-way into different 
fields of significant’. Here, arise some broader connections with Chapters 4 and 5, 
on Landy’s manual and the Break Down Inventory (2001b). One might look to Wun-
Ting Hsu and Wen-Shu Lai (2013) on database art, which, they suggest, draws upon 
the modalities of readymade and assemblage art by bringing about encounters in 
which one (digital) object is brought into contact with another (although largely 
dispensing with the moment in which an artist might choose and bring about these 
encounters in favour of chance selections via an algorithm, or interventions by the 
audience). To extend this logic, I would suggest that the Fluxus score, in putting 
into play series’ of movements or actions through ‘chance and choice’ (Dezeuze, 
2002, p.82; see Chapter 4, page 112-13) - so that in effect, one move or act is 
juxtaposed randomly with another, or with a particular object, for example - might 
also be seen as deployments of assemblage. Here again, it is possible to see 





p.255), this needle-jump between relationalities and beyond information. These 
juxtapositions may include (though are not limited to) a flickering between 
different kinds of context. This flickering-between takes in categories of art and 
‘non-art’; a distinction that has not been significant in the constitution of my 
argument in the foregoing chapters. To expand upon the implications of this 
decision in particular, it is productive to look to Zepke’s interrogation of the 
Duchampian readymade via Deleuze and Guattari. As he suggests, the readymade, 
which for Duchamp is a conceptual entity, is reconstituted, in Deleuzo-Guattarian 
thought, to centralise, instead, affect. Relationalities produced by the readymade 
are related via a range of forces, not (only) subjectivity and are ‘in constant contact 
with a multiplicity of possible futures […] and so produces conformity or resistance 
to the powers controlling the present’ (2008, p.35). As this might suggest, to 
consider art in terms of affect is also to instigate a move from imagining encounters 
and juxtapositions between similar kinds of thing (objects), to considering how 
different kinds of thing might encounter one another.  
I constitute ‘similarity’ and ‘difference’ here in a similar way to the earlier 
investigation of series and line in Chapter 5 (pages 133-4). Here, I explore how a 
range of inputs that arise from different sources and take different forms – ‘[a] bell 
chimes, someone walking by outside says “pardon?”, there is a flash of light as an 
opening window reflects the sun and the noise of a car as it passes, a fly lands on 
my arm’ - may nevertheless form a single series of events. This possibility arises, I 
argue, because they become manifest in relation to a single surface; here ‘the 
sensory environment’ of the person who experiences them. In relation to the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the impulses, encounters, and connections that 
might possibly form a series of imprints (so to speak) on a person, the 
anthropologist Kathleen Stewart explores an ‘ordinary affects [which] are a kind of 
contact zone where the overdeterminations of circulations, events, conditions, 
technologies, and flows of power literally take place’ (2007, p.3). Stewart’s account 
of affect, too, is written as a collection of tableaus, the details of which are 
impressed upon Stewart in the course of her daily encounters with and within and 
as part of ‘the ordinary’: ‘a world of affinities and impacts that take place in the 
moves of intensity across things that seem solid and real’ (2007, p.127). In the 
scenarios enacted here, Stewart records in minute detail a range of different kinds 
of thing, that operate at different strengths, levels of significance and temporality: 





lore, parking, entering and leaving familiar and unfamiliar buildings, sitting in 
various spaces that abut various other spaces more or less narrowly, and with more 
or less intensity. In so doing, she creates a fragmentary account of a psyche that is 
profoundly shaped through these affects. Moreover, she communicates something 
of the multidimensional complexities and multiplicities of the Deleuzo-Guattarian 
assemblage. 
7.4 Afterword: on what is/n’t here 
I end by extending into this afterword, the furthest edge of my thesis, a reflection 
on preoccupations and concerns that have shaped my thought. While not forming 
part of the logic or narrative of this thesis, they do underpin it. As such, they form 
part of an account of my encounter with Break Down, and an explanation – at least 
in part – of why it is such a significant work of art.  
Reminiscence: Material engagement at the ‘horsey park’, Alexandra Gardens, 
Cambridge, summer 2015. In Alexandra Gardens, as well as plane trees, grass, the best 
and highest swings in town, a good slide, and the ‘horse’ that earns the park its name 
for my son and his friends (long, with seats, a kind of horizontal see-saw with a sinister, 
nostril-flared horse head) there is also a climbing frame with platforms. To one side of 
this climbing frame, there is a peculiar tray with two kinds of metal mesh, one punctured 
by round holes, one by long, thin slots. One day, when my son is about three he begins 
to collect handfuls of daisies, twigs, pigeon feathers, leaves and the shards of plane-tree 
bark that lie on the ground. We carry these over to the tray. At first, we just gather more 
and more stuff, but then my son begins to play with his collection. He begins to sort; to 
think, with his fingers, about the daisies, the sticks, the bark, and the slots in the tray. He 
posts things through, but also experiments with leaving objects sticking out of the holes. 
He works intently for a long time, and when he turns to something else, he leaves behind 
a diorama of daisies, feathers and twigs with their stalks (or quills) posted through the 
round holes; plane-tree bark and leaves posted jaggedly partway through the long, thin 
slots. 
I do not mean to say that my son meant to make a diorama; certainly, the question 
of what precisely he ‘meant to do’ would have been entirely without interest to him 
at the time. Nevertheless, his play happened on that occasion to leave behind a 





trays. I wish now that the above reminiscence could have been a direct observation. 
I wish I had at least taken a photograph (although I am, of course, also aware that 
in doing so I would have corrupted the immediacy and simplicity of this process, 
which was his, not mine). It was only recently, when I described this thesis to a 
new friend, an artist, as we stood together in the ‘horsey park’ watching our 
children, that I understood in retrospect the significance of that moment of 
observing as my son thought with objects. Despite my earlier reading of the work 
on material engagement cited in this text; despite a period as an education worker 
assisting young people to make art at the Kettles Yard gallery in Cambridge, it was 
at the park that I gained an intuitive insight into the potentiality that resides in 
things, and especially in fragments. There is a creative power that resides in matter. 
Thought itself can reside in the work of handling and sorting demonstrated by my 
child. It is this that underpins my thesis. 
In my very earliest writings on Break Down, I was drawn especially by the scope 
and scale of the rage that I read into Landy’s destructive act and, as I imagined, his 
rejection and betrayal of domestic and family obligations through this work.8 Since 
then I have journeyed in my reading via social scientific consumption studies to 
texts that take into account conceptions of becoming and affect – of vibrant matter 
and of a dynamic personhood that is formed and shaped through material 
engagement. As such, the focus of my investigations has shifted, from my earliest 
excursions into whether Break Down could be seen as a ‘political’ work, via 
examination of the ways in which the work might express, contain within it, and 
perhaps counter commodity fetishism.  
The thesis I now conclude comprises a subtler examination of the work, the themes 
it provokes, and the ways in which these themes are animated in or by Break Down.  
In parallel, I have followed my child through his first years of life. In tandem with 
him, I have woken again to the Life that occupies a place in relation to the living 
that the Creator might occupy in relation to creation (Thacker, 2010, p.135). At the 
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park, we spent hours among the vibrant becomings of leaves, nuts, seed husks, 
twigs, webs. Further (lest this account begins to feel too pastoral), I should 
acknowledge the presence of other interesting items that were, for my son’s own 
good, shuffled out of sight – the cigarette dimps; the shards of broken glass; the 
bottle top; ring pull; abandoned bolus of chewing gum. These shifting attachments 
and intellectual roamings do not often surface in the preceding discussions, but 
the new respect I found for the ‘thisness’ of small and fragmented things – things 
that are perhaps of no great importance, that might be found on the ground - fed 
directly into my regard, in this discussion, for the beauty and potentiality of the 
fragments that Landy produced. They also shape the debates that, as I have 
discussed, underlie much of this text, between, on one hand, theorisations of 
materiality that centralise consumption and commodity and on the other, 
standpoints that are more profoundly informed by becoming or multiplicity. 
A final strand of thought and feeling that lies below the surface of this text while 
still in some sense propelling it has to do with emotional and physical survival. In 
Nourishment, the series of works that includes Creeping Buttercup (Landy, 2002a; 
Figure 29), Landy depicts botanical specimens. Specifically, he draws weeds that 
must subsist in the meanest of soil, pushing their way through concrete and 
between paving slabs and occupying the tops of walls in an endeavour to find the 
light. The series feels like a response to and continuation of Landy’s immediately 
previous work, both reproducing Break Down and turning the earlier work inside 
out. This can be seen firstly in Landy’s turn from a complex, years-long project to 
a comparatively simple subject. His use of pen or pencil and paper, and the 
technique of etching, must also be seen as an assertion, or claiming, of traditional 
art skills. Landy’s works reproduce the weeds – and sometimes the tins or bottles 
in which he stands them – in a concerted enumeration of each tiny detail, 
reiterating the inventorying spirit of Break Down. There, as in Break Down, it is 
possible to locate an energy that has to do with auditing; with documenting. 
Finally, just as ‘consumerism as a way of life’ (to appropriate the title of the 1998 
text by Steven Miles cited by Landy; see Chapter 1, pages 21-2) might be said to offer 
human beings a very poor, thin cultural soil, Nourishment elicits a vision of an 
urban botanical life that seems to receive very little in the way of the things that 
are needed to live. Yet the plants depicted by Landy evidently need very little, and 





flower, and human beings will also do what they must – literally, will make a life 
for themselves – with the poorest and thinnest of materials. 
Nevertheless, these plants have roots – Life cannot be separated from the living, 
which is to say that we living beings need – as Landy says – nourishment. Further, 
the living do not do their living independently, but are possessed of affects that 
can only work relationally, as can be seen from the roots that tangle energetically, 
miraculously, whitely, through gritted concrete and compacted earth for – as 
Landy says – nourishment. If the sentences above, on life that lives itself and 
human beings who need little to survive and to create have a rackety, jumpy feel – 
if in fact, they feel a little queasy - that is because I write on the afternoon of the 
24th of October 2016. Today, the tentative homes, the improvised shops and eating 
places of the ‘jungle,’ the refugee camp at Calais, are to be dismantled and 
destroyed; as the homes and hospitals of Aleppo are bombed to fragments and 
dust. I write with dread in my heart. In Calais, the bulldozers wait. Children are 
counted, but these precious human fragments, these beads who carry who knows 
what in their pockets, will not all stay on their thread. Some will be lost. On days 
like this, Break Down appears anew. In the plate-glass window, we display tonne-
bags of shattered brick and bone. The operatives in their work bays, labouring on 
with pliers and hammers, are just doing their jobs. They cut up passports; they 
shred clothes and family photographs. The conveyor belt carries us from one place 
to another but never offers safe harbour. The list on the wall; the list on the wall; 
the list on the wall. Michael Landy, walking wraithlike in his boiler suit the chilly 
morning after Break Down ends (The Man Who Destroyed Everything, 2002; see 
Figure 29) cannot, even in this most vulnerable moment, begin to inhabit the 
precarity of the migrant who has been counted, who must leave behind his 
belongings without counting them, who combs his hair and stands in line to board 
a coach. He does, though, enact the fragility of a person, living in a body. The 
fragility of being a person, living in a body.  
I have written almost nothing about migration, bombings and brick-dust in this 
thesis, nor about the small bundles of belongings – photograph; phone and 
charger; t-shirt, coins - that are carried onto boats or along motorway 
embankments. I have not written about the daily reality that has pervaded (and 
sometimes impeded) my writing of this text, of occupying and working within 





increasingly hostile ways. I have not written about the desk in my grandparents’ 
house, which one day in 2014 was found to contain, among a great many other 
things, a tennis ball and a number of small, useful tools, maybe 70 years old, 
belonging to my great grandfather (he put them in there one day and closed the 
drawer, and never got them back out again). I have not written about ship-
breaking, mudlarking, landfill picking or any number of other desperate practices 
of retrieval and reclamation that are referenced in the form of Landy’s Break Down. 
Nevertheless, these attractions, terrors, impulses, attachments, encroachments, lie 
somewhere in this text, and propel it. 
Observation: at home (October 2016). My son is four. He places Lego figures on the 
windowsill, in groupings that suggest encounters or confrontations. He suspends an old 
enamel kettle on a piece of string that is tied to the fence and slides it from one end of 
the garden to the other by its handle. He climbs onto my knee, placing himself 
(inadvertently, but exactly; precisely) between me and this work. I close my laptop. He 
wriggles. He picks up cutlery from the table, and as I watch, arranges it from end to end 
in a long line: knife knife knife fork fork fork spoon spoon spoon.  
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